

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1346539-0

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2 - original 1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - yellow 1 - Sect tick
1 - Mr. Boardman 1 - Mr. McIrdle

The Attorney General

August 17, 1956

Director, FBI

OPERATION ALERT-- 1956

1686

RECORDED - 28 Attached are the original and two copies of the FBI Final Evaluation Report of Operation Alert - 1956 for inclusion in the over-all Department of Justice report to the Office of Defense Mobilization.

You will note that the out-of-pocket expenses total \$55,024.15. It is believed that this figure could have been reduced considerably by a shorter exercise which would also have permitted us to make a thorough test of our communications facilities.


Enclosures (3)

1 - Assistant Attorney General (with enclosure)
William F. Tompkins

JEM:amj/men
(3)

(NOTE: This Final Evaluation Report of Operation Alert - 1956 is being submitted to the Attorney General for inclusion in the over-all Department of Justice report to ODM per oral request from John Airhart, relocation officer of the Department.)

Aug 17 1956
RECEIVED
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE



Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

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DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 06-19-2012

August 17, 1956

FBI FINAL EVALUATION REPORT
OPERATION ALERT - 1956

Upon sounding of the alert in Washington on the morning of July 20, all Bureau employees scheduled for actual relocation were notified and accounted for within a period of 10 minutes. Thereafter, those scheduled to go to the relocation site for the exercise departed, the bus leaving Justice Building 11 minutes after the alert sounded and arriving at our relocation site at 12:15 p.m. EDT. Bureau officials in charge of the exercise arrived at the relocation site 12:07 p.m. EDT. The Department of Justice and the [redacted] b7E [redacted] were notified that the FBI was operational at 12:11 p.m., less than an hour after the alert was sounded.

During the exercise we took the opportunity to carefully examine our over-all emergency procedures and to view our entire operations from a critical standpoint to bring about improvement where necessary. Insofar as this Bureau is concerned, our operations ran smoothly and with dispatch. Our personnel approached the entire exercise with a sense of urgency and thoughtfulness and exhibited a fine spirit throughout.

A series of 49 problems designed, insofar as possible, to simulate actual emergency conditions, was prepared in advance and worked during the exercise. Although the FBI refrained from transmitting security information in carrying out these problems, we did have an opportunity to make a very thorough check of our communications system. This check of our communications system included the use of telephone, teletype, microwave, and radio installations and included contacts with Bureau field offices at headquarters cities and a number of offices at their emergency relocation sites. In addition thereto, communications between field offices and from field relocation sites to field offices were required. The problems also required contact with outside agencies. The communications system proved to be outstanding and the communications personnel responded favorably at all times.

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
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Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

J.E. McArdle:awj;plp;
(9)
3 copies 2 this blind
memo made available
to Bennett w/letter 8/28/56 per his request
Justice 8/28/56 per his request
cc 7 Mr. Sizis/Jem.

Cover memo to Attorney General re: OPERATION
ALERT - 1956 JEM:awj;plp 8/17/56
JEM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

In addition to the previously prepared problems, we received 45 problems from outside agencies during the course of the exercise. This is more than twice as many as were handled during Operation Alert - 1955. The outside problems covered a wide range of activities, most of which would be encountered in an actual emergency. All problems were resolved promptly and where necessary contacts were made with other agencies and replies submitted to the original agency.

Bureau Liaison Representatives accompanied critical agencies to their relocation sites and were able to provide valuable services, both to the FBI and to the agency which they accompanied. The improved interagency communications system during Operation Alert - 1956, alleviated much of the difficulty we had in contacting our Liaison Agents during Operation Alert - 1955. During the early stages of Operation Alert - 1956, some delays were experienced in receipt of messages from outside agencies over the interagency communications system.

Insofar as the FBI is concerned, it is believed that we could have adequately tested our emergency communications system and our essential wartime functions in 3 days, and thus have reduced the over-all cost to this Bureau of Operation Alert - 1956.

Out-of-Pocket Expenses

The estimated out-of-pocket cost of Operation Alert - 1956, to the FBI totaled \$55,024.15. Of this figure \$47,317.03 was for salaries, \$4,011.41 was for travel, and per diem and actual communications costs amounted to \$2,029.41. The balance included rents and utilities \$4.64, supplies \$192.00, \$1,833.10 for other contractual services and \$105.96 for transportation of things.

The FBI has no unresolved problems growing out of our experience under the emergency financial plan as promulgated for Operation Alert - 1956.

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. MOHR

DATE: August 10, 1956

FROM : N. P. CALLAHAN *mc*

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1956 -- COST

Buplan Emergency Headquarters For S.O.G.

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman ☒
 Belmont ☒
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

In a memorandum dated July 23, 1956, to Mr. Belmont, Mr. Roach, Liaison Section, advised that the Office of Defense Mobilization required agencies participating in Operation Alert 1956 to furnish an estimate of "out of pocket costs" by August 31, 1956, to be included in the final evaluation report covering the Alert. There was attached a radiogram to all SACs (except Washington Field Office which was to be sent by teletype) requesting them to furnish actual or "best estimates" of such costs. This message was sent out after the start of the Alert.

In response to a verbal request from Special Agent McArdle, Liaison Section, this Division has tabulated the information furnished by the Field Divisions and has computed the costs covering Seat of Government personnel who participated on the basis of information furnished by Mr. McArdle. The total estimated cost was \$55,024.15 (\$47,317.63 for salaries and \$7,706.52 for other expenses). There is attached a tabulation showing these costs by objects of expenditure and by Field and Seat of Government separately.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this memorandum be referred to the Liaison Section for the purpose of furnishing the necessary figures to the Office of Defense Mobilization.

Enclosure

RECORDED - 28

66-17381-111

AUG 21 1956

WCJ:vlg

AUG 29 1956

ESTIMATED COST OF OPERATION ALERT 1956

	<u>Seat of Government</u>	<u>Field</u>	<u>Total</u>
Salaries	<u>\$11, 525. 47</u>	<u>\$35, 792. 16</u>	<u>\$47, 317. 63</u>
Other Expenses:			
Travel	1, 890. 60	2, 120. 81	4, 011. 41
Transportation of Things	--	105. 96	105. 96
Communication Services	1, 126. 65	902. 76	2, 029. 41
Rents and Utilities	--	94. 64	94. 64
Other Contractual Services	--	1, 283. 10	1, 283. 10
Supplies	<u>--</u>	<u>182. 00</u>	<u>182. 00</u>
Total Other Expenses	<u>\$ 3, 017. 25</u>	<u>\$ 4, 689. 27</u>	<u>\$ 7, 706. 52</u>
Total All Expenses	<u>\$14, 542. 72</u>	<u>\$40, 481. 43</u>	<u>\$55, 024. 15</u>

66-17391-1816
ENCLOSURE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

FROM : L. B. Nichols

SUBJECT:

DATE: 8/16/56

✓ C. P. Davidson

✓ H. K. Edwards

HL E ST

✓ Tolson

✓ Nichols

✓ Boardman

✓ Belmont

✓ Mason

✓ Parsons

✓ Rosen

✓ Tamm

✓ Nease

✓ Winterrowd

✓ Tele. Room

✓ Holloman

✓ Gandy

Fred Mullen stated the Attorney General wants to write a personal letter to all the Departmental personnel who participated in Operation Alert and he, therefore, asked for the names and addresses of Bureau personnel participating: (Ruplan) Emergency Headquarters For S.O.G.

I told Mullen that we operated on a rotating basis in order to give people experience; that this would involve a large amount of work as there were more than a hundred people involved and such a letter was not necessary as all of our personnel had been thanked; that if the Department wanted to do anything they could send over the one letter which would take care of everything. Mullen stated that if this was the way we preferred to have it handled this would be agreeable to him.

cc - Mr. Mohr

Mr. Belmont

LBN:fc (4)

701 XCH

RECORDED - 70

66-17381-1688

AUG 21 1956

58 AUG 21 1956

3. en

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

July 23, 1956

DIRECTOR, FBI

1689
EMERGENCY FINANCIAL SYSTEM
OPERATION ALERT 1956

Reference is made to a memorandum addressed to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies under date of July 10, 1956, by Willard S. Paul, Lieutenant General, United States Army (Retired), Assistant to the Director for Plans and Readiness, Office of Defense Mobilization, requesting that all agencies of the Executive branch of the Government test the effectiveness of a proposed emergency financial system during Operation Alert 1956.

In compliance with that request there are attached an original and two copies of a "Financial Schedule" for the Federal Bureau of Investigation prepared as of July 23, 1956, that is required to be submitted under the emergency financial system assumed to be in effect during Operation Alert 1956. It is my understanding that this schedule will be consolidated into an over-all schedule for the entire Department of Justice.

Enclosures (3)

CC: Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

Mr. E. A. Andretta
Administrative Assistant Attorney General (Enclosure)

WCJ:vlg
13

Cover memo to Mr. Tolson from J. P. Mohr re EMERGENCY FINANCIAL SYSTEM--DEFENSE PLANS--OPERATION ALERT 1956

WCJ:vlg 7-19-56

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

RECEIVED READING ROOM
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
JUL 20 10 03 AM '56

RECEIVED READING ROOM
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
JUL 20 10 25 AM '56

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-10-2003 BY 60322 UCBAW/BJS

FINANCIAL SCHEDULE

Agency Department of Justice Bureau Federal Bureau of InvestigationAPPROPRIATION OR FUND TITLE AND SYMBOL Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1967 (1570200)

For revolving and management funds only,
 indicate reporting basis used:
☒ Obligation ☒ Accrual ☐ Cash

Actual	Estimate
From 7/20/66 To 7/23/66 Inclusive	From 7/24/66 To 9/30/66 Inclusive

1. Amounts available at beginning of period .	\$92,236,952	\$91,406,628
2. Amounts received during the emergency ..	---	---
3. Total available	\$92,236,952	\$91,406,628
4. Amounts used (-)	830,324	xxx
5. Proposed use during period (-)	xxx	18,790,647
6. Amounts available end of period	\$91,406,628	\$72,615,981
7. Additional amount required	xxx	---

8. Usage by emergency function

Code	Function		
IV	Public Order and Internal Security	\$ 830,324	\$18,790,647
Total usage by function		\$ 830,324	\$18,790,647

Submitted 7/23/66
 (Authorized Officer) (Date)
 Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

ACTION BY BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

9. Approved for use

10. Amounts allocated xxx

Approved by _____

Date _____

SECOND PAGE CONTINUED

DOLLARS. LINE SEVEN IS ZERO. LINE EIGHT, CODE ROMAN NUMERAL
FOUR, FUNCTION PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY IS ONE
EIGHT SEVEN NINE NOUGHT SIX FOUR SEVEN DOLLARS.

HOOVER

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: July 19, 1956

FROM : J. P. MOHR

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY FINANCIAL SYSTEM
DEFENSE PLANS
OPERATION ALERT 1956

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mason	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

(to plan) Emergency Headquarters - For S.D.C.

Reference is made to the memorandum of Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman dated July 13, 1956, attaching, among other things, a copy of a memorandum from Willard S. Paul, Lieutenant General, United States Army (Retired), Assistant to the Director for Plans and Readiness, Office of Defense Mobilization, on the subject of testing the effectiveness of a proposed emergency financial system during Operation Alert 1956.

The memorandum requests that all agencies participating in Operation Alert 1956 test the proposed emergency financial system on the assumption that the system is in force and effect during Operation Alert 1956. The purpose of this is to make possible a practical evaluation of the system as a basis for development of a sound plan for legislative consideration. On the basis of that assumption, it instructs that: (a) All agencies take all necessary steps to apply the proposed emergency financial system during Operation Alert 1956; (b) Each agency make a suitable record of such actions taken during Operation Alert 1956 and of any unresolved problems encountered in the course of such actions; and (c) Each agency prepare a report of its evaluation of the proposed emergency financial system from its experience during Operation Alert 1956 and transmit this report as a separate attachment to its general report to the Office of Defense Mobilization on Operation Alert 1956.

Basic purposes of plan are: (1) To insure availability of funds to agencies for essential functions; (2) Provide authority for disregarding statutory restrictions on use of funds during emergencies; and (3) Provide practical basis for Treasury Department securing information needed for control of receipts, expenditures, and financing Government. In order to accomplish purposes one and three indicated above, agencies will be required to prepare and submit to the Budget Bureau a "Financial Schedule" as soon as possible after the declaration of an emergency and thereafter at the end of each month. The schedule will also serve the purpose of securing the approval of the Budget Bureau for the use of "pre-emergency funds" that are available, or the allocation of additional funds from the emergency appropriation available to the President if such funds are needed. The Bureau's present accounting procedures for use in connection with Defense Plans are based upon the

Enclosure *sent*

WCJ:vlg

9

92 OCT 11 1956

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18 AUG 24 1956
EX - 131
5

TOLSON

3/1/56

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

assumption that funds would be available in the event of an emergency. The proposed emergency financial system is designed to make sure that funds will be available.

To comply with the request of the Office of Defense Mobilization, it would be necessary for the Bureau to prepare a "Financial Schedule" as soon as possible after the start of Operation Alert 1956 and submit it to the Attorney General. To facilitate processing, this schedule has been drawn up and is attached together with a cover memorandum transmitting the original and two copies of same to the Attorney General with carbon copies to Mr. William P. Rogers, Deputy Attorney General, and Mr. S. A. Andretta, Administrative Assistant Attorney General. The schedule has been drawn up on the assumption that it will be prepared on Monday, July 23, 1956. A date has to be used since the figures are required to be in two parts; i. e., (1) from the start of the alert to the date the report is prepared; and (2) from the date of preparation of the report through the end of the current calendar quarter. The Director's signature is required on the schedule where indicated at lower left by penciled check mark and paper clip. The memorandum to the Attorney General is dated July 23, 1956, to correspond with the date of preparation of the schedule. It is felt that the memorandum should be held at the Bureau's relocation site during Operation Alert 1956 where it will be available in the event a request should be received for same during the alert. If no request is received, it will be delivered to the Department at the close of Operation Alert 1956.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. - It is recommended that the attached memorandum to the Attorney General transmitting the "Financial Schedule" be approved for use during Operation Alert 1956. The Director's signature is required on the "Financial Schedule" where indicated at lower left by penciled check mark and paper clip.

2. - If the above recommendation is approved, it is recommended that the original of the memorandum and its enclosures together with the carbon copies for Mr. William P. Rogers, Deputy Attorney General, and Mr. S. A. Andretta, Administrative Assistant Attorney General, be held at the relocation site for delivery if a request for same is received during Operation Alert 1956. If no request is received, the memorandum and the carbon copies will be delivered at the close of Operation Alert 1956.

*original destroyed
JPM/j
8/22/56*

(Recommendations - continued next page)

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

3. - It is recommended that the report on the evaluation of the proposed Emergency Financial System be prepared by the Administrative Division after Operation Alert 1956 has been completed and submitted for approval at that time.

J. P. Mohr

ADDENDUM: *W&J:vlgr* 7-19-56

Subsequent to writing the above, I received informal advice from the Accounts Branch of the Department of Justice to the effect that the Department intends to request during Operation Alert 1956 that it be furnished with the information set forth in the "Financial Schedule" that is attached to the memorandum to the Attorney General. It was indicated that the request would probably be made by teletype and that the reply would have to be furnished by the same medium. If that is done, the memorandum to the Attorney General would serve as the official confirmation of the information furnished by teletype.

There is attached for approval a teletype dated July 23, 1956, for the purpose of furnishing the information contained in the "Financial Schedule" in the event the request for same is received by teletype. The address will be inserted when the request is received.

*Original
destroyed
JPSH/7*

V. J. P. Mohr
OK.
R.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *aus*

DATE: August 20, 1956

FROM : R. R. ROACH *fw*SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - RELOCATION
OF THE DIRECTORBuplan Emergency Headquarters For S.O.R.

Remymemo 6-10-56 setting forth certain addresses and telephone numbers to be used in connection with relocation of Director under emergency conditions.

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mason	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

SAC, Washington Field Office has advised that the two "look outs" which may be called upon to assist in the relocation of Director are as follows: _____

b7E

_____ It is understood, of course, that these "look outs" will be called only as a last resort to facilitate the relocation of the Director under emergency conditions.

ACTION:

For information.

JEM:men
(8)

- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Holloman
- 1 - Mr. Hennrich
- 1 - Mr. Sizoo
- 1 - Section Tickler
- 1 - Mr. McArdle

RECORDED - 55

66-17381-1690

18 AUG 22 1956

187 -

MAILED

59 AUG 29 1956

66-17381-1691

CHANGED TO

64-4123-221-1270X

APR 18 1957

ms

2

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: July 18, 1956

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 In _____

SUBJECT:

BUPLANS Emergency H. [unclear] For S.O.C.
 OPERATION ALERT - 1956

Referral/Consult

Enclosed is



These documents have previously been furnished to the Bureau and are currently being used by the Laboratory in connection with their study of fallout patterns in connection with Operation Alert - 1956. On July 18, 1956, FCDA furnished additional copies of these documents. These copies will be retained in the Liaison Section.

ACTION:

For your information.

OHB:jlj/
 (6)

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. McArdle
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Bartlett

Enclosures

Enclosed
 for Mr. Bartlett
 Schmidt

RECORDED - 91

INDEXED - 91

66-17381-1692

18 JUL 1956

59 AUG 23 1956

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 1, 1956

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
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 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

SUBJECT: BUREAU DEFENSE PLANS

Buplan Emergency Headquarters For S.O.S.

Volume No. II, Immediate Action Defense Plans, DID, contains as Exhibit No. 2 a proposed teletype instituting procedures regarding diplomats and officials of enemy nations. Due to the current establishment in New York of Bulgarian and Albanian delegations to the United Nations, the proposed teletype has been revised to include those nationalities for the New York area.

The same form should be revised in the "highlights" documents supplied the Chain of Command.

RECOMMENDATION:

There is attached a plastiplat revision of Exhibit No. 2.

Enclosure

cc - Belmont
 Branigan
 McArdle
 J. W. Brown
 Whitson
 LW:blb

RECORDED - 50

16 AUG 27 1956

(6)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-17440 - 1

EXHIBIT NO. 2

RE: PROPOSED TELETYPE INSTITUTING PROCEDURES
REGARDING DIPLOMATS AND OFFICIALS OF
ENEMY NATIONS

TELETYPE TO NEW YORK URGENT
WASHINGTON FIELD (BY SPECIAL MESSENGER)

PRODIP. CONTACT STATE DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVE AND
START PROGRAM FOR SOVIETS, POLES, CZECHS, HUNGARIANS,
RUMANIANS, BULGARIANS, ALBANIANS.

HOOVER

WFO FOR ANY OF THE COUNTRIES EXCEPT BULGARIA, ALBANIA.
NYC FOR ANY OF THE COUNTRIES.

(DELETE COUNTRIES NOT AFFECTED.)

Cover memorandum from Branigan to Belmont 8-1-56 by
LW:blb re Bureau Defense Plans.

LW:blb

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
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Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

8-1-56
REC'D - 8-1-56
100-200000-16

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: August 6, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - CIVIL DEFENSE FOR
NATIONAL SURVIVAL

The 24th intermediate report of the Subcommittee on Military Operations of the House Committee on Government Operations contains the results of a study on Civil Defense for National Survival. Buplan Emergency Headquarters for S.O.C.

One of the opinions of the subcommittee is that a nuclear war could destroy civilization. According to the committee, the two most powerful deterrents to a nuclear war are the military power to strike back against an aggressor and the military defenses within the Nation. The subcommittee added that a third powerful deterrent which would materially strengthen our capacity to withstand attack is a better program of Civil Defense.

This report also points out that Soviet Russia possesses atomic-hydrogen weapons and the means to deliver them in massive attacks by airplanes and submarines and that high military authorities in the United States state that no matter how good our defenses some portion of the enemy force can always break through and cause heavy damage to the Nation.

The committee points out that in their opinion the key measure in Civil Defense against nuclear attack is shelter, that proper construction and location of shelters in heavily populated target areas can reduce casualties by two-thirds. This is in contrast to the Federal Civil Defense Administration policy of reliance on evacuation as the key Civil Defense measure, which policy according to the committee is weak, ineffective and dangerously shortsighted. The subcommittee recommends the creation of a permanent Department of Civil Defense, combining the Civil Defense functions of the Office of Defense Mobilization and those of Federal Civil Defense Administration. The committee also pointed out that the problems of Civil Defense are largely those of coping with the threat of devastation of an atomic-hydrogen war. In this connection the committee pointed out that a single hydrogen bomb in the low megaton (millions of tons) range will more than match the destructive force of all bombs dropped on Europe and Japan during World War II; that the explosive energy of a 10-megaton bomb, in TNT equivalent, would require a volume of TNT 600 feet wide, 600 feet high and 600 feet long. The committee also pointed out that high-yield weapons

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Gandy

JEM:vec/awj (5)

ENCLOSURE

RECORDED - 91

66-17381-1694

18 AUG 28 1956

1 - Mr. Boardman

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Section tickler

1 - Mr. McArdle

SEP - 4 1956

SENT DIRECTOR

8-7-56

LIAISON

Classified

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

ranging up to 50 or 60 megatons have been mentioned and that while no responsible authority publicly has placed limits on the potential destructive power of nuclear weapons, such limits are undoubtedly set by the weight-carrying capabilities of the vehicles which deliver them.

The committee ascertained there are 4 kinds of effects from nuclear weapon explosions; namely, blast, heat, prompt radiation and radioactive fall-out. The committee found that at 3.2 miles from the center of explosion of a 10-megaton bomb, reinforced concrete buildings with 10 inch walls and 6 inch floors would collapse; at 12 miles homes would be severely damaged and that at 18 miles such damage would be light to moderate. The heat effects of nuclear weapons are caused by the radiation power of the hot fireball, which reaches full size in a few seconds and several thousand degrees in temperature. The fireball of a 20 kiloton (thousands of tons) is 900 feet in diameter and for a 10-megaton weapon is about 3 miles in diameter.

Prompt radiation is due to the emission of neutrons, beta and gamma rays by the exploding bomb. The deadly rays shoot out in straight lines in all directions and have great penetrating power. The only protection is shielding or distance. It was estimated that at 3,000 feet from a 20-kiloton bomb, prompt neutron and gamma radiation would kill 50% of the humans even if protected by 1 foot of concrete. 3 feet of concrete would largely overcome their penetrating power.

The committee pointed out that radioactive fall-out unlike other potentials of a nuclear explosion cannot be accurately predicted because fall-out lingers, travels with the wind and may persist for long periods of time.

ACTION:

The foregoing is set forth for information only.

R. J. B. *V. Paul*

CIVIL DEFENSE FOR NATIONAL SURVIVAL

TWENTY-FOURTH INTERMEDIATE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS



JULY 27, 1956.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

UNITED STATES
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D. C., July 27, 1956.

HON. SAM RAYBURN,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: By direction of the Committee on Government Operations, I submit herewith the 24th intermediate report of its Subcommittee on Military Operations.

WILLIAM L. DAWSON, *Chairman.*

III

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FOREWORD

If a nuclear attack should be launched upon the cities of this Nation, millions of lives could be lost and the accumulated tangible assets represented by our homes, churches, schools, libraries, cultural treasures, industrial facilities, and other things we hold dear, could be completely destroyed.

Such an attack now is possible by a potential enemy possessing atomic-hydrogen weapons and sufficient means to deliver them by airplanes and submarines.

Each of these nuclear weapons could release explosive energy measured in millions of tons of TNT equivalent, and also spread deadly radioactive dust throughout large areas of the Nation.

The catastrophe of nuclear war, we believe, could destroy civilization. Every effort therefore must be made to prevent such war. But until the foundations of universal peace are firmly established, other grave responsibilities must be discharged.

This Nation must build and maintain, without delay, every factor of strength to deter war. The two most powerful deterrents we possess today are the military power to strike back against an aggressor's blows and the military defenses within the Nation.

These military forces of offense and defense cannot guarantee that an aggressor will turn aside a mad impulse to strike. Neither can they wholly prevent the exposure of our people to death and destruction if such an attack comes.

Confronted with these hard facts of the contemporary world, we must strive to increase the deterrent factors against war. The subcommittee believes that a third powerful deterrent can be created—to strengthen our capacity to substantially withstand attack, our national resiliency, by insuring the continuity of civil government and the protection of civilian life. For want of a better phrase we speak of “civil defense.”

The more unprepared we are as a nation, the more tempting a target we are to the aggressor.

The subcommittee believes that an effective nationwide civil defense should be created as a third strong deterrent to war, and if an aggressor ever should strike, as the indispensable means to national survival.

Difficult as this task may be, the subcommittee is confident that it can be accomplished. We refuse to join with those defeatists who take a fatalistic or hopeless attitude, or with others who verge on that position.

There are positive, constructive steps to be taken. These are set forth in the recommendations of this report.

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84TH CONGRESS }
2d Session }

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES }

REPORT
No. 2946

CIVIL DEFENSE FOR NATIONAL SURVIVAL

JULY 27, 1956.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. DAWSON of Illinois, from the Committee on Government Operations, submitted the following

TWENTY-FOURTH INTERMEDIATE REPORT

SUBMITTED BY THE MILITARY OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

On July 25, 1956, the Committee on Government Operations had before it for consideration the report of its subcommittee studying civil defense for national survival.

After consideration of the report as submitted, upon motion made and seconded, the report was approved and adopted as the report of the full committee. The chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.

SUMMARY OF REPORT

Nuclear weapons have revolutionized modern warfare. A single hydrogen bomb can release more destructive energy than all the bombs dropped on Germany and Japan in World War II.

The atomic bomb multiplied the explosive power of the World War II "block buster" 1,000 times. The hydrogen bomb, in turn, has multiplied the explosive power of the "nominal" atomic bomb 1,000 times.

Besides the enormous blast, heat and prompt radiation caused by a nuclear explosion, radioactive fallout can contaminate large areas of the Nation, causing radiation sickness and death to exposed people. For survivors, shortened life span and genetic damage can be expected.

Soviet Russia possesses atomic-hydrogen weapons and the means to deliver them in massive attacks by airplanes and submarines. The highest military authorities in the United States state that no matter how good our defenses, some portion of the enemy force can always break through and cause heavy damage to the Nation.

Since America is not an aggressive nation, the advantage in war lies with the enemy, and in nuclear war the advantage can be overwhelming and decisive unless the Nation is prepared to take the

aggressor's blows. Therefore, civil defense becomes necessary for national survival.

Scientists and other informed witnesses emphasized to the subcommittee the vital strategic role that civil defense must play, along with our striking power and military defenses. In the age of nuclear warfare, civil defense must be part of a unified and continuous concept of national defense.

Civil defense must be construed in a broad sense, encompassing all those tasks necessary to prepare the Nation to withstand and overcome the ravages of enemy attack.

Technologically it is feasible to protect a major portion of the population and the vital industries of America, but the question yet to be decided is whether the Congress and the executive branch are willing to put forth the funds and the effort required to achieve that protection.

The Nation spends yearly for direct military purposes \$35 billion to \$40 billion. The FCDA gets a yearly appropriation of \$60 million to \$80 million, something like one five-hundredth of the military budget.

The faults of civil defense lie not in lack of dollars alone. The Congress has refused to commit large funds for civil defense in the absence of an effectively planned national program. In the opinion of the subcommittee, Congress has not given to this problem the attention it has deserved.

The FCDA has not fully grasped the technical, administrative, or economic requirements of an effective civil-defense program.

The subcommittee believes that the key measure in civil defense against nuclear attack is shelter. This is based on the testimony received and on studies of the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory.

Proper construction and location of shelters in heavily populated target areas can reduce casualties by two-thirds, according to analyses by shelter design experts in industry and Government.

The FCDA's policy of reliance on evacuation as the key civil-defense measure is weak and ineffective and indeed dangerously shortsighted. Evacuation requires hours or days of advance warning, which cannot be guaranteed and which would be unavailable when intercontinental ballistics missiles are developed.

The FCDA policy of promoting local evacuation plans and backyard family shelters is an inexpensive budgetary substitute for an effective civil defense.

The FCDA Administrator indicated that his agency might consider a shelter program, but that he preferred to wait until evacuation feasibility studies, for which the Congress has appropriated \$20 million, are completed.

Such studies are underway in 25 or more States (4 involving interstate groups) under the name of "survival plan" studies, projected over a 2-year period. The subcommittee is convinced that these studies will result in enormous duplication of paperwork and are delaying basic national decisions on shelters.

The FCDA-sponsored concept of metropolitan target area authorities for planning and operating civil-defense programs poses unusually difficult problems, diverts emphasis from, and delays execution of, essential immediate tasks of civil defense.

Desirable as it may be in a nuclear weapon age, the subcommittee sees little promise in industrial dispersal as a civil-defense measure

because of the slow process, the powerful obstacles, and the sporadic and limited efforts of the Federal Government in promoting dispersal.

The FCDA Administrator never has construed his statutory authority to develop a realistic national plan for civil defense. Too many planning responsibilities are delegated to other Federal agencies or to outside organizations or to State-local groups.

The FCDA is not able to utilize fully and properly the enormous resources of the military agencies or the Atomic Energy Commission because it lacks scientific and technical personnel who can request and evaluate classified data important for civil defense. //

Although the FCDA is ostensibly the primary Federal agency concerned with civil defense, such responsibilities are divided among the FCDA, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the Department of Defense.

The FCDA and ODM delegate similar functions to various Federal departments and agencies, require similar techniques for analyzing bomb damage, and share responsibilities for industrial dispersal and other postattack planning activities.

The division of duties between FCDA, ODM, and the Department of Defense in civil-defense planning, worked out by prompting of ODM, has no clear statutory basis. The Congress has sadly neglected this area. }

In the strategic sense in which civil defense is here considered, the subcommittee sees no sensible distinction between the civil-defense planning activities of ODM and FCDA and believes that these related activities should be merged.

After consideration of the various alternatives to reorganization, the subcommittee concludes that a Federal department with Cabinet-level prestige and authority should be created. Civil defense must be as permanent a feature of our national life as military defense.

The military departments, having traditionally rendered assistance to civil authorities in emergencies, will be called upon to expand and will attempt to fill the vacuum created by inadequate civil defense, unless a strong national civilian program is developed.

Basic questions concerning the military role in civil defense were raised by the Presidential proclamation of nationwide mock martial law during Operation Alert 1955.

Since that time the military authorities have stepped up their civil-defense planning activities at the Department of Defense level and in the field.

The 1950 civil-defense legislation was outmoded upon its enactment 5 years after atomic bombs were dropped on Japanese cities, and 5 more years of weapon advances have made it obsolete.

All recent studies of civil defense, the unanimous resolution of the 1956 governors' conference, and the testimony of numerous informed witnesses before the subcommittee recommend a shift in basic responsibility for civil defense from States and localities to the Federal Government.

This accords with constitutional responsibilities of the Federal Government to provide for the common defense and to cope with planning, technical and financial requirements of civil defense in the nuclear age.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- ✓ 1. Federal civil-defense legislation should be redrafted to vest the basic responsibility for civil defense in the Federal Government, with the States and local units of government having an important supporting role.
- ✓ 2. The new legislation should create a permanent Department of Civil Defense, combining the civil-defense functions (broadly defined) of the Office of Defense Mobilization and those of the Federal Civil Defense Administration.
3. The Department of Civil Defense should consult with the Department of Defense and be required to formulate a master plan for nationwide civil defense. Plans for each target area should be made and protective measures initiated after careful determination of their respective priority importance to national defense and survival.
4. The master plan for civil defense should be pointed toward the establishment of an integrated nationwide civil-defense system based on the key civil-defense measure of shelter protection against the blast, heat, and radiation effects of nuclear explosions.
5. Studies under the survival planning contracts should be suspended, pending a reformulation of the criteria for the expenditure of the funds Congress authorized and appropriated for this purpose. A local or regional survival plan study should be concerned only with the adaptation and application of the national plan and of basic studies, to a local situation.
6. The Department of Civil Defense should be authorized to finance the construction of shelters in all target areas, with the cooperation of State and local authorities.
7. The Department of Civil Defense should be authorized to institute all other measures necessary to establish an integrated nationwide civil-defense system, and to utilize toward this end such available resources and facilities of the Federal departments and agencies as are necessary.
8. The Department of Civil Defense should be authorized to strengthen State and local civil-defense organizations by contributing equipment, supplies and funds for administration, training, stockpiles and other necessary civil-defense uses, subject to the supervision, inspection and approval, by the Secretary of Civil Defense, of the civil-defense programs of State and local authorities.
9. The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Civil Defense, should establish and implement an effective program of training active and reserve military personnel in civil-defense duties as a defined part of regular military training.
10. The Secretary of Civil Defense, in behalf of the President, should have defined statutory powers to act in an emergency and to mobilize all civilian resources for minimizing the effects of enemy-caused disaster upon the national economy and the people of the United States.
11. The Secretary of Civil Defense, in behalf of the President, should have statutory authority to carry out plans and operations in peacetime, under preattack situations, particularly before declarations of emergency have been made, in order to minimize the effects of enemy-caused disaster upon the national economy and the people of the United States.

12. The role of the military forces in civil defense should be clearly defined. State and local officials should be fully informed as to the terms and conditions under which military assistance to civil-defense authorities will be rendered in the event of widespread disaster and the breakdown of civil government.

13. The studies of martial law conducted by the Attorney General, the Department of the Army, and other Federal agencies should be made public promptly upon completion, to assist the Congress and the public in understanding the contemplated role of the military forces in civil defense.

INTRODUCTION

The Military Operations Subcommittee has conducted an extensive inquiry into civil defense. Six months of staff study were followed by public hearings commencing in January 1956. The subcommittee also received briefings in executive session at the headquarters of the Strategic Air Command at Omaha, Nebr.; the Continental Air Defense Command at Colorado Springs, Colo.; and the Federal Civil Defense Administration at Battle Creek, Mich. The latest developments in missile weapons were made known to the subcommittee by special briefing at the Pentagon and by inspections at certain Air Force sites.

Public hearings were held in Washington, D. C.; Baltimore, Md.; New York City and Syracuse, N. Y.; Detroit, Mich.; and San Francisco and Los Angeles, Calif. The witnesses at these hearings included distinguished scientists, doctors, engineers and other professional persons; responsible public officials in Federal, State and local government; the chairman and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other military spokesmen; and informed private citizens, civic leaders, industrialists and representatives of national organizations. Altogether these witnesses numbered 211.

Also communications were received from 36 State governors and from 33 mayors of the largest cities in the United States.

A list of the public witnesses, alphabetically arranged, and of the responding governors and mayors (or their civil defense directors) arranged by States, is appended to this report. The public hearings are printed in 7 volumes comprising 3,145 pages of testimony.

This is the most extensive investigation of civil defense undertaken by a committee of the Congress. Indeed, aside from the yearly Appropriations Committee reviews and the enactment of an occasional minor amendment to the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, there has been only one other congressional committee inquiry¹ into civil defense since the basic legislation was passed more than 5 years ago.

The subcommittee chairman, Hon. Chet Holifield, brought to the inquiry a background of 10 years of knowledge as a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The problems of civil defense are largely those of coping with the threat or the devastation of atomic-hydrogen war. The knowledge and interest of the members of the subcommittee have been of great benefit in this investigation.

¹ Civil Defense Program, hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil Defense of the Committee on Armed Services, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (hereinafter cited as the Senate Civil Defense Subcommittee hearings), pts. I and II with appendixes. The Senate Civil Defense Subcommittee issued an interim report.

PURPOSE OF SUBCOMMITTEE INQUIRY

The immediate purpose of the subcommittee inquiry was to take testimony concerning several resolutions which had been referred to it by the chairman of the full committee, Hon. William L. Dawson. These resolutions proposed that the Federal Civil Defense Administration be reorganized and made an executive department either of Cabinet rank or within the Department of Defense.²

It became quickly apparent, however, that the civil defense inquiry demanded more than a consideration of organizational changes. Civil defense was a neglected field. The 1950 legislation which created the Federal Civil Defense Administration, outdated from the start, was left far behind by the swift march of atomic-hydrogen weapons technology and the evidence that Soviet Russia produces such weapons and can deliver them. A careful review of the basic legislation was indicated.

Furthermore, the subcommittee sensed a desire upon the part of many congressional Members to understand better the need and the complexities of civil defense, and to get a more precise measure of performance on the part of the Federal agencies concerned. Underlying this desire is the sentiment, often expressed, that a decision should be made whether civil defense is important and urgent and therefore should command far greater support in terms of finances, facilities, administrative direction, and executive leadership; or whether it is a useless and wasteful exercise and therefore should be abandoned.

Through its investigations and this report, the subcommittee has endeavored to place civil defense in clearer perspective and to point the way to necessary corrective action by the Congress and the Executive.

METHOD OF APPROACH

The subcommittee undertook its inquiry without prejudging the issues. Subcommittee members modified or refined their views as the hearings continued and as new facts or concepts were introduced. On occasion, positions were taken in the hearings to bring out points of testimony or to develop the meaning of given policies. However, the consensus of final subcommittee judgment on the matters under inquiry is contained in this report.

The recommendations in the report are not new or startling. They have been proposed by one or another informed and competent person. Witnesses differed in their views, of course, though there was a surprising degree of unanimity on basic issues concerning Federal responsibility for planning and financing an adequate civil-defense program. Necessarily the subcommittee has used its own judgment in drawing upon the wealth of suggestions and recommendations presented to it, selecting those which seem more fundamental and urgent.

The inquiry was completely free of partisan spirit. The subcommittee considers the problems too acute and their solution too vital to national survival and security to become the object of political debate. As Chairman Holifield said in opening the hearings: "No

² H. J. Res. 98, 71, 75 and H. Con. Res. 108, 84th Cong.

administration, no party, can claim special competence in civil-defense matters today.”³

Nothing will be gained, however, by blinking the facts or suppressing justified criticism. The subcommittee is a stern critic because the issues need critical analysis and civil defense needs a drastic revision in concept and performance. This report is frank because the facts must be told.

DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

To understand the need, the urgency, and the magnitude of the civil defense effort, we must start with a consideration of the weapons threat. Here the subcommittee restates some fundamental facts, the real import of which is not considered by our national leaders, military and civilian, in terms of civil defense preparedness.

Words can scarcely convey how radically atomic-hydrogen weapons have transformed the nature of warfare. In the few short years since atomic bombs first were produced, not only have these weapons grown in quantity, variety, and yield, but newer, more destructive hydrogen bombs have been produced. The atomic bombs which gutted Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 each had the explosive power of 20,000 tons (20 kilotons) of TNT. Today they are referred to in nuclear weapons jargon as “nominal” bombs. Hydrogen bombs have TNT-equivalent explosive power measured in the millions of tons (megatons).

High-yield weapons ranging up to 50 or 60 million tons have been mentioned. No responsible authority publicly has placed limits on the potential destructive power of nuclear weapons, although such limits undoubtedly are set by the weight-carrying capabilities of the vehicles which deliver them. Indeed, as Dr. Ralph Lapp suggested, the critical phase of the arms race now may be in the delivery systems.⁴

The enormous jump in destructive power of nuclear weapons is shown starkly by a comparison with conventional explosives used in World War II.

According to Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, head of the Strategic Air Command, almost 1,500,000 sorties were flown against Germany. A total of about 2,700,000 tons of bombs were dropped. We lost 22,000 bombers and 158,000 crewmen. The RAF effort was about equal to that of the United States. Against Japan 33,000 sorties were flown, 160,000 tons of bombs were dropped, and we lost 485 B-29's and 3,000 crewmen.⁵

This vast output of destructive energy, which destroyed or heavily damaged scores of large cities, key industries and 20 to 30 percent of the homes, and killed or wounded many hundreds of thousands of persons, can now be matched in destructive force by a single hydrogen bomb in the low megaton range. This tremendous increase in destructive power over conventional bombs, as Dr. Willard F. Libby, member of the Atomic Energy Commission, explained to the subcommittee; is due to the concentrated, sudden, and violent release of

³ Civil Defense for National Survival, hearings before the Subcommittee on Military Operations of the House Committee on Government Operations, January 31 to June 23, 1956, 84th Cong., 2d sess. (hereinafter cited as subcommittee hearings), pt. 1, p. 3.

⁴ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 3, p. 778.

⁵ Study of Airpower, hearings before the Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate, 84th Cong., 2d sess., pt. 2, pp. 125-126.

a large amount of energy in a small space. The explosive energy of a 10-megaton bomb, in TNT equivalent, would require a volume of TNT 600 feet wide, 600 feet high, and 600 feet long.⁶

Expressed otherwise, the atomic bomb dropped in Japan multiplied the explosive power of a conventional bomb by 1,000. A medium-sized hydrogen bomb (20 megatons) multiplies the explosive power of the "nominal" atomic bomb by 1,000 and of the conventional bomb by 1 million. The "block buster" has become a "city pulverizer" and even more.

NUCLEAR EXPLOSION EFFECTS

The four kinds of effects from nuclear weapon explosions, as described by Dr. Libby,⁷ are blast, heat, prompt radiation, and radio-active fallout.

The bomb explodes with a blinding flash of light, and incandescent gases shoot skyward in a giant fireball. A shock-blast wave from the explosion rushes outward, faster than sound, and slams with great violence into structures, which are pulled backward seconds later by a violent inrush of air.

At 3.2 miles from the explosion center (ground zero) of a 10-megaton bomb, reinforced concrete buildings with 10-inch walls and 6-inch floors would collapse; at 12 miles homes would be severely damaged; at 18 miles such damage would be light to moderate. For a Hiroshima-type bomb, by way of comparison, the above-described damage would occur at 1.5 miles, 2.3 miles, and 4 miles, respectively.

The burning effects of nuclear weapons are caused by the radiation power of the hot fireball, which rises like a balloon. The fireball reaches full size in a few seconds (or less, depending on bomb size) and several thousand degrees in temperature. For a 20-kiloton weapon, the fireball is 900 feet in diameter, for a 10-megaton weapon, about 3 miles.

A 10-megaton weapon, exploded on a clear day at ground level, would produce third-degree burns on all exposed persons out to 11 or 12 miles. Air bursts generate twice as much energy in the fireball, and in such cases third-degree burns from a 10-megaton explosion would appear out to 15 miles. Clouds, fog, and other atmospheric factors reduce the burn hazard. At many points, fires would spring up, and in congested city areas which contain many combustibles, firestorms would rage.

Prompt radiation is due to the emission of neutrons, beta, and gamma rays by the exploding bomb or in the decay of fission products a minute or two afterward. The deadly rays shoot out in straight lines in all directions and have great penetrating power. The only protection is sufficient shielding or distance. Dr. Libby estimated that at 3,000 feet from a 20 kiloton ("nominal") bomb, prompt neutron and gamma radiation would kill 50 percent of the humans even if protected by 1 foot of concrete. Three feet of concrete would largely overcome their penetrating power.

The blast, burn, and prompt radiation effects mentioned above, are not isolated hazards, of course, but mutually reinforcing. That is, a person who escapes serious thermal burns might die from a heavy dose of neutrons or gamma rays; a person who manages to

⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, p. 5.

⁷ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, pp. 4 ff.

escape the direct blast, might be killed by flying debris or burned to death in a secondary fire.

But these three main types of hazards have this in common—whatever the size of the bomb, the effects fall off rather sharply with distance. For example, a 20-megaton bomb is 1,000 times as powerful as a Hiroshima-type “nominal” bomb, but the blast-damage area is multiplied only 10 times. The significance of such physical facts for civil defense planning will be considered later in this report.

RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT

The fourth type of nuclear explosion effect—radioactive fallout—is unlike the others in that the effects of time and distance are no longer compact and easily predictable. Fallout lingers, travels with the wind, and may persist for long periods of time. A nuclear bomb, exploded on the ground, tears a great hole in the earth and throws dust and debris into the sky. The dust particles become “infected,” so to speak, by the fragmented atoms in the explosion which comprise many different radioactive species. The radioactive materials are washed down by rain or ride to earth with the slowly settling dust and contaminate large areas.

For weapons of the megaton range, fired near the ground, Dr. Libby has distinguished three types of fallout:

(1) Local fallout due to larger particles which fall to earth in the first few hours or days.⁸ Prevailing winds spread the radioactive dust, often in cigar-shaped patterns. At Bikini Atoll in March 1954, a single explosion contaminated an area of 7,000 square miles downwind by local fallout. In Operation Alert, 1955, a civil defense exercise, it was assumed that 14 megaton-range bombs, exploding at ground level, contaminated an area of 63,000 square miles. Dr. Libby has used the figure of 100,000 square miles in discussing the hypothetical fallout from a single bomb burst.⁹

(2) Fallout due to small particles which never reach the stratosphere but remain in the lower layers of the atmosphere until settled or washed down by rain. Such particles may make several trips around the world before settling, but come out in several weeks in the same general latitude where the bomb was exploded.

(3) Long-term fallout (half or more of the total), finely divided material which reaches the stratosphere and remains there for years, slowly leaking to earth at an average rate of possibly 10 percent per year.

Radioactive materials “live” for shorter or longer periods, ranging from fractions of a second to decades. A rough rule for decay of radioactivity is a tenfold loss with every sevenfold increase in age. That is, 7 hours after an explosion, fallout radioactivity would be one-tenth of its intensity at 1 hour. In 2 days, the intensity would decrease to one one-hundredth, in 2 weeks to one one-thousandth. The importance of prompt protective measures following an explosion is obvious.

⁸ The Atomic Energy Commission and the Weather Bureau appear to differ somewhat as to whether local fallout reaches the stratosphere before descending. See subcommittee hearings, pt. 3, pp. 620-621.

⁹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, pp. 60, 64.

DAMAGE EFFECTS OF RADIATION ¹⁰

In addition to the hundreds of thousands or millions of persons who, if unprotected, would be killed or injured in a nuclear attack by burns, lacerations, and contusions, other unprotected millions would be killed or injured by fallout radiation.

Penetrating gamma rays contaminate the environment, food, water, clothing and the skin and strike the inner organs of the body. In high doses they injure blood-forming cells and bone marrow, the lining of the intestinal tract and the brain. Softer, less penetrating beta rays can severely injure the skin.

Radiation doses are measured in units called roentgens. Exposure to 400 roentgens kills, on the average, half the persons affected. Double that dosage probably would kill most persons.

Short and long term radiation effects are involved. The immediate effects vary with the exposure. Less than 100 roentgens probably would cause only occasional nausea in the first 24 hours. Exposures from 300 to 500 would produce nausea and weakness in the first 24 hours, a latent period 7 to 12 days, and then full-blown radiation sickness. Higher dosages are followed in a few hours or days by vomiting, diarrhea, fever, fatal collapse, and death shortly thereafter.

There is no specific cure for radiation sickness. In the middlethal range, 300 to 500 roentgens, after a few weeks blood cells stop forming, hair falls out, temporary sterility occurs. Prostration, hemorrhages, ulcerations, multiple abscesses, bloody diarrhea and general sepsis are other symptoms. Most of these effects will disappear and chances of recovery are good if the victim can survive the 3- to 4-week period when body defenses are down.

Long-term effects are cataracts, leukemia, increased degenerative diseases, shortened life span, and genetic change. Any amount of radiation will cause mutations in the genes. While mutations are occurring constantly due to radioactivity in the normal environment and to dosages from such sources as fluoroscopes and X-rays,¹¹ the intense radioactivity resulting from nuclear explosions could do untold damage to the genetic constitutions of many survivors and visit the curse of war on their succeeding offspring for all generations to come.

Dr. Shields Warren pointed to the postattack problem of providing food for growing children which would be free of radioactive material that causes bone cancer. He referred to strontium-90, a calciumlike substance which persists for decades after nuclear explosions, and can be absorbed by humans directly or through ingesting plant food and milk in areas of radioactivity.¹²

CASUALTY POTENTIALS

While a lone aerial bomber, today, at the touch of a button, can unleash more destructive force than did all the allied bombers in World War II, casualty rates depend, of course, on the density of the target population.

Project East River, a Government-sponsored study of civil defense in 1952 (before the hydrogen bomb was produced), estimated that a

¹⁰ Based on testimony of Dr. Charles L. Dunham, Director, Division of Biology and Medicine, Atomic Energy Commission, and of Dr. Eugene P. Cronkite, head, Division of Experimental Pathology, Medical Department, Brookhaven National Laboratory, subcommittee hearings, pt. 3, pp. 899 ff.

¹¹ See testimony of Dr. Bentley Glass, subcommittee hearings, pt. 7, pp. 2710 ff.

¹² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 6, p. 2358. See also testimony of Dr. Libby, subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, pp. 22 ff.

surprise attack over target areas in the United States with 100 "nominal" bombs could result in 6 to 12 million casualties, with one-third dead, one-third needing hospitalization, and one-third needing some medical care.¹³

Projecting the area of complete destruction and severe damage (3.1 square miles) from a Hiroshima-type bomb, Project East River estimated that 1,000 such "nominal" bombs could destroy or heavily damage a 55-mile square, equal to the combined areas of the central cities in the 32 largest metropolitan areas. Thirty-three million people live in these 32 cities.

Project East River also observed:

Forty-five percent of the Nation's industrial workers and population are within range of missiles which can today [1952] be successfully launched from submarines. Over half the Nation's foreign and coastwise commerce is carried on in six ports, all of which are highly vulnerable to the effects of atomic bombing either by air or water blast. One-quarter of this commerce is concentrated in the port of New York.¹⁴

Operation Alert 1955 assumed that 60 cities in the United States, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, and Alaska were struck by 61 bombs, ranging in size from 20 kilotons to 5 megatons of TNT equivalent, delivered by air or by guided missiles launched from submarines. Eleven of the "struck" cities had no advance warning.

The Federal Civil Defense Administration estimated the casualties thus: 8¼ million persons dead at end of first day; another 8 million dead within 6 weeks following the attack. About 3.9 million of the total deaths were attributed to radioactive fallout. About 12 million persons injured in the attack survived the first day, and about one-third of these ultimately recovered.¹⁵

RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT DANGER

The deadly effects of radioactive fallout, although recognized for some years, are not fully appreciated by the American public. This is due partly to the limited scientific test data available, partly to the playing down of the danger by the Atomic Energy Commission. Many local plans for evacuation of cities do not take account of fallout.

The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs were exploded about 2,000 feet in the air and the resultant radioactivity was largely dissipated in the atmosphere. Ground bursts of higher-yield weapons, which later brought fuller awareness of the sinister threat of fallout, have enlarged vastly the potential casualty area and added new dimensions to civil-defense planning.

In 1948 the Hopley report believed it unlikely that atomic bombs would be exploded on the ground and thus create a major fallout problem for civil defense. Today the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory is convinced, on the basis of its studies, that radioactive fallout must be considered the major antipersonnel weapon.¹⁶

¹³ Civil Defense Health and Welfare, pt. VIII of the Report of Project East River, July 15, 1952, pp. 1-2.

¹⁴ Reduction of Urban Vulnerability, pt. V of the Report of Project East River, July 1952, p. 3.

¹⁵ Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1955 Annual Report, pp. 32-33.

¹⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 6, p. 2434.

The worldwide extent of potential fallout devastation resulting from nuclear attack was drawn to public attention recently by Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, Chief of Research and Development, Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army. He stated that an assault in force made by the United States against Russia could cause "on the order of several hundred million deaths." He expected that winds blowing to the southeast would confine the fallout mostly to the U. S. S. R. but possibly taking in Japan and the Philippines. Winds blowing the other way would back the fallout into Western Europe.

The radiological fallout hazard first came to world attention in March 1954 when some Japanese fishermen were caught at sea in a fine rain of radioactive ash from a test explosion at the Bikini Atoll some 80 or 90 miles distant. Official announcement of the fallout hazard was not made by the Atomic Energy Commission until February 1955.

The information released on that date by the AEC might easily convey to the lay reader a misleading impression of the extent and duration of the radioactivity hazard. While explaining that fallout is due to surface nuclear explosions which draw up large amounts of materials into the bomb cloud, the first paragraph of the statement also observes that the "main radioactivity" is dissipated within a few hours and concludes with a sentence that air explosions do not produce any serious radiological hazard.

The AEC release referred to radioactivity within the first 36-hour period. The persistent or lingering radioactivity received practically no attention. Dr. Libby acknowledged that there was no reason to confine the discussion in that manner and stated it "was an inadvertent omission."¹⁷

The subcommittee sees no excuse for inadvertencies or casual treatment of atomic energy when life and death matters such as this are involved. The AEC displays a kind of easy optimism about nuclear explosion effects. The AEC spokesmen dwell upon the effects of "nominal" bombs rather than on those of the high-yield megaton weapons. Data presented to the subcommittee on the intensity of local radiation hazards are diluted by resort to global averages and other minimizing assumptions. The genetic effects of radioactivity are passed by with [the comment that] "there is [a] wide [range of admissible opinion on] this [subject]."¹⁸ Important information on atomic energy often is released in dribbles, through speeches of AEC Commissioners, and couched in highly technical and hypothetical terms rather than in authoritative, concise, plain-spoken facts.

While the AEC insists that its information is available for civil-defense purposes, the subcommittee notes that publications dating back 7 or 8 years on biological and medical effects of radiation only now are being released.

The subcommittee sees no reason for withholding from the American people the full facts about the deadly effects of atomic and hydrogen bombs.

¹⁷ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, p. 56.

¹⁸ The Effects of High-Yield Nuclear Explosions, Statement by Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman, and a Report by the United States Atomic Energy Commission, February 1955, p. 18.

THE ENEMY THREAT

What is Soviet Russia's capability to launch a nuclear attack on the United States and to inflict death and destruction of the kind described above?

The subcommittee had classified briefings on this matter. The following two sections rely on statements before the subcommittee and on the sworn testimony before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on the Air Force with classified material deleted.

Gen. Earle E. Partridge, head of the Continental Air Defense Command, testified before the latter subcommittee:

In evaluating the Soviet threat, we feel that the Soviets, if they attack at all, would launch a very large scale air attack against this country, and that they will do their best to achieve surprise.¹⁹

National intelligence estimates of Soviet capabilities, according to General Partridge, "state that in 1956, this year, the Russians have sufficient bombers to launch an initial attack against the United States, employing hundreds of bombers." By 1959 the Russian bomber force will be large enough to launch a stronger attack and to penetrate our defenses. Pointing to the fact that there are 170 metropolitan areas (230 cities) in the United States containing key facilities or population of 50,000 or more, General Partridge concluded as follows:

I believe we must assume, then, from the data which I have given you and which General LeMay and others have given you that the Soviets have the capability for air attack on the United States using large numbers of modern bombers, and that they have sufficient numbers of weapons to destroy the key targets in this country unless those are well defended.²⁰

The submarine threat also was noted by General Partridge. He believed that aircraft would be favored by the Soviets for an initial surprise attack, and "that it would be very difficult for the Soviets to put large numbers of submarines along our coasts undetected"; the real submarine threat would lie in followup attacks, since "some 30 percent of the profitable targets in the United States lie within 150 miles of the shores."²¹

Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, stated to our subcommittee that Russia now has 400 submarines and is building new ones at the rate of 75 to 85 per year. It is not certain, but reasonable to expect, that these include guided-missile submarines. Admiral Burke also discounted the probability of a surprise attack by large numbers of submarines, but stated that submarines could approach our coastal cities undetected.²² Vice Adm. Francis S. Low, commander of the Western Sea Frontier, expressed a similar view.²³

¹⁹ Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on the Air Force, hearings, pt. 3, p. 233.

²⁰ Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on the Air Force, hearings, pt. 3, p. 240.

²¹ Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on the Air Force, hearings, pt. 3, p. 239.

²² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 421.

²³ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 6, p. 2313.

AMERICA'S VULNERABILITY TO ATTACK

How well prepared is the United States in a military way to prevent or ward off enemy attack?

Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Chief of Staff for the Air Force, testified before our subcommittee that with the present stockpile of weapons and delivery capabilities, the United States was safe from attack unless Soviet Russia made a mistake in judgment.²⁴ The subcommittee believes that we cannot rely on the good judgment of the Soviets any more than we can rely on their professed peaceful intentions.

Dr. Albert G. Hill of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, recently appointed scientific director of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, observed that wars never start for logical and good reasons but for a complex of reasons, many of which are emotional. He added:

One can never count on a potential enemy being completely logical and deciding he won't attack us because he himself will be destroyed.²⁵

In war, the aggressor always has an advantage, but in nuclear war the advantage of offense is overwhelming and decisive if the attacked nation is not well prepared to receive a massive assault. Before Soviet Russia had nuclear weapons and means to deliver them, as Dr. Hill pointed out, military and civil defense at home were not vital; offensive power was enough. Now offense and defense, including civil defense, are "part and parcel of the same thing."²⁶

General LeMay stated to the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee his judgment that the United States presently can win any war that the Soviets might start, but he added:

We are not capable of winning it without this country receiving very serious damage. Five years ago we could have won the war without the country receiving comparatively serious damage.²⁷

General Partridge also said:

* * * we must be prepared to accept major damage, severe damage if the enemy does attack.²⁸

General Twining and other military witnesses before our subcommittee, while recognizing the importance and deterrent value of air defenses to intercept or shoot down attacking aircraft, made it clear that enemy breakthroughs always could be expected.²⁹

In the allied bombing raids over Germany during World War II, less than 2 percent of the bombers were shot down. The attrition rate for B-29's in the Korean war was about 1 percent. General Partridge maintained that the air-defense system now being established "will be far more effective, infinitely more effective than anything built in World War II."³⁰ However, no military officer

²⁴ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 339.

²⁵ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, p. 68.

²⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, p. 69.

²⁷ Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on the Air Force, hearings, pt. 2, p. 102.

²⁸ Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on the Air Force, hearings, pt. 3, p. 263.

²⁹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, pp. 390, 444 et passim.

³⁰ Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on the Air Force, hearings, pt. 3, p. 254.

publicly has ventured a prediction of defense capabilities to prevent breakthroughs. A range of 0 to 30 percent attrition has been mentioned.³¹

General LeMay noted "that defense systems are becoming more and more sophisticated," but that this is also true for offensive systems. He summed up his position thus:

(So we believe that in the future the situation will remain the same as it has in the past, and that is a bomber force well equipped, determined, well trained, will penetrate any defense system that can be devised.³²)

The United States is expending many billions of dollars to improve its aircraft warning and continental defenses against enemy attack. These include land-based radar stations in the United States, Canada, Alaska, and elsewhere, airborne early warning aircraft, and picket ships for ocean patrol, Texas towers in shallow coastal waters, and a complex communications network and control system known as SAGE (semiautomatic ground environment). Improved intercepting planes, antiaircraft missiles, and other weapons systems are being developed.

General Partridge emphasized, however, that the Nation's continental defense resources are deficient in early warning time, radar coverage, altitude performance of present fighter planes, fire-control systems, skilled personnel, and bases.³³ Many of the projected programs will not be achieved for some years to come.

Since much attention has been directed to the distant early warning (DEW) radar line across the northern part of the continent, it is well to note General LeMay's observation that the DEW line, even when completed, would not prevent a breakthrough of Soviet bombers. Furthermore, he noted, the DEW line would play no part in warning against submarine missiles.

By the time the DEW line is completed, some years hence, Russian bombers like the turboprop Bear, with range extended by refueling in air, "will be able to take off from Russian territory and go clear around the warning line and come in from the southeast and hit the coast with very little warning, with just what the coastwise radars can see." And when the intercontinental ballistics missile (ICBM) comes into general use, General LeMay observed, the DEW line will afford no protection.³⁴

CIVIL DEFENSE CONCEPTS

Where does civil defense fit into this picture?

As already indicated by reference to Dr. Hill's testimony, in the age of nuclear warfare offense and defense necessarily become a unified or continuous concept. Since America will never strike first, our offensive power is retaliatory power. Our defensive power strives not only to maintain the ability to retaliate (protection of Strategic Air Command bases and other key facilities) but to intercept and destroy attacking aircraft or submarines. And since a large but indeterminate number of enemy aircraft will be able to penetrate even the best defenses, the civilian population also must be prepared to take the aggressor's blows. Civil defense comes into play.

³¹ Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on the Air Force, hearings, pt. 2, p. 147, 150.

³² Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on the Air Force, hearings, pt. 2, p. 145.

³³ Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on the Air Force, hearings, pt. 2.

³⁴ Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on the Air Force, hearings, pt. 2, pp. 155-158.

Nuclear warfare thus imposes new, grim, complicated, and costly tasks upon all the people of the United States. Airplane and submarine raids on the continental United States were not impossible during World War II, but ocean barriers, limited bomber or submarine range, and conventional explosives dictated that at best such raids would be isolated or circumscribed in their impact. The tin hat and the sand bucket of World War II air raid wardens must now be replaced by strange, new techniques for sheltering and shielding against enormous blast and heat and death-dealing rays that spread over the land with the blowing winds.

More than that, the civilian population must learn how to recover from the terrific impact of a nuclear assault, not only to tend the sick and wounded and keep life going, but to maintain essential production, and work toward full restoration of the economy.

It is obvious from this discussion that civil defense can have a wider or narrower meaning, depending on the concept of its role.

In the more common and limited concept, civil defense is regarded as concerned mainly with rescue operations and welfare services to stricken populations—a “pick-up-the-pieces” approach.

Sometimes the term “civilian” instead of “civil” defense is used to emphasize the fact that these tasks are more appropriate to civilian than to military organizations.

In the broadest sense of the term, civil defense is conceived as dealing with the whole complex of nonmilitary activities necessary to prepare or “mobilize” the economy against possible war, to survive and emerge from the ashes of attack, to maintain the continuity of government and essential production, to proceed toward partial recovery and then toward full resumption of peacetime pursuits. The term “nonmilitary defense” often is used to convey the broad sweep of civilian activities which must be joined with the military for preparedness, defense, and recovery.

The military services commonly employ the term “passive defense” to denote measures other than outright military action which are necessary to protect military installations or activities. That term also is used occasionally as a synonym for “civil” or “nonmilitary” defense. Besides the passive defense of their own facilities, the military have certain obligations to render emergency or “support” assistance to civil defense agencies, a matter which is analyzed later in this report.

The subcommittee retains the term “civil defense” because of its familiar usage, and views the concept in a broad sense, without dwelling on fine distinctions.

Witnesses before the subcommittee, whatever their particular concept of civil defense, stressed the three basic components of national defense in the nuclear age: A strong offense, an active defense, and effective civil defense. Most of them agreed that civil defense has great deterrent value; that is, the enemy will be less inclined to attack if he sees effective steps taken here to make targets less profitable and to protect the civilian population. Usually, like Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., they ranked civil defense third in deterrent value, after offensive and defensive military power.³⁵ Drs. Merle A. Tuve and Lloyd V. Berkner, Gen. Otto Nelson, and others expressed the thought that civil defense might well be the final or critical deterring factor against

³⁵ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, p. 215.

war as military capabilities of the opposing nations are brought nearer into balance.³⁶

Dr. Paul C. Tompkins, scientific director of the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, rated military offense and defense and passive (civil) defense as three "integral, equal components of our overall military situation." The fundamental flaw in the prevailing national concept of civil defense, he said, is the failure to provide for "the vital strategic role it must play in our national security posture." This role he set forth as "close integration and essentially an active cooperation in war."³⁷

The testimony of these objective and informed witnesses leads to this compelling conclusion: Civil defense must be considered in a strategic sense. As a national effort it is neither hopeless nor useless. On the contrary, civil defense is an integral part of the Nation's ability to deter war, to ward off attack if war comes, to survive actual assault, and to restore its way of life. As a strategic component of national defense, civil defense must be accorded a share of the national budget commensurate with its deterrent and protective value and must command the resources necessary to discharge its tasks.

CIVIL DEFENSE VALUE AND COSTS

Technologically it is feasible to protect the major portion of the population and the vital industries of America, but the question yet to be decided is whether the Congress and the executive department are willing to put forth the funds and the effort required to achieve that protection.

In the face of the grim, ugly facts of nuclear warfare we deal with probabilities. Not all can be saved. Not everyone can be guaranteed protection. Nevertheless, casualties resulting from an all-out nuclear assault can be reduced by many millions.

Dr. Tuve, who is director of the Carnegie Institute research laboratory and chairman of the committee on civil defense, National Academy of Sciences and National Research Council, stated to the subcommittee that 80 percent of the casualties and deaths could be avoided with reasonable preparation. In his considered view "a civilian defense effort costing several billion dollars and spread out over a few years may mean a difference of 60 million casualties or more in the event of all-out war."³⁸

General Nelson, with the experience of the extensive Project East River studies behind him, stated that "a practical and workable non-military defense program can be achieved and at a cost that is not prohibitive."³⁹

Lt. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr., Chief of Engineers, United States Army, said available studies and experience with shelter and protective construction in military installations "indicate clearly that a civil-defense program which is effective against the power of modern weapons will be extremely costly." Without committing himself to a cost estimate, he urged that "definite goals and criteria should be established and programs initiated to insure their accomplishment."⁴⁰

³⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, p. 193; pt. 3, p. 671.

³⁷ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 6, p. 2454.

³⁸ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, p. 193.

³⁹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 3, p. 675.

⁴⁰ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 691.

In place of definite goals and criteria and a national program of civil defense, today we have an aimless and ineffectual striving by the Federal Government and various splinter efforts by States and localities.

The Nation spends yearly for direct military purposes \$35 billion to \$40 billion. The Federal Civil Defense Administration gets a yearly appropriation of \$60 million to \$80 million, something like one five-hundredth the size of the military budget.

In the 6 years of its life, FCDA has received, altogether, little more than \$300 million. Half of this amount is allocated for emergency supplies and equipment, mostly medical.

Civil defense expenditures by State and local governments, according to Census Bureau estimates, totaled less than \$34 million in fiscal year 1955.

The subcommittee realizes, of course, that some Government funds not directly expended for civil defense, have utility and application in that field. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the degree of effort in civil defense, as measured by the expenditure of public dollars, is a minor one.

In saying this, the subcommittee does not mean that the faults of civil defense lie alone in a lack of dollars. There is no national program against which to match yearly budget plans and measure progress. The Congress has refused to commit vast sums of money for civil defense in the absence of such a program.

Administrator Peterson complained to the subcommittee that the \$300 million or more appropriated for FCDA for fiscal years 1951 through 1957 represented only 17.5 percent of the amounts requested. The congressional response has not been generous. In view of the disparate and diffused civil defense planning activities sponsored by FCDA, there is reason to believe that some of the meager funds available are being wasted.

Considered as a vital strategic component of the national defense, an effective program of civil defense is not cheap, any more than planes and ships and weapons systems are cheap.

But civil defense could pay more direct dividends in better living. Unlike military armament, as Dr. Warren pointed out, roads, overpasses, recreation areas and other measures having civil defense utility, foster and strengthen the economy rather than drain away its resources. Specially constructed shelters could be centers for community peacetime activities. Stocks of foodstuffs and of medical supplies, carefully maintained and rotated, are valuable assets.

The largest single cost component of a national civil-defense program involves group shelter construction. It has been estimated that a public investment of \$2 billion to \$3 billion a year, phased over a 6-year period, will accomplish the primary tasks of civil defense in the United States. The major financing should and must be a responsibility of the Federal Government.

Investments of this order are well within the Nation's economic capacity. These would be investments in national security which are indeed modest compared to military expenditures.

The subcommittee suggests that the required civil-defense outlays, even if added to the military budget, probably would return more security dividends, dollar for dollar, than they would as military outlays.

PLANNING REQUIREMENTS OF CIVIL DEFENSE

The subcommittee believes that more hard thinking and more doing, and less shallow oratory are needed in civil defense. Perhaps there has been too much concern over who should do the job (military or civilian, Federal or local), and not enough concern as to how the job needs to be done.

It is not the subcommittee's function to lay down a blueprint for civil defense. Nevertheless it is necessary to draw attention to the fact that the Federal Civil Defense Administration has not yet begun to grasp fully the technical, administrative, or economic requirements of an effective civil-defense program.

The technical planning requirements were outlined to the subcommittee in a penetrating and incisive analysis by representatives of the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory. The observations in this section are based on that analysis, except that the subcommittee makes its own interpretations and conclusions.

First of all, an effective civil defense must be an integrated system. This never can be achieved by individual and unrelated local efforts, since these may conflict or cancel out, each other, or may result in gaps or "weak links" which seriously weaken the program. "The importance of approaching the needs of passive defense as an integrated system rather than an agglomeration of individual measures cannot be overemphasized", said Capt. R. A. Hinnens, commanding officer and director of the Naval Laboratory.

To illustrate simply the weak-link concept, Walmer E. Strobe, director of the weapons evaluation group at the Laboratory, cited the hypothetical case of a drydock constructed to withstand 50 pounds per square inch (p. s. i.) of blast pressure from a nuclear weapon. Nearby was a powerplant essential to the operation of the drydock. If the blast-resistance capacity of the powerplant were only 5 p. s. i., obviously it would be useless to have greater protection in the drydock when the powerplant would be destroyed. Potentially this is a case of "pouring money down the rathole."

The weak-link analysis, Mr. Strobe pointed out, can be applied not only to the plant or installation, but to the whole target area, and ultimately to the whole Nation. Thus it might be wasteful to accumulate a huge store of medical supplies if there were not enough doctors, nurses, and other trained medical personnel to use them in treating the injured. The weakest links, the ones that will fail first, are the ones that should be worked on first. The optimum civil-defense system, combining protective construction, shelters, food-stuffs, emergency supplies and equipment, depends on a careful analysis of all the relevant factors in a particular target area.

In principle the requirements do not differ as between civilian and military targets. Protection of the shipyard work force and facilities in, say, Long Beach, Calif., and protection of the resident population are part of the same problem.

Planning for effective civil defense will be faulty (and ultimately fatal) if unrealistic or restrictive planning assumptions are not avoided. To depend on so many hours of advance warning, or to speculate about the enemy's decision to deliver so many bombs to such and such targets, makes the plan useless if the assumed conditions do not prevail. The proper planning objective is to take in all possible

assumptions—to plan for the worst, so to speak, with a sharp look ahead toward the weapons and delivery systems of tomorrow and the years to come. The Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory calls this a “target-oriented” approach as contrasted with a restrictive “weapon-oriented” approach.

Mr. Strobe listed 7 types of restrictive assumptions in the “weapon-oriented” approach which commonly vitiate most civil defense plans. These are:

- (1) Yield of the weapon (whether so many kilotons or megatons).
- (2) Type of attack (whether air, ground, or water burst).
- (3) Number of weapons delivered.
- (4) The point of attack.
- (5) The time of attack.
- (6) The warning of attack.
- (7) The existence of central control.

A “target-oriented” system will not be tied down by any specific assumptions concerning the above. The optimum combination of protective measures in the system is designed to exploit to the fullest the damage control possibilities.

In this concept, civil defense is not a technique for bare survival or for performing emergency welfare services. Civil defense is conceived as an active, integrated system of countermeasures, time-phased to proceed from immediate survival to recouping from the blow. This is civil defense in the strategic sense in which we have considered it in this report.

A study submitted by the Naval Laboratory ⁴¹ distinguishes three time phases. The emergency phase begins upon warning of attack and may last for several days to a week, depending on the importance of the target; the operational recovery phase may last for months or years, perhaps for the duration of hostilities; the final recovery phase follows and may be indefinitely prolonged.

In the emergency phase the object is to save people and, in a larger framework, facilities. In other words, life and property losses are to be kept to a minimum. The operational recovery phase seeks to regain the military usefulness of the target as soon as possible. The final recovery phase seeks to regain, to the extent possible, normal operations.

Starting in the emergency phase, survival and recovery operations revolve about one central or key measure; shelter. This is not an arbitrary or emotional choice, but one dictated by hard physical facts—the effects of high-yield nuclear weapons.

Shelter is the central measure because no other single measure can provide as much protection against all weapon effects or depends so little on specified warning time. Shelters are not an exclusive measure, but without shelters all other measures such as evacuation or industrial dispersion can have but limited, if any, effect. These others are supplementary or—to use the Naval Laboratory term—“peripheral” measures.

Evacuation and dispersal as peripheral measures, do not possess this specific instrumental value: they can do nothing to shrink the damage impact of the weapon; they are measures for getting out of

⁴¹ Radiological Defense Measures as a Countermeasure System, February 15, 1956, printed in subcommittee hearings, pt. 6, pp. 2384 ff.

the way. Shelters by contrast serve to "make the weapon look smaller," that is, to reduce the area of casualty production.

Very good shelters can protect occupants even at ground zero for air bursts, and up to within 2 to 4 crater radii for surface bursts. For a 10-megaton weapon, this means protection within 1 to 2 miles of ground zero.

Adapting data from Dr. Libby's testimony, Mr. Strobe explained that a 10-megaton weapon might produce a damage radius of 15 miles or an area of some 700 square miles, and also contaminate some 7,000 square miles by fallout. Shelters properly constructed could reduce the radius of blast and heat damage to an order of 1 to 2 miles or the area to 3 to 12 square miles. In percentage terms, the area of immediate effects would be reduced to 1 percent and the larger area of fallout to one-tenth of 1 percent of the original casualty areas. This constitutes a drastic reduction of the blast, burn, and radiation effects of high-yield weapons. Shelter squeezes a 20-megaton down to 20-kiloton size.

A large bomb exploded at surface level would, of course, annihilate even sheltered people and facilities within an immediate impact area of 1 to 2 miles (depending on bomb size), and the more closely packed the population, the greater the casualties. The value of locating shelters within target areas is heightened considerably, however, because exact enemy hits on the target cannot be assumed. The recent incident of an Air Force bomber missing a nuclear target by several miles at the Pacific proving grounds under ideal test conditions, is a case in point. For intercontinental ballistic missiles, held forth as a newer and greater threat, nuclear projectiles traversing thousands of miles at 20 times the speed of sound and descending from 500 or so miles in the sky, precise target hits would be very unlikely.

If the "circle of probable error," that is, the aiming error in any direction, is, say, 5 miles, the chances of hitting the target are about 4 in 100. In other words, as Mr. Strobe explained, 96 percent of the time shelter would save lives in the target area toward which a given missile would be directed.

Implicit in this concept of shelter as the key measure in civil defense is the attribute of self-sufficiency. The sheltered population must have at hand the resources of continuing purposeful activity without waiting for directions or communications from some outside source. Shelter is not only a refuge from immediate explosion effects, but a base of operations or a staging area for the next phase in recovery action.

This requires planning "from the inside out" rather than "from the outside in," directly reversing conventional civil defense which organizes aid crews to converge on a stricken area from the periphery. In the era of megaton bombs, with their extended range of impact and the means of contaminating large areas, shelters may be the only "clean" areas for some time after an attack.

It follows that shelters built for bare survival for limited periods may be cheaper initially, but ultimately more costly, than those equipped and stocked for a longer stay, or for the preparation of recovery activities.

SHELTER-EVACUATION POLICIES

Within this framework of analysis it becomes readily apparent how weak and ineffective, and indeed dangerously shortsighted, is the FCDA's reliance on evacuation as a technique for minimizing casualties in the event of nuclear attack. The whole FCDA evacuation approach to civil defense depends on one of the restrictive "weapon-oriented" assumptions; namely that there will be adequate warning time.

Evacuation as a peripheral measure has a proper role. But evacuation without sufficient advance warning is impossible, and the fleeing population is subject to fallout radiation unless it too can have shelter.

The danger and the fallacy of relying exclusively on a single technique of civil defense were emphasized in the 1955 report of the Project East River review committee. That report, upon a review of the advances in weapons technology since the original 1952 Project East River studies, decided that evacuation from large metropolitan complexes, particularly in view of the fallout hazard, had become largely an unmanageable problem. The value of properly-constructed shelters in protecting against blast, heat, and radiation effects was recognized.

Dr. Killian likewise emphasized to the subcommittee the limitation of a single-approach evacuation theory. "To say that evacuation is the solution or is not the solution is very dangerous in any given situation."⁴²

The strenuous efforts and sizable expenditures by FCDA to show that evacuation is possible are somewhat beside the point, Willard Bascom indicated, since the question is not whether evacuation is possible but whether it is appropriate. In his view, the advocacy of evacuation as a civil defense measure without clearly stating its limiting assumptions and conditions is "meaningless."⁴³

Whatever its limitations as a survival technique, evacuation does have this budgetary advantage; it requires no large Federal outlays (providing one lets the evacuees find their own shelter along the exit routes in case of fallout and their own ways and means of living in reception areas, and also lets the local highway officials worry about the cost of road improvements).

Administrator Peterson put it this way in explaining the purpose of current FCDA-sponsored evacuation studies:

The attempt in these studies, Mr Chairman, in every instance has been to find out whether evacuation would work in any given city. If evacuation would work, we would prefer to evacuate these cities rather than to undertake a very costly shelter building program.⁴⁴

The Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory study, mentioned earlier, asserts that—

a great deal of confusion has resulted from the attempts by some people to propose tactical evacuation as the central countermeasure—as a cheap substitute for atomic shelter.⁴⁵

⁴² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, p. 220.

⁴³ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, p. 163.

⁴⁴ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, pp. 1346-1347.

⁴⁵ Radiological Defense Measures as a Countermeasure System, subcommittee hearings pt. 6, p. 2334.

Besides evacuation, FCDA has found another way to avoid an expensive shelter program: Let each individual build his own (providing he can afford it and has a basement or backyard). Administrator Peterson and other FCDA officials have attributed this "individual" shelter approach to the refusal of Congress to appropriate the large sums necessary for group shelter construction.⁴⁶ It turns out, however, that for the whole term of his office, Administrator Peterson has not proposed a group shelter construction program.

To understand these developments in perspective, it will be necessary to review early shelter policy, the shift to evacuation, and the circumstances indicating that shelter is coming back into FCDA consideration. A more detailed summary is presented as an annex to this report. (See pp. 82-93.)

The problem usually has been viewed by FCDA as one of alternatives rather than of building an integrated civil defense system. All civil defense planning such as it is, in the United States has varied between the two oversimplified polar concepts of shelter and evacuation, the emphasis at any particular time depending on the degree of understanding of weapons effects and of the means and costs of countering them. This shifting emphasis is reflected in slogans used from time to time by FCDA officials in exhorting the populace to do what the prevailing concept dictates.

Thus it was common to use the expression "duck and cover" in the days when nuclear bombs were smaller, radioactive fallout relatively unknown, and other civil defense measures seemingly impracticable. Interestingly enough, *Duck and Cover*, a popular pamphlet first prepared by the National Security Resources Board in 1950 and inherited by FCDA, sold millions of copies through the Government Printing Office. It was not withdrawn from publication by FCDA until February 1956, years after the information was outdated and misleading.

In 1951 and 1952, the FCDA under Administrator Millard Caldwell tried to obtain congressional appropriations of \$250 million to initiate a program of matching grants to the States for shelter construction, as contemplated in the Federal Civil Defense Act. The projected Federal share of the costs for the shelter program, at the time the 1950 legislation was being considered in the Congress, was \$1,125 million for a 3-year period. Later FCDA estimates put the Federal share at \$865 million.

At the outset, large underground shelters were considered, but Administrator Caldwell quickly decided upon a policy of using or "shoring up" existing structures, leaving new shelter construction to a later phase. Unconvinced that the FCDA requests were justified, the Congress refused to vote any funds for shelter purposes.

Upon taking office early in 1953, Administrator Peterson expressed full agreement with the congressional action. Asserting that he saw no other alternative to the enormous destructive impact of hydrogen bombs, Administrator Peterson shifted to a policy of evacuation, or as one witness expressed it, "run like hell."⁴⁷ This policy was presented by the Administrator in speeches and FCDA literature as "evacuate or die"⁴⁸ or "die, dig or get out."⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, pp. 1210, 1263, 1267;

⁴⁷ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 6, p. 2099.

⁴⁸ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 6, p. 2506.

⁴⁹ Annex A, p. 89.

In this phase of FCDA civil defense policy, shelter plays an incidental role, either as the optional choice of individuals in remodeling their bathroom or basement or digging in their backyard; or as more or less hastily improvised devices for shielding from fallout along evacuation routes.

The different senses in which "shelter" can be used as a civil defense measure has led to considerable confusion and also has enabled the Administrator to argue before the subcommittee that FCDA always has entertained a "balanced" concept of shelter and evacuation.

As the shadow of the impending intercontinental ballistics missile lengthens over the world, the FCDA is beginning to see that the half hour or so in which such a missile can travel from Moscow to Chicago or elsewhere, even if allowed as warning time, is hopeless as a basis for evacuation. The dilemma is the more acute and uncomfortable because the FCDA has persuaded the Congress to vote it \$20 million for "survival plan" studies which are pointed toward the evacuation concept.

Since these studies were programed as a 2-year project, the FCDA is far behind the rush of weapons technology and the declining possibilities of advance warning time. When confronted with this dilemma by the subcommittee, Administrator Peterson repeatedly insisted that the FCDA was not wedded to evacuation policy and might move into the shelter field. He wanted to defer basic decisions, however, until findings were available from the evacuation studies within the next year or two (or possibly earlier).

In the meantime, as the potential warning time diminishes, and in the absence of any national policy or program for shelter construction, certain cities like Milwaukee and possibly New York are falling back on the technique of "strategic" evacuation. That is to say, since advance warning time cannot be counted upon for quick or "tactical" evacuation, the city leaders, using their own judgment, would attempt to identify a period of gathering war tensions and encourage their city populations to withdraw well in advance of possible attack.

FCDA SHELTER POLICY

Since shelter plays the key role in an effective civil defense, a firm Government policy on shelter is crucial. To ascertain FCDA's views in this field requires close examination of the testimony, not only because of apparent differences of opinion between the Administrator and his staff shelter expert, but because the Administrator's prepared statement may create misleading impressions unless it is placed in the context of his complete testimony.

In his prepared statement to the subcommittee, Administrator Peterson declared:

The survival of populations likely to be the targets of thermonuclear weapons will depend upon a balanced application of evacuation and shelter.

Space and shielding are our only weapons in civil defense. The destructive effect of recently developed thermonuclear weapons is so great that it is unthinkable for people to remain near the heart of a probable thermonuclear target if there are any possible alternatives.

So, the commonsense answer appears to be evacuation, in combination with the utilization of predetermined shelter. Evacuation—to escape blast, heat, and initial radiation. Shelter—of substantial strength outside the areas of heaviest damage for those who must remain, and lighter shelter beyond the probable target area to escape radioactive fallout, the lethal secondary effect of a thermonuclear ground explosion.⁵⁰

He also stated:

When our survival studies are completed, we will have much more specific information on shelter needs. But now we believe that a sound shelter program is possible and at a cost which this Nation can afford.⁵¹

Describing the results of "Operation Cue" at Nevada in May 1955, which tested atomic explosion effects on structures, he listed as one of the "major impressions gained from the technical tests" that "shelters can provide excellent protection at a reasonable unit cost."⁵²

It should not be inferred from this testimony that the FCDA is about to embark on a shelter construction program. Its work in the shelter field is confined to study of various shelter designs and the effects of atomic explosions on structures.

The enabling legislation, apart from authorizing shelter research and design work, limits the Federal activity to 50-50 matching grants to States for shelter construction. The law bars such grants for dual-purpose shelters.

No grants for shelter construction ever have been made. It was agreed by most witnesses at the subcommittee hearings that a shelter program would be possible only if financed mainly by the Federal Government.

The Administrator has not made any request to the Congress for shelter financing, nor has he ever proposed that the law be changed to permit the Federal Government to assume the necessary financial responsibility.

In his testimony, Administrator Peterson said that a shelter program would be submitted to the Congress—

when we are satisfied in our minds that we have the soundest possible program, with the most accurate costing of that program possible to put before the Congress.⁵³

That time would come, he thought, toward the end of the evacuation feasibility studies now in their initial phase.

It is my belief, Mr. Congressman, that some time in the next year and a half to 2 years, maybe it can be done sooner than that, I don't know, we can go before the Congress with a sound program, with price tags attached and that day it seems to me there will be a showdown in this country on whether we are serious on civil defense.

On that day when we go in with the price tag attached, civil defense is going to cost so many hundreds of millions or

⁵⁰ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, pp. 1185-1186.

⁵¹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1167.

⁵² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1167.

⁵³ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1213.

billions of dollars and is going to become a material factor in the fiscal considerations of the Government of the United States.⁵⁴

He also said:

I stated in New York before the Governors of Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey and the mayor of New York that if our survival plans study showed we could not evacuate New York then we would have to undertake a shelter program.⁵⁵

This concept, he asserted, applied to Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and all other areas: "We have always said if these studies proved that evacuation would not work then you would have to rely on the only other tool you have which is shelter."⁵⁶

Under questioning, Administrator Peterson said he would not necessarily wait until the evacuation feasibility studies are completed before submitting a "sound program, costwise," to the Congress. He hoped to get 7 or 8 of the studies finished within 6 months for that purpose.⁵⁷

In great metropolitan areas like Los Angeles, surrounded by ocean, mountains, and desert, evacuation is regarded as absurd, and studies of evacuation feasibility have no purpose that the subcommittee can see. The deputy chief of police, Los Angeles, Arthur C. Hohmann, reminded the subcommittee, if it needed reminding, that the mere appearance of a popular singer in Palm Springs caused a traffic jam from Los Angeles, which took many hours to overcome.⁵⁸

Mayor Norris Poulson of Los Angeles emphasized to the subcommittee that the day for a complete reappraisal of the Federal civil-defense program was long overdue and that radical changes in philosophy and programs must be forthcoming.⁵⁹

In any case, the feasibility of evacuation cannot be "proved" because the assumption as to necessary warning time must be made, regardless of what the survey finds. When this assumption, questionable at best, is ruled out by the ICBM, evacuation goes with it. Administrator Peterson preferred to proceed on the basis that "The evil of today is sufficient in this business."⁶⁰

As he saw it, the ICBM era lay in an uncertain future. "If the chairman can name the date the ICBM comes into play, then I am willing to name the date that evacuation as a concept becomes seriously impaired and will need to be discarded."⁶¹

Shelters he regarded as a costly nuisance.

Except that if it were not for the coming of the ICBM then the evacuation concept would be sound and would continue to be sound and we would not need to spend either the money on the shelters nor go to the inconvenience. Actually the people's lives would be much more secure if we got them out of the point of the assumed explosion.

⁵⁴ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1181.

⁵⁵ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1346.

⁵⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1347.

⁵⁷ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1234.

⁵⁸ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 6, p. 2234.

⁵⁹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 6, p. 2231.

⁶⁰ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1348.

⁶¹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1217.

In other words the only thing that is impeaching evacuation today is the possibility of the ICBM which eliminates warning time.⁶²

When the Administrator was asked why, in the face of that impending threat, he was willing to sponsor a 2-year program of evacuation studies, he averred that in mid-1955, when these funds were requested from the Congress, the ICBM threat did not seem so formidable as it does today. In his view then, "the emphasis appeared to be more properly and more largely upon evacuation." "These survival studies now must contemplate this business of the possibility of increased reliance upon shelter."⁶³

Although Administrator Peterson maintained that the FCDA guide manuals for the studies embodied a balanced shelter-evacuation concept, examination of the FCDA guide manuals affirms the original intent of these studies to promote local evacuation plans. The Survival Plan Work Book, for example, states that—

the survival plan aims primarily at an adequate solution of the tactical evacuation problem and situation.⁶⁴

The FCDA guide manual proposes 19 study areas. Shelter is listed as one of these study areas, conceived not in terms of a basic civil-defense measure but as a side feature of evacuation. The manual recites:

Under this study the shelter requirements and shelter availability along evacuation routes and in reception areas will be analyzed.

The Administrator's testimony and related documentation makes it clear, in any event, that he considers a shelter program impracticable or unnecessary against the present-day threat of multimegaton bombs. He has not departed from his original belief that the answer to contemporary weapons is evacuation. Shelter is a problem only for the ICBM era because then there is too little warning time and evacuation is "pretty largely out of the window."⁶⁵ And even so, he speculated, missiles launched in saturation attacks would make shelters quite useless.⁶⁶

The threat of submarine missiles which can be launched offshore today was discounted on his expectation of effective Navy counter-measures.⁶⁷

With an administrator's understandable caution, Administrator Peterson gave different emphasis to shelter possibilities than did Benjamin C. Taylor of his small shelter staff.

Mr. Taylor stated that there is nothing complicated about the construction of underground shelters; the know-how exists.⁶⁸

Administrator Peterson emphasized that "definitive answers are not readily available in this area."⁶⁹

Mr. Taylor estimated that evenly spaced underground shelters would save 64 percent of the people who otherwise would be killed

⁶² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1340.

⁶³ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1234.

⁶⁴ Federal Civil Defense Administration, Document M-27-2, December 1955, p. 4.

⁶⁵ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1351.

⁶⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1227.

⁶⁷ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1228.

⁶⁸ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1262.

⁶⁹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1178.

after an explosion, if given a 20-minute warning time. "The study I have just described," he said, "gives some idea of the great saving in life that can be effected by a mass shelter program in a metropolitan target area."⁷⁰

Administrator Peterson described such calculations as "loose" and said: "I think there is a tendency on the part of some to believe they have found some mysterious and mystic device in a shelter that will save everyone."⁷¹

Mr. Taylor stated that "with proper design, subways could provide excellent shelter for very large numbers of people over a broad area and further permit protected movements to outlying areas after an attack."⁷²

Administrator Peterson expressed the opinion that subway shelters could become a great burial ground.⁷³

Mr. Taylor stated that a shelter program could be started without waiting for the survival plan studies.⁷⁴

Administrator Peterson based his shelter ideas on the outcome of the studies.

Mr. Taylor gave the subcommittee a special briefing at the Battle Creek headquarters of FCDA which the subcommittee asked him to restate in open hearings at Washington, D. C. Mr. Taylor's superiors deleted from his Battle Creek statement various items which the subcommittee has replaced in the testimony with identify brackets.⁷⁵

Among items deleted were the following:

If sufficient data can be gathered, FCDA expected to initiate some part of the shelter program in the budget request for fiscal 1958.

Mr. Taylor expressed hope that the subcommittee hearings will get across to the country the urgency of a shelter program even though it is costly.

The estimated total cost for shelter protection of 87 million people in metropolitan target areas would be \$13 billion, which could be phased over a 6-year period at \$2 billion per year, an amount which could be absorbed by the economy.⁷⁶

The subcommittee received considerable testimony from other expert witnesses regarding the cost and value of shelter against high-yield weapons.

General Sturgis said that the design or location of shelters required a great deal of study but urged that such study be undertaken.⁷⁷

H. L. Bowman, consultant to the Atomic Energy Commission, pointed to unexplored problems in human resistance to blast pressure, but he stated that there was enough technical information to "make a start" on a shelter program.⁷⁸

Dr. Dunham of the Atomic Energy Commission stated that adequate shelters would protect not only against burns and traumatic injuries but against radiation either from high bursts or from the lethal effects of ground surge mist from an underwater blast. He

⁷⁰ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1283.

⁷¹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, pp. 1227-28.

⁷² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1285.

⁷³ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1330.

⁷⁴ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1294.

⁷⁵ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1292.

⁷⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, pp. 1267, 1292.

⁷⁷ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 593.

⁷⁸ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 3, p. 937.

stated that shelters were the only practical remedial measure at this time.⁷⁹

Edward Cohn of the firm of Ammann & Whitney, consulting engineers, stated that the area of severe blast damage to buildings could be reduced as much as 70 percent at relatively low cost if blast resistance is considered in the design of new construction. He noted that blast resistance by itself would not afford adequate protection in large densely built-up cities where secondary fires and fire storms might cause death by suffocation and heat, of those persons protected from blast. Large shelters, he said, would reduce unit costs and provide greater safety because of more responsible engineering.⁸⁰

Mr. Taylor of FCDA stated that a dome shelter design held forth great promise at a cost of about \$100 per person, including necessary stores of food and medical supplies. This estimate was independent of land costs.⁸¹

The dome shelter design was suggested by the American Machine & Foundry Co. J. Edmund Fitzgerald, an engineer representative of that company, estimated that the average shelter cost per person might be \$50 per person, excluding land costs, or about \$8 billion for the whole United States.⁸²

Mr. Fitzgerald estimated that shelter would yield a 65 percent survival rate after a 20-megaton explosion, with either 20 minutes or 1½-hour warning time. The survival rates for evacuation, by comparison, were put at 20 to 40 percent, depending on the highway improvements. Based upon a Milwaukee survey, he estimated that a shelter program would cost the city less than a recommended freeway improvement program for evacuation.⁸³

Although Mr. Taylor of FCDA emphasized the importance of shelter for protection against the fallout hazard, the serious implications of fallout have not been fully considered in FCDA-sponsored evacuation policy.

Mayor Frank Zeidler, of Milwaukee, reporting for the American Municipal Association, said that in most cities, evacuation plans were primitive. "There exists beyond the evacuation almost nothing in the way of reception centers or welfare centers."⁸⁴

Likewise Col. John E. Fondahl, civil defense director for the District of Columbia, testified in regard to the Washington area that there was no provision in the evacuation plan for selected movement because of fallout, nor any provision for the care of evacuees.⁸⁵

Administrator Peterson denied that evacuation policy anticipated having people in the open country. He cited preliminary studies in St. Louis purporting to show "you could evacuate a million people and give them reasonable shelter against the existing effects of radioactivity."⁸⁶

The subcommittee has examined the St. Louis study cited by the Administrator. It stated that one of the "many problems not yet solved" was staging the evacuees in suburban areas, dispatching them to places of temporary shelter, then providing shelter and feeding until they could be returned to their homes or be relocated.

⁷⁹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 3, pp. 905, 921.

⁸⁰ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 3, pp. 958, 969.

⁸¹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, pp. 1285, 1289.

⁸² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 3, p. 996.

⁸³ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 3, pp. 998-999.

⁸⁴ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 7, p. 2793.

⁸⁵ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 5, p. 2045.

⁸⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1351.

The study estimated that up to a million persons would be homeless while the stricken city was being rehabilitated, for whom shelter, food and other services would have to be provided. On the basis of a shelter survey by the American Red Cross, the St. Louis study estimated that probably not more than 186,000 persons could be sheltered in the eastern half of Missouri exclusive of St. Louis and St. Louis County. It observed: "It is clear therefore that additional shelter must be prepared for." After a brief stay in the staging areas, the report said, rapid reevacuation was essential.⁸⁷

Since enemy choice of targets, accuracy of bomb delivery and direction of the winds on the day of assault cannot be assumed, civil defense is confronted not only with the problems of widespread blast and heat damage but of fallout that potentially can cover a nation. Consequently the problems of shelter against the effects of nuclear explosions and against fallout tend to merge and assume the dimensions of a single nationwide shelter problem.

The subcommittee observes that while evacuation has a temporary and limited value against the weapon advances which diminish warning time, the problem of the warning time for shelters cannot be ignored either. Shelter locations will have to be so spaced that persons can have ready access within periods of 15 to 20 minutes.

While the strategic factors in offensive war by the enemy make it difficult, and perhaps impossible, for massive assault to be prepared and launched completely under surprise conditions, civil defense must contend with greatly diminished warning time. The great expenditure of effort and funds by the United States to achieve the technical means of early warning against attack by manned bombers must comprehend expanded research into detecting and countering intercontinental missiles.

INDUSTRIAL DISPERSAL

Contrasted with shelter and evacuation as civil defense measures, dispersal does not depend on warning time in a tactical sense. Dispersal is a slow, gradual process in response to complex economic, social and other forces, although occasionally it is speeded up where strategic military production is concerned.

There is considerable interest in industrial dispersal as a technique for reducing urban vulnerability. In 1952, Project East River rated this area of activity as crucial. Numerous witnesses before the subcommittee stressed its importance for civil defense. Administrator Peterson expressed the thought that, looking to the era of intercontinental missiles, dispersal might be the most effective preattack civil-defense measure.⁸⁸

The Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory rates dispersal high in potential value, perhaps next to adequate shelter, for reducing personnel casualties. As we have seen earlier, shelter reduces drastically the area of casualty production. Dispersal, by thinning out the population in the reduced area, makes any given strike even less "profitable" to the enemy.

But dispersal, as the Naval Laboratory points out, also has its limitations. These are twofold: It is highly sensitive to weapon yield and highly insensitive to planning urgency.

⁸⁷ A Preliminary Study of Pre-Attack Evacuation, Office of Civil Defense, St. Louis, Mo., June 30, 1954.

⁸⁸ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1166.

As larger weapons appear, dispersal distances must be greatly increased to be effective. Under the dread circumstances, entirely possible, that a few large weapons could contaminate the whole United States with radioactivity to casualty-producing levels, the value of dispersal (without shelter) drops to zero.

The significance of higher weapon yield and fallout after the 1954 Pacific test explosions led several Government agencies to undertake studies of the dispersal problem with a view to recommending new standards for industry.⁸⁹

In May 1955, the Department of Defense, the Office of Defense Mobilization and the FCDA joined in asking General Nelson to head a review committee for the purpose of reevaluating the Project East River recommendations. The letter of request by ODM Director Flemming pointed particularly to the fact that "our existing dispersion policy of 10 miles from the perimeter of the target area is obsolete under the new weapons conditions." The "serious hazards caused by fallout" also were noted.

The review committee concluded that there had been some dispersal, mainly of certain key defense production facilities. However, it regarded dispersal of military production alone as "far from an adequate or complete solution."

In the review committee's opinion, the Federal dispersal program has been far too limited. It believed that dispersal must cover a broad range of industries vital to postattack recovery and rehabilitation.

On the assumption that the productive capacity of the U. S. S. R. was about 30 percent of the present United States level, it was suggested as an immediate first objective that 30 percent of our gross national production be dispersed. This recommendation was renewed before the subcommittee by General Nelson, Dr. Berkner and others.

Dr. Berkner, for example, pointed out that since World War II industrial plants were being rebuilt at rates exceeding 2½ percent per year. Within a period of 10 years, more than one-fourth of the total plant capacity in the United States is replaced, offering opportunities for dispersal. He emphasized the need for balanced industrial dispersal oriented around selected industries which were vital to the maintenance of industrial effectiveness after attack.⁹⁰

The Project East River review committee considered dispersal in a context both broader than military production and broader than industry alone. In the widest sense many different kinds of measures contribute to the reduction of urban vulnerability. The review committee proposed such measures as highways around cities, slum clearance programs, and park and other projects which have a bearing upon the extent and control of explosion damage in cities.

Presumably in response to the general recommendations of the Project East River review committee, ODM Director Flemming issued Defense Mobilization Orders I-18 and I-19, both dated January 11, 1956. One assigned to FCDA responsibility for reduction of urban vulnerability. That agency was asked to develop and coordinate plans and programs toward this end, including coordination at the metropolitan target zone level.

⁸⁹ AEC-FCDA Relationships, hearing before the Subcommittee on Security of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., 1st sess., (March 24, 1955), p. 9.

⁹⁰ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, p. 110.

The other order purported to set forth a new policy and criteria for industrial dispersion and protective construction. It recited the following policy:

It is the policy of the United States to encourage and, when appropriate, to require that new facilities and major expansions of existing facilities important to national security be located, insofar as practicable, so as to reduce the risk of damage in the event of attack, and to encourage and, when appropriate, require the incorporation of protective construction features in new and existing facilities to provide resistance to weapons effects suitable to the locations of said facilities.

The previous 10-mile distance criterion was abandoned in favor of 8 general criteria against which the vulnerability of a given facility might be evaluated. The order stated that while distance of a facility from the probable area of destruction is the controlling factor in reducing risk of attack damage, no single distance standard and no single set of specifications for protective construction appear practicable against nuclear, chemical, and unconventional weapons in our cities. The eight general criteria were to be applied so as to achieve the most protection practicable in a given case.

All Federal departments and agencies were made responsible for adhering to the policy and criteria set forth in the order. The Department of Commerce (Office of Area Development) was asked to give dispersal guidance and assistance to Government agencies and private firms and organizations. The FCDA was made responsible for integrating its plans and programs for the reduction of urban vulnerability with those for industrial dispersion at the metropolitan target-zone level. The latter agency also was made responsible for promulgating construction standards and specifications for protection of persons and property against nuclear and unconventional weapons effects.

The policy and criteria enjoined upon the Federal departments and agencies by the ODM order are so vague and general and contain so many possible combinations of factors that they really constitute no policy and no guide. Consider, for example, the eighth criterion to be applied in determining the appropriate distances from a probable target area: "The economic, operational, and administrative requirements in carrying out the function for which the facility is to be provided." Each department and agency which exercises influence over plant or facility location could justify any decision it wished under the eight criteria in the ODM order.

In extending the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, the Congress, after vigorous debate, included a section declaring it was the policy of Congress to encourage geographical dispersal of industrial facilities. As explained by the House conferees on the bill:

The amendment is designed to give an expression of congressional support and approval of the dispersal policies which the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Department of Defense have already adopted, and are carrying out. The amendment does not apply the principle of dispersal to existing plants. It does not require replacing existing industries. And it does not mean that geographical dispersal is the

only, or in some cases even the principal, factor to be considered. The amendment calls for the application of the principle of geographical dispersal of industrial facilities, under the coordination of the Office of Defense Mobilization, (1) when practicable, (2) when consistent with existing law, and (3) when consistent with the desirability of maintaining a sound economy. Full recognition can and should be given under this provision to the many other factors entering into the location of industrial plants, such as access to raw materials, power, labor and transportation.⁹¹

State Senator George C. Miller, who served as chairman of a special California Senate Committee on Civil Defense, observed to this subcommittee that it "would take at least 50 years to achieve any degree of success in an economical, practical, and reasonable manner" in dispersal. Such a program as an immediate measure he considered "utterly ridiculous."⁹²

Considering the powerful obstacles to industrial dispersal (which the review committee admitted were underestimated by Project East River in 1952), the sporadic and limited efforts of the Federal Government in promoting such dispersal, and the multiple and variable factors set forth as official Government policy for the future, the subcommittee sees little promise in dispersal as a civil defense measure. Granting it is desirable and has theoretical value, it cannot be relied upon as a specific technique in an operational civil defense program.

"SURVIVAL PLAN" STUDIES

Since the FCDA predicates all future civil defense policies and programs on the outcome of the evacuation feasibility studies, designated "survival plan" studies, the subcommittee has examined closely this area of activity.

Administrator Peterson described the "survival plan" studies as "the most important thing we have undertaken."⁹³

As he portrayed these studies, projected over a 2-year period, they will lay the necessary groundwork for new Federal legislation, for firm FCDA budget estimates, for establishing regional civil defense authorities, and for "operational plans" tailored to target areas, each reflecting the "optimum combination of evacuation and shelter."⁹⁴

The subcommittee does not know the origin of the survival studies. Administrator Peterson attributed the idea partly to General Nelson who, as chairman of the Project East River review committee, had proposed the development of "nonmilitary defense plans" for 14 leading metropolitan target areas. Administrator Peterson said, however, that he himself had a hand in establishing the review committee and that many of its recommendations were initiated or influenced by FCDA.⁹⁵

Governor Averell Harriman testified that "survival planning" had its birth in the activities of his office and Mayor Robert H. Wagner's in New York. The initiative for forming a tristate project group and for supporting the appropriation in Congress, Governor Harriman

⁹¹ 84th Cong., 2d sess., H. Rep. No. 2468, p. 3.

⁹² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 6, p. 2111.

⁹³ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1234.

⁹⁴ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, pp. 1166, 1191, 1234.

⁹⁵ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, pp. 1238, 1354.

said, came from Albany and New York City without any stimulus from Washington. Maj. Gen. C. R. Huebner, New York State civil defense director, added that Administrator Peterson was quite receptive to their ideas and that FCDA staff cooperated in drawing up rules and regulations for "survival planning."⁹⁶

Mayor Wagner's assistant, Stanley H. Lowell, dated the action back to the civil defense report of a committee headed by Lt. Gen. Willis D. Crittenger (retired), former commander of the First Army and personal adviser and civil defense representative of Mayor Wagner. This report was submitted to the mayor in early 1955, according to Mr. Lowell, and then there ensued a March 11, 1955, meeting of the mayor and Governors Harriman, Meyner, and Ribicoff. As a result of that meeting, General Crittenger and Thomas K. Finletter were dispatched to Washington to secure FCDA backing "for a survival study and plan for the metropolitan area of New York."⁹⁷

The studies are to be conducted in four phases.

Phase I includes a statement of the problem, an inventory of existing data, and design of the research study proper.

Phase II would comprise the detailed surveys, compilation, and analysis.

Phase III would be devoted to formulation of "operational survival plans" based on present resources and recommended improvements.

Phase IV would require the testing of the operational survival plan "to reasonably evaluate the workability." Presumably this would involve actual evacuation of cities.

As of July 1956, contracts have been signed with 25 groups representing greater or lesser population areas for the conduct of phase I of the study. Proposals were pending from 18 additional areas for either phase I or phase II contracts. Altogether the 25 study groups, according to FCDA estimates, represent a total population of 85,500,000. The pending contracts would bring in more millions of people.

Separate contracts will be made for each study phase. The standard terms of the contracts recite that "the contractor will complete the survival plan project."

Administrator Peterson and his General Counsel indicated that there was a moral but not a legal commitment for retaining the contracting parties through each successive phase.⁹⁸ The Baltimore study project manager believed he had a legal commitment all the way through.⁹⁹

Contracting parties with the Federal Government are one or more States or combinations of States and cities or counties. Where more than one State is involved, one State acts for the group as a fiscal agent to handle Federal funds. The participating entities in interstate groups usually set up a committee to perform the contract.

The FCDA permits the contracting parties to hire their own staff or to farm out all or parts of the project to university research groups, management consultant firms, or other organizations.

In the Washington area the study project is under the supervision of a tristate committee appointed by the Governors of Maryland and

⁹⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 5, p. 1817.

⁹⁷ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 5, p. 1863.

⁹⁸ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1355.

⁹⁹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 5, p. 1558.

Virginia and the Commissioners of the District of Columbia. A private firm was selected by that committee to conduct the first phase of the study.

In the Baltimore area an area survival committee was created, comprising the civil defense directors of Baltimore city, 5 Maryland counties, and the State of Maryland. A project manager with an assistant and clerk was engaged in carrying on phase I of the project at the time of the subcommittee hearing in Baltimore.

In the New York area a working committee for the project known as the Metropolitan Tristate Civil Defense Planning Board was established, consisting of the civil defense directors of Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York and the city of New York. The civil defense director of New York City is chairman of the board. Phase I of the contract, now almost completed, was prepared in part by board staff and in part by a management consultant firm.

The State of California, as a contractor with FCDA for its three target areas, subcontracted the whole phase I project to the Stanford Research Institute. The wording of the contract indicates that California will conduct the whole project study in 3 phases rather than in the usual 4.

The State of Michigan, which also signed a contract for its target areas, subcontracted the entire study to a management consultant firm.

A contract signed by Ohio also was subcontracted to a management consultant firm, Booz, Allen & Hamilton, the same firm retained by the New York study group.

The subcommittee was advised that some of the larger consultant firms were making proposals to various States and cities for conducting the survival plan studies. Michigan reported that it had received bids from 6 firms; Colonel Fondahl said 28 were interested in the Washington area project.

Proposals of consultant firms for the Washington area study, Colonel Fondahl said, ranged from \$300,000 to \$1.3 million. In another area, a representative of one firm complained to the subcommittee that his offer was turned down as being too low.

The availability of \$20 million in no-year Federal appropriations evidently has generated an active interest among consultant firms in acquiring this business. In at least one case, as just noted, the same firm was making studies for two areas. The Stanford Research Institute group also told the subcommittee it was available for work in the Portland, Oreg., area.

Administrator Peterson indicated to the subcommittee that phase I of the "survival plan" studies was designed to get State and city groups in metropolitan areas working together. In one case known to the subcommittee, the decision to hire a private firm reflected the inability of the participating parties to agree. Colonel Fondahl stated that initially the Washington area committee believed that the research and planning work should be done by the established local agencies which "would have to live with the plan after it was once developed." A private research firm was hired after the failure to obtain a coordinated study agreement.¹

The Project East River review committee estimated that survival plans in each of 14 leading metropolitan target areas could be made for about \$100,000 each in about 9 months' time.

¹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 5, p. 2044.

Administrator Peterson observed on this point:

I am certain that \$100,000 wouldn't accomplish what I had in mind with reference to the survival studies and what is needed and I can't believe that the committee would think so either.

He was unable to give an estimate of total project cost, stating that "there is no precedent in the world for these studies." He wondered whether \$20 million might be enough.²

FCDA funds allotted and time allowed to perform phase I contracts do not seem to follow any pattern.

The State of California was allotted \$198,000 and 6 months' time.

The New York area group, representing almost the same population and covering a tristate area, was allowed \$108,000 and 4 months' time.

Texas was allowed \$192,000 and a year's time to conduct a phase I study for the Houston critical target area, about one-fifteenth the population of the California area and one-thirteenth that of the New York area.

The Washington group, representing the same population as the Texas group, was allowed \$10,000 and 40 working days. Colonel Fondahl said that both the time and the money ran out.

The Boston group was allowed \$25,000 and 3 months for a population of 5 million.

The Ohio group was allowed \$16,500 and 3 months for a population of 8,200,000.

Pending contracts for phase 2 studies indicate substantial increases in allotments will be made for the more intensive research required in this phase. The Washington area, for example, proposes a jump from \$40,000 to \$800,000.

The FCDA guide manuals for the studies outlined 19 proposed areas of inquiry relating to evacuation. The New York and California groups, whom the subcommittee queried in some detail, had reorganized these proposed study areas. Thus the California group added categories which were omitted or only implied in the FCDA manual, such as studies of shelter availability in the target areas, food resources, industrial resources, medical aid, and military plans and organizations.

Both the New York and California studies added a category on nuclear weapons effects. "These things are necessary," said William L. White, director of the California project, "both to build the planning assumptions and also to test plans which might be made."⁴

Apparently, then, different projects are developing their own planning assumptions without any assurance that they will conform to those made elsewhere or with the relevant military intelligence and weapons technology.

The New York group proposed that certain regular staff members of the tristate board have access to Atomic Energy Commission and military briefings without relying on "secondhand information" from FCDA.

Mr. White agreed that the study of weapon effects is not peculiar to California and that, indeed, many of the FCDA's 19 study areas,

² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, pp. 1234-1236.

³ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, p. 135.

⁴ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 6, p. 2463.

plus the ones added by the project group, are common to all civil defense problems, with differing degrees of local application.

In California an "interim survival plan" is being developed as a framework for gathering data for the "operational plan" required in a later phase. This was necessary, Mr. White explained, because he found it difficult to know what data to look for without having an initial plan or context of operation.

The enormous duplication of paperwork, multiple research on common problems, variations in selection of study areas, and individual planning assumptions are apparent in this planning approach. Nothing in the individual contract prevents duplication. Only the alertness or enterprise of the research staff traveling around the country and contacting other groups could minimize to a degree duplicate work.

Because the project group cannot readily know in advance what information will be available or will be developed in studies elsewhere, it is difficult to develop reliable cost estimates, according to Mr. White.

Administrator Peterson recognized the possibilities of duplication in the studies, stating that after some of the studies had been finished he expected to find common elements, permitting them to be more rapidly and cheaply performed in some areas or to apply common principles in others.

The subcommittee examined the reports of the New York group which represents the largest metropolitan area complex and was among the first of the contractors to complete phase I. Both the reports of the regular civil defense staff and of the management firm were examined.

What these reports, at a cost of \$108,000 for the first phase, contribute to a "survival plan" in any meaningful sense of the term, escapes the subcommittee. Of course, the small fact-gathering assignments which the regular staff undertook have some value as gathered facts, and the management firm's recommendations for further studies (with suggested qualified management firms to conduct them) may produce some useful facts in the future. But nothing emerges from the material which even looks like the outline of an operational survival plan.

If anything, the report of the management firm cuts away the whole foundation of the evacuation feasibility study by the following admonition:

Survival plans should be made independent of any predicted available preattack warning time.

The firm's report of phase I devotes a substantial portion to a philosophy of civil defense. It reflects the views of 3 staff consultants of the firm, which received \$32,000 plus \$4,000 in out-of-pocket expenses for its share of the four months' study.

The views in the report may or may not be sound. Certainly many of them are questionable.

At the same time, dozens of projects in other areas reflect the philosophy and understanding of other private management firms or local civil defense staffs. Except for the common element of Federal financing, there is nothing in these studies which insures any community of understanding or basic approach or even method of fact-finding.

We illustrate the lengths to which such "atomized" civil defense planning can go. The management firm for the New York study decided "survival planning" must be considered in very narrow and austere terms. Consequently, in recommending what categories of essential government or commercial items (one of the 19 FCDA study areas) should be studied, it decided that such "morale-building" items suggested by FCDA as cigarettes, soap, and paper products should be rejected.

The subcommittee believes there are more important problems at this time than the question of whether evacuees should have soap, cigarettes, and paper. We do suggest, however, that for the Federal Government to spend funds and contract with a tristate board, to hire in turn a management firm to make such decisions, is planning for civil defense the hard way.

Col. Jack C. Gault, who has had War Department experience in civil-defense planning and who assisted in the preparation of the Hopley report, observed that these studies are "almost on the step of being a boondoggle."⁵

Colonel Gault pointed out that this congressional appropriation allowed the local civil-defense organizations to spend funds for administrative purposes, action barred by the Federal Civil Defense Act. He expected that 90 percent of the allotments for the studies would end up in administrative costs.⁶

Under the Federal Civil Defense Act, as amended, the Administrator makes matching grants of funds to States for purchase of supplies and equipment and for a few other purposes, but contributions for administrative expenses of State or local civil-defense organizations are prohibited. Federal grants to State-local groups to conduct studies, utilizing the funds to pay their own staff and to hire additional staff or consultant firms, appears to be a circumvention of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950.

Many requests have been made to the subcommittee by State and local groups that the law be amended to allow Federal contributions to help States and local groups ease the administrative burden of civil defense and thereby possibly to strengthen the local organizations. While the subcommittee is not opposed in general to this idea of Federal contributions to these organizations for administrative expenses, it sees no excuse on the Administrator's part for making such contributions through the mechanism of "survival plan" studies.

Colonel Gault said he believed the projects were turning into a boondoggle because the project directors and other local civil-defense officials "are getting the idea that the alpha and omega of civil defense is contained in the survival project and therefore we can sit back and forget until 2 years hence when an agency or somebody else may come up and give us a mass-evacuation plan, and they call that civil defense."⁷

Administrator Peterson conveyed to the subcommittee the thought that this use of Federal funds had value in giving local groups an opportunity to exercise initiative in civil-defense planning. He said he recognized that if a war were impending in "30 days, 6 months, or a year from now, that would be no way to go at it. Then we would

⁵ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 7, p. 2660.

⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 7, pp. 2643-2655.

⁷ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 7, p. 2660.

be much better off to go at it from the top down." The imminence of war, he said, would require that FCDA proceed "in a more thorough authoritarian manner."⁸

The subcommittee believes that the FCDA approach to civil-defense planning through these studies is exactly the reverse of that which is required.

An understandable and effective procedure would have been for the FCDA to resolve or decide certain basic national policies and to formulate a master plan in accordance therewith and then to adjust this master plan to the requirements of designated targets chosen on a priority basis, this in conjunction with planning by the military authorities for the protection of military installations or adjacent areas.

Witness after witness emphasized the need for a vigorous national civil-defense plan. This would seem to be a matter of commonsense and of urgent necessity in view of the Federal Government's responsibility to defend the Nation against enemy attack. It is not "authoritarian" to give effective national direction to local civil-defense programs when the objective is national survival.

While the subcommittee does not want, in any sense, to discourage civil-defense planning that will lead to effective programs, it doubts seriously that, aside from the collection of assorted local data which always have some use in any planning, the "survival plans" will be of much use.

Finally, the subcommittee sees no evidence whatever that these plans will eventuate in what the Administrator called the "optimum combination of evacuation and shelter." Undertaking a shelter program as a key civil-defense measure depends on national decisions of the highest import and the provision of necessary authority and funds to the responsible Federal agency. The studies serve to postpone these basic decisions.

Shelter, as we observed earlier, is the central measure in any effective civil-defense program. Developing so-called operational survival plans in advance of a national decision to institute a shelter program is dangerous and doomed to failure.

METROPOLITAN TARGET AREA PLANNING

The survival-plan studies analyzed in the preceding section were represented to the subcommittee by Administrator Peterson, ODM Director Flemming, and numerous other witnesses as the preparatory stage for organizing civil-defense authorities on a metropolitan target zone basis.

In the Administrator's view, the aforesaid studies "are already having a profound influence on one organizational concept * * * the concept of metropolitan area planning."⁹ He attributed the need for new organizational concepts to the compelling force of weapon changes.

Originally when we were dealing with kiloton weapons this idea of metropolitan target complex did not occur to the people dealing in civil defense or anywhere else in America. Now, when you get into the megaton weapon this is forced upon us.¹⁰

⁸ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1238.

⁹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1186.

¹⁰ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1220.

The establishment of such metropolitan authorities Administrator Peterson considered imperative. In his view, the problems of organizing such authorities were not beyond solution. "We will have to solve it or we won't survive," he said.¹¹

In a similar vein, Mayor Zeidler stated to the subcommittee: "This is one of the great unsolved problems of the present civil defense situation in the United States."¹²

The immediate inspiration for this organizational approach to civil-defense stems from the 1955 report of the Project East River review committee. The report concluded that:

With megaton bombs, the whole concept of self-help on a town or city basis becomes impractical. Since nuclear weapons of the type likely to be used devastate an area much larger than most cities, an impact on any metropolitan target zone is such as to require that an effective defense be planned and conducted on a metropolitan target zone basis.

The review committee made this as its first recommendation:

That the metropolitan target zone be utilized as a basic unit for nonmilitary defense planning and operations.

The review committee further recommended a series of steps to bring this recommendation into effect.

As a first step it proposed that FCDA finance a study and preparation of nonmilitary defense plans for each of 14 (or other number) of leading metropolitan target zones; that an FCDA representative and staff be assigned to those zones; and that the participating State governors and mayors of the principal cities designate a representative to serve on an ad hoc committee along with a designated member of the Department of Defense. The FCDA was to allocate each committee a sum not to exceed \$100,000 and allow 9 months for the preparation of a nonmilitary defense plan for these leading target zones.

A memorandum prepared by FCDA states that agreement with the Project East River review committee recommendations was to be expected because FCDA participated in formulating them.

The FCDA issued a release on January 4, 1956, several months after the review of Project East River had been completed, stating on behalf of FCDA Administrator Peterson, ODM Director Flemming, and Secretary of Defense Wilson, that they jointly "have decided to implement" this first recommendation of the Project East River review committee for organizing and operating nonmilitary defense on the basis of metropolitan target zones.

"In order to implement this conclusion," the joint release stated, "we recognize that it will be necessary to develop, by metropolitan target zones, a mechanism that will result in all Federal, State, and local governmental agencies, whose duties relate in any way to nonmilitary defense working together as a team in order to achieve agreed upon nonmilitary defense objectives."

Eventually such a mechanism, the joint release continued, should be able to develop plans and execute programs for (1) dealing with postattack problems, including coordination with military plans; (2)

¹¹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1245.

¹² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 5, p. 1957.

reducing vulnerability of target areas and promoting dispersal; and (3) handling peacetime disasters.

Also it was stated that the mechanism to be established within the metropolitan target zones is now under study by the FCDA. Shortly after the release was issued, FCDA received from ODM an "assignment of responsibility of reduction of urban vulnerability," which included "coordination at the metropolitan target zone level of dispersion, urban redevelopment, highway, and other programs."

The subcommittee observes that the concept of metropolitan area planning on a basis which transcends existing political boundaries is not new or unique to civil defense. The complex economic, social, and administrative problems of metropolitan areas long have been recognized and discussed.¹³

A decade ago the Bull Board noted the relevance to civil defense of the problems presented by "large metropolitan areas which overlap military and political boundaries." Since the Board envisaged regional headquarters of a Federal civil-defense agency to coordinate civil-defense activities of the States and the regional military commanders, the solution proposed by the Bull Board for metropolitan areas was to establish subareas under Federal officials "in order that the civil-defense organizations in a highly populated area may be under the direction of a single head."¹⁴

The Hopley report,¹⁵ as Mayor Zeidler noted, devoted a brief chapter to metropolitan area organization in the civil-defense program. The report observed that many municipalities in a metropolitan area had different services, such as fire protection and water supply, even though they might have public utility systems in common. It stated:

These differences serve to emphasize the fact that in time of emergency there should be strong central civil-defense operational control in the metropolitan area. Emergency conditions will not permit of delays in crossing municipal, county, or State lines because of difference of governmental entity in an area where municipalities are contiguous, boundary lines artificial, and the populace united in concert of purpose and needs.¹⁶

The Hopley group believed the combined resources and facilities of all municipalities should be pooled in unified civil-defense operation by the mechanism of a central council. Also suggested was the appointment of a director or coordinator of civil defense for the metropolitan area, appointed by, responsible to, and under the direction of the central council.

Within a given State the Hopley group thought it entirely practical for metropolitan area directors to be appointed by the Governor in cooperation with local authorities.

In metropolitan areas crossing State lines, the Hopley group thought it would be practical for the communities of each individual State to form their own metropolitan area organization under a central council, these in turn to be worked into an interstate organization by mutual-aid agreements between the respective councils.

¹³ See Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, a report to the President (June 1955), p. 50.

¹⁴ A Study of Civil Defense, National Military Establishment, Office of the Secretary (released February 1948), p. 14.

¹⁵ Civil Defense for National Security, report to the Secretary of Defense by the Office of Civil Defense Planning (1948).

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 47-48.

The Hopley group recognized the many legal and other problems required to be solved but believed that they could be solved by proper legislation at all levels of government and by advance plans, arrangements and agreements. The committee concluded:

However rigid may be political boundary lines in normal times, they become simply artificial and invisible lines in time of emergency. Civil defense can operate through a metropolitan area with the same facility as in one individual municipality, if organized as suggested.¹⁷

In 1952 Project East River proposed "that the States, with Federal encouragement and financial aid, if necessary, create and finance metropolitan district planning commissions." These commissions would engage in land-use planning on a metropolitan area basis and engage in "vulnerability analysis."¹⁸

This land-use planning approach to the reduction of urban vulnerability was transformed by the 1955 review committee of Project East River into a full-blown recommendation for civil defense target area authorities. The recommendation has been endorsed by the three Federal agencies noted above, and by many other individuals or groups.

It is important to understand the land-use planning background and the emphasis on reduction of urban vulnerability in the current concept of the metropolitan target area authority.

Since the reduction of urban vulnerability, as we have considered it in this report, has limited effectiveness for civil defense in the foreseeable future, it would be a serious mistake to let the issue of such a defense depend on the outcome of efforts to create area authorities.

The Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, in discussing the problems of metropolitan areas, referred to the civil defense application made by the 1952 Project East River in this manner:

The report stresses the need for metropolitanwide planning as a basis for directing future development in a manner that not only would reduce urban vulnerability but also make cities and suburbs more livable.¹⁹

Noting that metropolitan areas are economic and social complexes not yet integrated into governmental units and confronted with major obstacles to such integration, the Intergovernmental Relations Commission saw here a need for "political invention."

The subcommittee does not believe that an effective civil defense requires inventions in the political field that are yet to come and whose success cannot be foreseen. This is a technique for postponing the solution of urgent problems or for creating an assumed solution not within reach.

Because the problem of area authorities is not solved and no one seems to know quite how to solve it, the testimony accordingly was vague, despite the emphasis on the need.

ODM Director Flemming saw in these metropolitan authorities a technique for reducing urban vulnerability, in the style of Project East River. He said:

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

¹⁸ Reduction of Urban Vulnerability, pt. V of the report of Project East River (July 1952), p. 43.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 52.

As far as I am concerned, the way to get at urban vulnerability is through metropolitan target zone authorities, where all segments of the total program can be brought together * * *. And that is why frankly I felt that the only thing to do was to make it perfectly clear that as far as the Federal Government is concerned, we are putting our eggs in that particular basket. That is why I delegated this question of urban vulnerability to the FCDA.²⁰

Director Flemming regarded the 1955 congressional appropriations of \$10 million to FCDA for "survival plan" studies as intended "to start programs in that particular [metropolitan authority] area."

The FCDA general counsel, Raoul Archambault, Jr., stated to the subcommittee that the groups engaged in these studies in areas involving more than one State were "informal committees" and "have not yet acquired a status of legality or any degree of formality." He said that FCDA could not deal with those groups as an entity but still had to deal with the separate States.²¹

Of the 25 contracts for "survival plan" studies made to date (July 1956), 21 are for areas within the confines of single States.

The FCDA staff proposal which Administrator Peterson conveyed to the subcommittee as having his general approval, referred to:

Authority to exercise greater control over civil defense activities related to metropolitan complexes which include more than one State through joint commissions or authorities.²²

He stated that he had not the slightest idea, nor did anyone else, what particular form of organization should be proposed to the Congress.

At another point he said:

We are entering into something new in government. The New York Port Authority is something close to what we have in mind.²³

The Project East River review committee refrained from analyzing the legislative requirements of its proposed metropolitan target area authorities but said that:

The technique of utilizing metropolitan target zones for planning and operations in nonmilitary defense will require a material increase in the Federal Government's leadership, authority, responsibility, and operational control of non-military defense while retaining the essential elements of State and local participation and responsibility.

It recommended generally that the 1950 legislation be amended as necessary, to incorporate its recommendations.

Administrator Peterson quoted to the subcommittee, presumably with approval, the observations of the Project East River review committee but did not care to specify in what respect his agency should assume "leadership, authority, responsibility, and operational control."

He said he had asked the governors' conference to consider and report on the aforesaid recommendation. The State governors at

²⁰ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1063.

²¹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1383.

²² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1190.

²³ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1383.

their recent Atlantic City conference unanimously resolved, among other things:

That the Federal Civil Defense Administrator be empowered to encourage the formation of such regional civil-defense planning authorities and, if necessary, because of the failure of the local and State authorities to proceed, to establish such authorities.

The governors' conference also stated that "the necessary machinery to accomplish such coordinated planning exists." Furthermore it limited its endorsement to regional authorities for planning purposes only and not for operations because "it is felt that existing governmental lines of authority must be observed, recognizing the overall authority of the Federal Government, unless there is a specific agreement to the contrary among the States affected."

Thus the governors proposed no new governmental organization but assumed that the machinery is already here. Their opposition to interstate governmental entities that would operate in civil defense was shared by the New York State civil defense director, Gen. C. R. Huebner, and several other witnesses.

The Project East River review committee, by way of contrast, contemplated that these regional authorities would both plan and conduct civil-defense operations.

The governors' proposal that the Administrator be permitted to establish Federal planning authorities where State and local units fail to proceed, leaves open the question to what extent Federal activity would be required. Administrator Peterson acknowledged that in view of the Federal alternative to inadequate local organizations, the tendency would be to cover the country with Federal authorities. He said that these authorities "will eventually be financed by Uncle Sam or they won't be done".²⁴

The subcommittee observes two alternative fallacies in the concept of metropolitan area authorities for civil-defense purposes.

(1) If they are to be limited to planning purposes, then they are taking on a basic function which must be performed by the Federal Government.

The subcommittee believes strongly in the principle of target area planning and full consultation with State and local officials, but it does not view the basic planning effort as largely a non-Federal activity. In this respect the subcommittee does not concur with the Project East River review committee concept that nonmilitary defense planning should be vested in so-called ad hoc committees. The subcommittee agrees with Dr. Hill, one of the distinguished members of the review committee, who believed that there should be more centralized planning and leadership. He noted that the ad hoc committees would inevitably be uneven in results.²⁵

(2) If the metropolitan area authorities are conceived as operating entities in civil defense, this means that civil defense would depend on a new form of Government organization for which there is no obvious place in the present structure of American Government. Join to that the consideration, widely accepted, that civil defense must depend on existing Government agencies and functions and the

²⁴ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1385.

²⁵ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, p. 85.

vexing problem arises as to how much direction an areawide authority could exert over the local operations of government.

A number of witnesses, including Mr. Bascom and Mr. Bowman, pointed out that planning must go beyond the assumed damage areas of large nuclear weapons.

The subcommittee observes that as the weapons grow larger, so do the requirements of planning, and with nationwide fallout as a hazard, the geographic limits on the planning problem are the Nation itself.

FCDA PLANNING

Although the Administrator is authorized, among other things, to "prepare national plans and programs for the civil defense of the United States," he has never construed his statutory authority to develop a realistic national plan for civil defense. The FCDA has prepared a looseleaf booklet entitled "The National Plan for Civil Defense Against Enemy Attack." But as one witness observed, this is no national plan at all, but merely a compendium of general statements and appended texts of applicable laws, rules and regulations, a "conglomeration of everything FCDA has put out."²⁶

The FCDA has distributed its planning responsibilities in the following ways: (1) It disseminates planning assumptions on a yearly basis to States and localities for such use as local civil-defense officials care to make of them; (2) it finances "survival planning" conducted by State-local groups; (3) it delegates various planning responsibilities to other Federal agencies; and (4) it contracts out other planning responsibilities to university groups or private organizations.

Whether or not this wide distribution of planning responsibilities was contemplated by Congress, or required by law, the fact remains that the FCDA largely has divested itself of its civil-defense planning function.

Local civil-defense officials complained to the subcommittee that these FCDA yearly planning assumptions were vague, general and subject to various interpretations. When Adm. A. G. Cook (retired), civil-defense director for San Francisco, requested from FCDA a clarification of conflicting reports concerning evacuation as against shelter policy, the FCDA reply advised him that the decision was his to make.²⁷

Mr. Strobe, for the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, cited a 1951 FCDA publication to illustrate the "7 deadly sins" of civil-defense planning. But subsequent yearly planning assumptions of FCDA were guilty of the same sins. These 7 faulty assumptions used for fiscal 1954, for example, assumed: (1) That the enemy would use weapons of a given yield (2½ times the power of the 20 kiloton bomb dropped on Japan); (2) Would launch a given type of attack (air burst); (3) Would deliver a given number of weapons (in 400 bombers); (4) Would attack certain targets (the 67 major metropolitan industrial areas); (5) Would attack during a certain time (during normal working hours); and (6) Would allow so much warning time (15 minutes); (7) Central control would exist in the sense that the attacked area would require outside support.

²⁶ Testimony of Col. Jack C. Gault, subcommittee hearings, pt. 7, p. 2646.

²⁷ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 6, p. 214.

In fiscal 1956 FCDA got around to including the fallout danger in its planning assumptions, and broadened them to avoid some of the previous restrictions. As the assumptions become broader, of course, the planning problem magnifies.

In effect, FCDA's planning assumptions now imply a civil defense planning task which no agency of government, Federal, State or local, presently is prepared to carry out.

Due largely to the insistence and efforts of Mr. Bascom and the scientific advisory group of the National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, which advises FCDA under a contract arrangement, the FCDA just recently has developed some awareness of civil defense research needs.

In earlier years FCDA research was limited to a shelter design study made by Lehigh University, with the Corps of Engineers acting as the contracting agency. In 1954 and 1955 very modest research contracts were let for shelter design, radiological instrument design, and evacuation and traffic control studies in the Milwaukee area. In 1956 additional contracts were let for such studies as home warning devices, communications, and public attitudes.

The first sizable contract (\$200,000) was awarded in 1954 to the Stanford Research Institute for the purpose of devising a nationwide bomb damage assessment system. This was "an initial study," recently completed. The institute has another contract for \$300,000 to carry on the study, which includes methods of locating and calibrating weapon bursts and reporting them to computation centers for assessment. The monitoring devices and instrumentation necessary to provide nationwide surveillance of bomb damage probably would involve a \$100 million system, according to Mr. White of the institute.²³

In addition to these two contracts, Stanford Research Institute holds as subcontractor the \$198,000 California "survival plan" contract for phase I of the project, and at the time of the subcommittee hearings was interested in a "survival plan" contract for the Portland, Oreg., area and for a separate FCDA shelter study.

The only other sizable contract (almost \$600,000) has been let to the University of California for the purposes of studying the requirements of radiological defense. Examination of the terms of this contract shows a wide-ranging series of study subjects which the university must undertake. The contract calls for "undertaking the initial study and research necessary to furnish the basis for design and development of the organizational system necessary to execute a national radiological defense plan."

The university is obligated to make a "comprehensive determination, review and analysis of the present status of radiological defense and its relation to overall civil defense and weapons development." Included within this scope are the review and analysis of programs for better predictions of fallout patterns and identification of tests and experiments necessary for radiological defense. Also a review and analysis of the following: The shelter-evacuation program and the most satisfactory use of cover; programs for selecting, securing, distributing, and using radiological instruments; the communication systems for the control of radiological defense; practical means of decontamination on a large scale; the present body of knowledge re-

²³ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 6, p. 2480.

lated to the prophylaxis, diagnosis, and treatment of radiological injuries; and internal radiation hazards created by inhalation or ingestion of radioactive materials. The university is to determine and conduct development and research on methods, directly or by subcontract.

This does not appear to be a manageable contract. In effect the FCDA has placed within the confines of a single contract with an outside organization a basic segment of its statutory function to develop national plans and programs for the civil defense of the United States.

Radiological defense, as expert witnesses testified, is now, and will be increasingly, an important part of civil defense. FCDA Counsel Archambault contended, on the other hand, that all FCDA contracts, however important, would be an "ever so small part of the total responsibility of civil defense as defined by the Act."²⁹

The subcommittee is not opposed to Government contracts with universities and other groups for important and necessary research in selected civil-defense problems. However, the transfer of the large and crucial problem of developing a national radiological defense plan to any outside group is an abandonment of FCDA's statutory responsibility as the Government agency charged with planning functions in this field.

In justification, the FCDA pleads inability to obtain qualified scientific and technical personnel for its own staff and cites the intention of the framers of the 1950 legislation that FCDA should conduct research mainly by contract or assignment instead of building up its own research laboratories.

The contract authority in the 1950 act, we note in passing, is far from clear. There is no explicit authority to perform substantive planning functions by contracting them out. The FCDA also relies in part for its contracting on authority outside its enabling legislation, namely, the First War Powers Act of 1941, as amended.

Administrator Peterson contended that FCDA should not be denied any resource to accomplish its tasks and that therefore the contract with the University of California to study the requirements of a national radiological defense system was just and proper. While agreeing that all resources should be available for research, the subcommittee is concerned whether FCDA's contract authority has been wisely and selectively employed.

Mr. Bascom, who participated actively in the negotiations leading to the University of California contract, testified to the subcommittee that the function of the university group was to plan and not to experiment. That is, its job was to collect information from various sources and develop a system. He said:

There is no special experience in radiological problems within this particular group. Their intention is to bring together all the people that know the score and to utilize their present knowledge to make a plan for the country.³⁰

In relying on other resources to perform its research work, FCDA also is obligated to utilize the facilities of other Federal departments and agencies. The subcommittee was advised that one reason for placing the radiological defense contract with the University of California was the proximity of that institution to the

²⁹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1374.

³⁰ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, p. 162.

Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory at Hunters Point, Calif.³¹

In other words, the FCDA hired a private resource to utilize a Government resource in this field of research.

The Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, contrary to some supposition even in Navy quarters, is authorized and stands ready to serve all Government agencies, providing the funds and facilities for special projects are supplied. Captain Hinners, commanding officer and director of the naval laboratory, stated:

Our mission includes specific assistance to other Federal agencies in the field of atomic and radiological warfare.³²

The Naval Laboratory has a \$12 million plant, an annual operating budget of \$5 million, and a staff of some 600, half of whom are technical and scientific personnel. The staff of this one laboratory almost equals the size of the whole FCDA staff. Captain Hinners stated that this was the only laboratory that had substantial numbers of personnel in biological, medical, and physical sciences working as an integrated team under a single scientific director. It was testified that no agency within or outside the Department of Defense other than this laboratory is devoted exclusively to atomic defense, and none on this scale of effort.

The FCDA never has utilized the facilities of the naval laboratory for any research projects. The laboratory has had only occasional visits from FCDA personnel. Within the past 6 months to a year, 3 or 4 FCDA personnel visited the laboratory.

The FCDA contends that under its statutory obligation, it makes full use of Government facilities. In the subcommittee's view, this failure to use or explore the possibilities of using the naval laboratory for important civil-defense research, is a gross failure under the statutory obligation. The least that the FCDA could have done, before letting its largest and most ambitious research contract—for radiological defense—would be to seek the professional scientific and technical advice of the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, which is in close proximity to the contracting institution.

The subcommittee interrogated Captain Hinners with respect to the naval laboratory's ability to perform a contract of this nature. Upon hearing for the first time a recital of the scope of the contract he stated, "that is a large order." As to the contract obligation to review the present status of radiological defense, he considered the laboratory as much up to date on that as any existing agency.

The laboratory also has devoted considerable effort, Captain Hinners said, to better prediction of fallout, and some progress is being made.

Within the biological and medical program of the laboratory, methods of prophylaxis and treatment of radiological injury are being studied.

In other enumerated items of the contract, he considered that a tremendous amount of data, not now within the laboratory, would have to be assembled. For example, a survey of the shelter-evacuation program, he said, would require survey-type information of existing shelter facilities on a nationwide basis. Regarding communications and the distribution of radiological monitoring instru-

³¹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, p. 160; pt. 6, p. 2430.

³² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 6, p. 2424.

ments, a different order of technical skills would be required, since they involved the study of governmental organization.

As to large-scale decontamination, Captain Hinners said that facilities and techniques in this field are yet to be developed experimentally and that the first large-scale exercise was to be held shortly under a joint naval laboratory-Army project.

FCDA DELEGATIONS

Under its enabling legislation the FCDA is authorized to delegate "appropriate civil-defense responsibilities" to other Federal departments and agencies, with the approval of the President. The FCDA is to review and coordinate these delegated responsibilities both among the recipient agencies and with the activities of the States and neighboring countries (Mexico and Canada). In a subsequent section of the act, the Administrator is directed to cooperate with the other Government departments and agencies and to utilize their facilities and resources to the maximum.

A basic tenet of civil defense under this legislation, according to Administrator Peterson, "is that the FCDA will make maximum use of the existing resources of other Federal agencies."³³

We noted above, in the case of the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, FCDA's neglect of this important Federal resource.

In theory the FCDA uses the technique of delegation to utilize manifold Federal Government resources for civil-defense purposes as a means of avoiding duplication or the necessity of building a large empire. This concept of delegation was advanced by the sponsors of the original 1950 legislation.

In fact, the delegation process has become a means of transferring to other Federal departments and agencies heavy burdens of planning responsibilities which neither the FCDA nor the receiving agencies are prepared to carry.

The common FCDA complaint is that insufficient funds have been earmarked by the Congress for the delegations program. Granted the insufficiency of the funds, the agencies possessed of the "paper" delegations still are without benefit of a national civil-defense plan against which to match their efforts or to measure progress. All subscribe to the words of Dr. Leonard Scheele that, in spite of Federal agency efforts, America is "woefully unprepared".

The FCDA, with Presidential approval, has delegated 33 specific civil-defense activities to 7 departments and agencies of the Federal Government: the Departments of Commerce, Health, Education, and Welfare, Agriculture, Labor, Interior, and Justice; and the Housing and Home Finance Agency. It will serve no purpose here to recite the provisions of these impressive-sounding directives. A review of this area of activity reveals that the delegations program is, to date, rather meaningless.

While Administrator Peterson insists that these delegated responsibilities do not relieve him of primary responsibility as the delegating authority, there is no indication to the subcommittee that FCDA makes any serious review or requires any measure of performance. The agencies, apparently, are quite content with this. As Assistant Secretary of Labor Rocco C. Siciliano stated, "FCDA has not pro-

³³ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, p. 1192.

vided, nor have we requested guidance as to how the manpower job should be accomplished."³⁴

The agencies cannot readily distinguish the delegated activities from those they normally pursue since all their work has some bearing on civil defense. For example, the Department of Agriculture decided to absorb \$162,000 of civil-defense costs for 1956 under its own budget until it could know more clearly the scope of the tasks delegated by FCDA. Under Secretary of Agriculture True D. Morse said that these were considered as normal Department activities.³⁵

Dr. Scheele stated to the subcommittee that the Public Health Service worked hard in this field before there was an FCDA and before the Service ever had a delegation. In fact, the Public Health Service exercised its own initiative in pressing for the delegation.³⁶

The Commissioner of the Bureau of Public Roads in the Department of Commerce stated that his agency did not need a specific delegation of authority to render the advisory services which it gives to local civil-defense organizations.³⁷

An agency possessed of an FCDA delegation may lack the authority as well as the funds to plan as directed. Referring to the Housing and Home Finance Agency delegation, Administrator Peterson said:

They do not have to the best of my knowledge at the moment, either the authority under the law or the money to do much with the information that we can make available to them.³⁸

In this sense, and because delegated activities are not readily distinguishable from normal agency activities, the FCDA delegations program is more of an exhortation to agencies to become interested in civil defense rather than a specific assignment of function.

Administrator Peterson admitted, for example, that his own agency probably has more technical information on protective shelters than does the HHFA. The latter agency has been allocated \$25,000 to conduct research, plan national programs, and give technical guidance to States in the following three areas: (1) protective standards for new and existing housing; (2) providing temporary emergency housing in support of areas subject to enemy attack; and (3) emergency restoration of essential housing and related community facilities damaged by enemy action. One official, with an assistant and secretary, is applying himself to that imposing set of tasks.

The delegatee agencies find it difficult not only to distinguish between their own and delegated civil-defense activities, but to distinguish between delegations received from FCDA for civil-defense purposes and from ODM for defense-mobilization purposes. In most cases, apparently, the same staff and facilities are used for both. As Assistant Secretary Siciliano expressed it: "Fortunately, both sets of delegations come for the same purpose, and for that reason there is no jurisdictional dispute in our organization."³⁹

As described by the HHFA representative, John J. Chapman, that agency has the job of "dovetailing similar and parallel responsibilities" of FCDA and ODM.⁴⁰

³⁴ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 4, p. 1144.

³⁵ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1106.

³⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 3, pp. 804-843.

³⁷ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 3, p. 647.

³⁸ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1316.

³⁹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1139.

⁴⁰ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 3, p. 1021.

Despite the close similarity of the two sets of delegated functions, the FCDA is obligated to allocate funds to the recipient agency, but the ODM is not so obligated. Director Flemming of ODM has taken the position that accurate costing of mobilization functions delegated to agencies is impossible.⁴¹

Insofar as the recipient agency utilizes the same staff for both delegated functions, in effect some FCDA funds are utilized for ODM purposes.

The FCDA has not attempted to delegate functions to agencies like the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense, although their services are utilized in various ways. At the time of the subcommittee hearings, a delegation to the Corps of Engineers for an inventory of national engineering resources was pending.

FCDA officials have been allowed to observe atomic explosion tests, but noticeable in their roster of participants are administrative personnel in place of scientists and engineers.

The FCDA is not in a position to utilize fully and properly the enormous resources of the military agencies and the AEC, partly because of its lack of scientific and technical personnel and partly because of security requirements.

The difficulty in the latter respect is not so much that the security-conscious agencies are unwilling to let properly cleared FCDA personnel have access to material; rather the data are supplied on a "request" basis. As pointed out by Dr. Cronkite of the Brookhaven National Laboratory, even scientists cannot tell a priori what information will be useful to civil defense.⁴²

In the States and localities the security problem is even more acute, and many local civil-defense officials voiced complaints to the subcommittee. General Huebner, for example, pointed out that only he and one assistant have been cleared for secret information in the State of New York. He said that his agency lacked the necessary knowledge for planning and could not obtain it from the AEC much less the FCDA.⁴³

The AEC has established a small liaison staff to work with FCDA personnel. Dr. Libby suggested to the subcommittee that possibly this small staff could be increased tenfold. The subcommittee endorses this suggestion.

In pursuit of his coordinating responsibility, the FCDA Administrator presides as chairman of a so-called Defense Coordinating Board established by the President under Executive Order 10611, dated May 11, 1955. The Board membership, besides the Administrator as chairman, consists of 17 Government officials—the heads of the 10 executive departments, the AEC Chairman, the FPC Chairman, the ODM Director, the Budget Bureau Director, and the Administrators of HHFA, GSA, and VA. This Board is directed "to assist in the development of an orderly integrated plan for the participation of all Federal departments and agencies in the civil defense of the Nation, taking into consideration other defense requirements, both economic and military."

Meetings of the Defense Coordinating Board have been informal and infrequent and do not seem to have had any appreciable effect on integration of Federal agency civil-defense functions. The ODM Director, who sits on the Board under the FCDA Administrator's

⁴¹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1135.

⁴² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 3, p. 935.

⁴³ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 5, p. 1833.

chairmanship, does not defer to the latter in exercising certain coordinating functions, and military planning for civil defense is beyond the Administrator's reach.

DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE

Aside from normal agency activities and delegated responsibilities, Federal civil-defense functions are divided among three primary agencies: the Department of Defense, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the Federal Civil Defense Administration. The three agencies' joint interest in this field is signified by the fact that all three sponsored Project East River in 1952 for a comprehensive study of civil defense, with the Army Signal Corps acting as the contracting agency. Likewise, in 1955 the same three agencies sponsored a reevaluation of Project East River in the light of new weapon developments.

The Department of Defense has no specific statutory responsibilities for civil defense, but conducts planning activities for protection of its own facilities because it recognizes in some degree the potential demand which may be put upon military resources and trained troops in time of emergency, an issue brought into public prominence by the President's declaration of mock martial law during Operation Alert 1955.

The ODM has no clearly defined statutory responsibilities for civil-defense planning but asserts authority in this field in the capacity of adviser to the President and inheritor of National Security Resources Board functions, and as the recipient of delegated powers from the President under the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended.

The FCDA ostensibly is the central Government agency in this field, but its basic statute was passed without regard to the requirements imposed on other agencies by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, or other legislation.

In order to understand this division of labor and to evaluate proposals for reorganization, it is necessary to review the development of civil-defense activities in the Federal agencies.

Bull board report

In late 1946, about 1½ years after the World War II Office of Civilian Defense was dissolved, the War Department established a Civil Defense Board to study civil-defense functions and to determine the Department's own responsibilities in relation thereto. This group, commonly known as the Bull board (headed by Maj. Gen. Harold Bull) prepared a report, released February 1948, which stressed the importance and urgency of civil-defense planning under Federal leadership and direction.⁴⁴

Effective civil-defense planning at all levels of government, the Bull board report said, would require first the formulation of definite national policies, possibly by the (then proposed) National Security Resources Board, and the execution of these broad policy decisions by "a Federal operating civil-defense agency" which would "plan, operate, and supervise civil defense in all its phases".⁴⁵

The Bull board considered the various alternatives for locating the civil defense agency in the government structure. Should an existing civilian department or agency be selected to embrace the civil defense

⁴⁴ A Study of Civil Defense, National Military Establishment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, released February 1948, p. 19.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 14

function? "The essentially civilian nature of the problem, the deep interest of the States and communities and the desirability of freeing the military departments from the added burden indicated such action."

However, the Bull board could find no such civilian agency appropriate "to discharge the overall planning and direction required in peace and war" or to "afford the intimate coordination with the military deemed so essential". Creation of a new department or independent agency also was rejected as introducing complexities in Federal planning and operation and close coordination with other agencies responsible for national defense functions.

The Bull board finally decided that a single agency within the Department of the Armed Forces (then pending) should be established, separate from the 3 military departments, directed and operated by civilians, and controlled by the Armed Forces Secretary. In this way, the board believed, close contact between military and civil planning could be assured while retaining the desirable feature of civilian administration.⁴⁶

In the event the Department of the Armed Forces were not established, it was proposed that a separate civilian agency with a civilian director be established in the War Department as the military service having "the more intimate relationship with civil defense problems and the more appropriate territorial organization."⁴⁷

Hopley report

In March 1948, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal created by directive an Office of Civil Defense Planning which, under the direction of Russell J. Hopley, prepared a civil-defense report recommending "for adoption a permanent peacetime system of civil defense which will round out our defense structure." Civil defense was regarded as "the missing link" in the national defense.⁴⁸

The Hopley report proposed that a National Office of Civil Defense be established "with a small but capable staff to furnish leadership and guidance in organizing and training the people for civil-defense tasks." Basic operational responsibility for civil defense was to be placed in the States, with maximum use of volunteers and existing agencies and facilities.⁴⁹

The two most appropriate places for the proposed Office of Civil Defense were considered to be the Executive Office of the President and the Department of Defense. The latter was deemed preferable "since a very large part of the civil-defense program will require continuous coordination with all agencies responsible to the Secretary of Defense."⁵⁰

In the meantime, the National Security Act of 1947 was enacted, which placed the three military services under a Secretary of Defense and created several other agencies, including the National Security Council and the National Security Resources Board as advisers to the President, to integrate domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security and to coordinate the military and civilian mobilization of resources for defense.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁴⁸ Civil Defense for National Security, report to the Secretary of Defense by the Office of Civil Defense Planning, October 1948, forwarding letter and p. 1.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

The National Security Resources Board was to advise the President concerning policies and programs for the maximum use of material, manpower, and production resources in time of war, and for stabilization of the wartime economy. One of the duties imposed on the Board was that of advising the President concerning "the strategic relocation of industries, services, Government, and economic activities, the continuous operation of which is essential to the Nation's security."

In performing its functions the Board was directed to utilize to the maximum extent the facilities and resources of other Federal departments and agencies.

In 1949 President Truman transferred to the National Security Resources Board the responsibility for civil-defense planning theretofore exercised by the Department of Defense.

In 1950 the Board prepared a study called United States Civil Defense which proposed that an independent agency, the Federal Civil Defense Administration, be established in the executive branch.

While the 1950 civil defense legislation was being considered, the Congress also passed the Defense Production Act of 1950, which vested in the President broad powers to mobilize production resources for defense. These powers were assigned to an Office of Defense Mobilization created under the authority of that legislation.

By Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953, the President abolished the National Security Resources Board and the then Office of Defense Mobilization and vested their assorted functions in a newly created Office of Defense Mobilization.

ODM CIVIL DEFENSE FUNCTIONS

The ODM under its ambiguous authority derived from the National Security Resources Board via Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953 and the extensive authority conferred upon it by Presidential directive under the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, operates in a vast field without clear understanding of its functions by the Congress. It can delegate functions to any agency and, in effect, redirect congressionally approved programs by virtue of this authority to direct other agencies to engage in mobilization work.

The recipient agencies are confronted, as we have seen, with the problem of distinguishing and allocating funds for civil defense and mobilization work. While it is generally understood that the Congress does not object to mobilization activities as part of agencies' regular work, the subcommittee notes the similarity in function and difference in budgeting between ODM and FCDA delegations and suggests that this area requires congressional clarification. Administrator Peterson said to the subcommittee: "I will admit these delegations are criss-crossing and confusing."⁵¹

The confusion of civil defense responsibilities as between the ODM and the FCDA is illustrated again in the fact that ODM asserts jurisdiction over the location of Federal Government agencies ("continuity of Government") on the Federal level, but has assigned to FCDA the responsibility for advising State and local units of government in this area.

⁵¹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1251.

Administrator Peterson stated to the subcommittee his belief that the location of Federal agencies should be an FCDA responsibility. He differed in this respect with his own General Counsel.⁵² The FCDA couldn't even locate its own headquarters at Olney, Md., because ODM decided that a distance of at least 30 miles from Washington, D. C., was required.⁵³

The ODM also asserts jurisdiction over what is termed "reduction of urban vulnerability," presumably based on its advisory function under the National Security Act and Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953 concerning "the strategic relocation of industries, services, government, and economic activities."

As noted above, ODM assigned responsibility for the reduction of urban vulnerability to FCDA. At the same time it retains general responsibility for formulating national dispersal policy and for administering the rapid tax amortization program, with the help of the Department of Commerce, while making FCDA responsible for coordinating dispersal policy and other measures to reduce urban vulnerability at the metropolitan target zone level.

The transfer of responsibility by ODM to FCDA for the reduction of urban vulnerability was made shortly after the Project East River review committee decided that little had been done in this field.

Both ODM and FCDA require means for assessing bomb damage after enemy attack, the former for industrial production purposes, the latter for relief and rehabilitation purposes. The Department of Defense also requires such information for military purposes.

Director Flemming stated to the subcommittee that these three agencies had established an interagency damage assessment steering group chaired by him. The ODM is planning to develop a damage assessment center at a safe location with necessary analytical and communications equipment and staff; also the FCDA is developing its own computer site to determine losses in such categories as population, hospitals, doctors and food stocks.⁵⁴

Director Flemming acknowledged to the subcommittee that there was confusion within his own agency as to the proper division of functions between ODM and FCDA in a postattack situation. He added:

I would say that in the light of what has happened since the FCDA Act was passed that a good case can be made for the statement that the law is not clear in this particular area.⁵⁵

The confusion of responsibilities between the two agencies was reflected in the direction of Operation Alert 1955. Administrator Peterson stated to the subcommittee that FCDA held nationwide civil defense exercises before ODM or the Department of Defense "got into the picture." However, he believed that the responsibilities were so broad that the other agencies properly participated, and he was satisfied if the President designated Director Flemming as the spokesman for all.⁵⁶

⁵² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, pp. 1386-1388.

⁵³ Senate Civil Defense Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, pp. 155-156.

⁵⁴ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1040.

⁵⁵ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, pp. 1058-60.

⁵⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1327.

The latter's position during Operation Alert 1955 was characterized by the chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Civil Defense as follows:

In the papers all the reports that we have been getting would indicate that Dr. Flemming had literally taken matters over.⁵⁷

An FCDA evaluation report of Operation Alert 1955 concluded:

There is need for better understanding between FCDA and the military on their related roles in a civil defense emergency.⁵⁸

To this we may add that the exercise showed need for a better understanding also between the related roles of ODM and FCDA.

As a result of the confusion arising out of this exercise and because, on Director Flemming's own admission, ODM could not readily distinguish between its own and FCDA's postattack functions, he took the initiative in bringing the three agencies together and working out a division of labor in the civil defense field.

According to Director Flemming's explanation, the Department of Defense, consistent with its military mission, would render all possible support to FCDA in emergency relief and rehabilitation work, including such things as traffic control, maintenance of law and order, provision of emergency medical services, debris clearance, detection and removal of weapon hazards, and emergency restoration of damaged facilities.

The FCDA would be responsible for directing relief and rehabilitation, including the provision and distribution of emergency food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and cash allowances and the other necessary community services, in which military help would be enlisted.

The ODM would have the logistical support function. The Director would mobilize resources and direct production required to meet both military requirements as submitted by the Department of Defense and essential civilian requirements as submitted by FCDA, together with nonmilitary aid requirements submitted by the Department of State. He would also direct economic stabilization programs, direct Federal programs for the allocation of resources and generally adjudicate conflicting claims for manpower, production, energy, fuel, transportation, telecommunications, housing, food, and health services.

According to Director Flemming this allocation of responsibilities has been approved for planning purposes by himself and concurred in by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the FCDA Administrator.

This allocation of responsibility, be it noted, is made without benefit of statutory direction. Director Flemming saw nothing in existing law to bar it.⁵⁹ This is an area which, the subcommittee believes, has been sadly neglected by the Congress.

The allocation of responsibilities among the three civil defense planning agencies of the Federal Government without benefit of a clear congressional mandate is more a matter of necessity in the face of evident confusion than it is a carefully thought out policy.

⁵⁷ Senate Civil Defense Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 750.

⁵⁸ Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1955 Annual Report, p. 355.

⁵⁹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1059.

In the subcommittee's view the philosophy of mobilization as expressed in Director Flemming's division of duties, is based on World War II concepts now largely outmoded, and in any event does not achieve a sensible distinction in postattack duties and responsibilities.

There was considerable testimony by military witnesses before the subcommittee that nuclear war would have to be fought with the weapons and resources in being and that a decision would be quickly reached. The subcommittee recognizes certain differences in emphasis depending on the service outlook of the military witnesses. General Twining, for example, was most emphatic in this view since he understandably places great reliance on the striking power of the strategic Air Force. As far as he personally was concerned, the Army would have no place to go, certainly in the beginning, and could perform no more useful service than to help "clean up the debris."

General Taylor, on the other hand, warned that large segments of the land forces might be sent overseas in advance of assaults in a period of gathering world tensions, or be deployed to counter attacks which were more localized or in which both sides refrained from using nuclear weapons.⁶⁰

The subcommittee believes that mobilization in the sense of preparing production, manpower and other resources for great wars with long periods of buildup, after which the productive and military might of America is brought to bear for final victory, is outmoded.

It may well be that the major effort in what is now called mobilization should be directed to planning and organizing resources not for the long buildup during war but for coping with the sudden and smashing letdown after the attack. These tasks are new, intricate, costly, but in any event they cannot be distinguished from the civil defense tasks under the strategic concept of civil defense set forth in this report.

In a post-attack situation, both FCDA and ODM would become operating agencies. The post-attack powers and duties of FCDA are set forth in its enabling legislation; those of ODM are not. Presently, ODM considers itself a relatively small staff or policy agency, although it does have some operating functions, and FCDA has a somewhat similar role, although some regard it as operational.

Such distinctions, with or without real differences, should not become a means for obscuring the unified and continuous nature of the tasks that must be done both to prepare for nuclear war and to withstand its ravages.

The subcommittee is not impressed with the argument of ODM Director Flemming that his agency must retain its identity because it must adjudicate conflicting demands for resources by the military agencies and the civil-defense agency. This is the conventional concept of previous wars predicated on a distinction between the homefront and the battlefield. In nuclear war there is no such distinction.

Dr. William H. Stead, who prepared a special report on civil defense for the National Planning Association, pointed out cogently that the adjudicative function, so called, in ODM is but one of numerous functions; also that in the event of emergency, ODM itself would be one of the biggest claimants, based on its own projected role. The

⁶⁰ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, pp. 457-459.

subcommittee concurs with Dr. Stead that the adjudicative function presents a relatively minor problem and should be no obstacle to merger of the basic FCDA and ODM functions.⁶¹

REORGANIZATION OF CIVIL DEFENSE

The subcommittee also subscribes to the conclusion reached by the 1955 review of Project East River sponsored by ODM, the Department of Defense, and the FCDA, under the direction of General Nelson:

The respective roles of the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Office of Defense Mobilization leave much to be desired. Much of the work of these two agencies is most intimately interrelated, and to attempt to separate them by subject or by time phase is artificial and leads to confusion and duplication.

The review report mentioned the various alternatives in reorganizing the Federal agencies concerned with civil defense, including giving Cabinet status to the FCDA Administrator, placing the FCDA in the Executive Office of the President, merging the FCDA with the ODM, also in the Executive Office, or creating a fourth arm of the military establishments to discharge civil defense responsibilities.

The review report took the position that specific organizational charges were not within the scope of its requested recommendations, but stated that "the need for organizational improvement, increased status, prestige, and effectiveness is clear."

The report noted that the President had asked his Advisory Committee on Government Reorganization to give its attention to this subject.

The staff members of the Federal Civil Defense Administration also have conducted an organizational study which, according to informal advice received by the subcommittee from FCDA headquarters, was instituted in order to ascertain where the respective functions of FCDA and ODM began or left off, and how the agencies which were dual recipients of their delegations could undertake to apportion their limited personnel and facilities to the two seemingly similar tasks. Administrator Peterson has reported his general approval of the staff study.⁶²

Copies of the so-called Study of Future Organization have been distributed by the FCDA to State or local civil-defense officials for comment. The subcommittee is aware that it has not met with universal approval. A number of objections were made during the subcommittee hearings to a plan which would submerge and possibly lose civil defense among a host of manpower, stabilization, production control, and other functions now associated with ODM.

The subcommittee holds no brief for any specific internal organizational feature of such a proposed merger of FCDA and ODM. It does believe, however, that misunderstanding may have been caused by the manner in which the organization chart was drawn up by FCDA staff members in connection with their organization study. It shows civil defense as one thin operating unit among the assorted staff functions of the proposed new Cabinet department.

⁶¹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, pp. 1089 ff.

⁶² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1326.

The subcommittee has considered the various organizational alternatives and concludes that the civil-defense functions of the ODM and the FCDA should be merged into a permanent new department of Cabinet rank.

The subcommittee is mindful of the fact that Cabinet departments are hard to establish in our scheme of government; that usually the creation of a Cabinet department, as in the case of the most recent one, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, represents a gradual development of Government functions which by public acceptance acquire the degree of importance that warrants an established place in the traditional structure of Government.

Civil defense in the United States, as an important Federal Government function, is hardly 6 years old. The ODM, counting also its predecessor agency, the National Security Resources Board, is hardly 10 years old. Nevertheless, the subcommittee believes that the emphasis in civil defense must be placed on future need rather than on past experience. America's political revolution is nearly two centuries old, the weapons revolution only a few short years.

Civil defense, in the strategic sense we consider it, is here to stay as long as there are an Army, Navy, and Air Force or any combination of them. It requires the solution of complex, new problems by the best scientific, engineering, and administrative talent that the Nation can provide.

A regular Cabinet department may serve to give the civil-defense effort the status and prestige and recognition that it deserves. The Nation should not be caught in the vicious cycle that until a function of Government has historic experience and acceptance, it will not be made into a department, and conversely that creation of a Cabinet department is necessary to confer such status and acceptance.

The subcommittee hopes that this vicious cycle will be broken by a positive expression of executive leadership and by appropriate action in the Congress to establish a Department of Civil Defense.

MILITARY ROLE IN CIVIL DEFENSE

In 1952 Project East River found that one of the chief obstacles to the public acceptance of civil defense "is the reticence of military forces to accredit civil defense as a partner along with the Army, Navy, and Air Force on the national security team."

The chief motivations for this attitude were ascribed to two fears of the military: (1) that their annual appeals to Congress for huge sums of money would be less effective if they emphasized the importance and need of civil defense; (2) that such emphasis would constitute an admission of weakness or incompetence in carrying out the defense mission.⁶³

Coupled with this military reticence toward civil defense, Project East River found from attitude surveys a prevailing public belief that an attack would not come, or if it came, would be successfully warded off by the military forces.⁶⁴

General Nelson, who directed the monumental Project East River, restated to the subcommittee the project's views on military reticence toward civil defense and said the controversial experience in that

⁶³ Information and Training for Civil Defense, pt. IX of the report of Project East River, September 1952, p. 1.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

project suggests "it will be very difficult to get the Defense Department to express itself very clearly in this field."⁶⁵

This is understandable enough, even if not excusable, since the military are trained to think in terms of offensive action and combat. The difficulty is that nuclear war makes the whole United States a potential theater of combat and demands drastic changes in strategy and tactics.

The military defense of our Nation has become increasingly complicated and difficult because of the advent of atomic and hydrogen weapons. This has caused intense interservice rivalry for the use and control of these new weapons. The roles and missions of our military services are now therefore being reexamined by the Chiefs of Staff.

The civilian population stake in survival, depending as it does on an adequate civil-defense program, demands and requires that civil defense be considered in this reevaluation as an integral part of the total national defense capability.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have the direct responsibility for all major military planning, were quite willing to acknowledge to the subcommittee the importance of a strong, effective civil defense, but there is little evidence that they have seriously analyzed the present status of civil defense or assigned it a strategic role.

Adm. Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that the Joint Chiefs were interested in civil defense and considered its requirements in overall defense planning.

At times, in their meetings, Admiral Radford said, "we would have occasion to discuss it."⁶⁶ However, he expressed satisfaction with the 1950 legislation which placed primary civil-defense responsibility in the States and localities with guidance and supervision by the Federal Civil Defense Administration. When questioned about the need for greater Federal authority in this field he replied: "I don't know what the legislative sequence should be or just what is practicable."⁶⁷

A nuclear attack on the United States, in Admiral Radford's view, was "just a larger emergency" of which the military services took account in their emergency planning to assist local authorities if disasters got out of hand. Nor did he see any great difficulty in protecting military bases against such attack.⁶⁸

Asked whether the Joint Chiefs as a body had given any consideration to the relative worth of civil defense as a deterrent, Admiral Radford replied, "I would say generally, yes."⁶⁹

General Twining, Air Force Chief of Staff, readily assented to the deterrent value of civilian defense, but when asked whether it should rank third, after offensive and defensive military power, replied, "I had not thought about it that way, but it is certainly a very great deterrent to have an adequate civil defense * * *."⁷⁰

Admiral Low, commander of the Western Sea Frontier, expressed it thus: "I have never thought of it that way, Mr. Chairman. But, frankly, I do not see how it would be much of a deterrent."⁷¹

⁶⁵ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 3, p. 668.

⁶⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 356.

⁶⁷ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, pp. 342, 349.

⁶⁸ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, pp. 349, 350.

⁶⁹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 359.

⁷⁰ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, pp. 379, 389.

⁷¹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 6, p. 2318.

General Taylor, Army Chief of Staff, accepted the premise "that civil defense is an integral and important part of our national security" and an important deterrent to enemy use of nuclear weapons.⁷²

Carter L. Burgess, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve), stated that "civil defense in all its aspects is today and will be in the future a matter of major concern to the entire Department of Defense." The reasons for this concern, he said, were the deterrent value of a strong civilian capability in this field, and the stronger this capability, the less need to divert military forces from their combat mission for assignment to civilian disaster duties.⁷³

Assistant Secretary Burgess has been made responsible for all civil-military relations in civil defense. He also sits on the Civil Defense Coordinating Board, established by the President and chaired by Administrator Peterson.

Within Assistant Secretary Burgess' office, a special Civil Defense Liaison Division has been established for contact with FCDA and other Government agencies having civil-defense responsibilities. A military liaison officer is stationed in the Battle Creek headquarters of FCDA.⁷⁴

The Civil Defense Liaison Division is, however, a small unit within the numerous activities under the jurisdiction of the Assistant Secretary (Manpower, Personnel and Reserve). Col. Barnet W. Beers, the head of this liaison unit, told the Senate Civil Defense Subcommittee he has a staff of five officers and some clerical help.⁷⁵

By Department of Defense Directive No. 3020.6, dated November 16, 1955, an Emergency Planning Committee was created as a mechanism to consider, develop and coordinate "all planning, other than strictly military planning" in the Department of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel and Reserve) is chairman. Three other Assistant Secretaries, dealing with supply and logistics, properties and installations, and health and medical, are on the committee as well as representatives designated by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the three military department Secretaries.

The Emergency Planning Committee is authorized to establish task forces in various operational areas. Although civil defense is not specifically mentioned in the Department of Defense directive, Assistant Secretary Burgess advised the subcommittee that a task force on civil defense has been established. This group "participated with FCDA in the joint development of an attack pattern for the Operation Alert 1956 exercise."

Regarding the Emergency Planning Committee's interest in civil defense, Assistant Secretary Burgess said:

Internal civil defense problems and relationships with other agencies in this field are given policy level consideration in this committee.⁷⁶

⁷² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 430.

⁷³ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 577.

⁷⁴ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 531.

⁷⁵ Senate Civil Defense Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, p. 181.

⁷⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, pp. 531-532.

ARMY FUNCTIONS IN CIVIL DEFENSE

By Department of Defense Directive No. 3025.1, dated January 24, 1952, the three military departments are assigned certain civil defense and related responsibilities. The Army is made responsible for planning emergency support of civil-defense operations in case of enemy attack. It must also coordinate Navy and Air Force participation in such emergency support.⁷⁷

Army Regulations No. 500-70, dated July 8, 1952, set forth the conditions for emergency employment of Army resources in civil defense. These regulations declare that civil defense is "primarily a responsibility of civil government at all levels" and that in the event of war-caused emergencies which local and supporting civil-defense organizations are unable to cope with, "the Army will provide aid to civil governments with the minimum practicable diversion from the Army's primary mission."⁷⁸

General Taylor stated to the subcommittee that the Army performs many civil-defense operations, particularly relating to disaster relief, but that these are "incidental" to the Army's primary mission of combat. Regular Army training, he noted, develops skills useful in civil-defense operations.⁷⁹

Support functions to the FCDA listed by General Taylor were procurement of medical supplies and mobile hospital units (through the Armed Services Medical Procurement Agency); technical advice and assistance in field testing of hospital units, instruction in handling of mass casualties and in mass feeding; storage of FDCA materiel; participation in survey of local transportation planning; advisory engineering functions (through the Corps of Engineers); preparation of publications, displays, and films; research, specifications, samples, and other matters relative to protective equipment.⁸⁰

General Taylor also stated that "The Army now participates in civil defense planning at the Federal, State and local levels." He said there was close liaison between Zone of Interior Army commanders and FCDA regional administrators. Recently he repeated and amplified previous guidance in a directive to the commanding general of the Continental Army Command to collaborate with other military service representatives in the preparation of a plan to assist civil authorities in civil-defense emergencies.⁸¹

LIMITED SUPPORT ROLE

The military witnesses before the subcommittee adhered to this concept of a limited military support role on an emergency basis. Thus General Taylor said:

I sincerely hope that this committee and the country is not depending upon the Army under this kind of thing, we are not prepared for it, we are not big enough for it and then it conflicts with our primary role of combat.⁸²

⁷⁷ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 428.

⁷⁸ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, pp. 302-303.

⁷⁹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 432.

⁸⁰ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, pp. 432-423.

⁸¹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 433.

⁸² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 444.

Again he said:

First I am not responsible for civil defense, I don't want to be responsible for civil defense and if the Army had to take over any role of this sort, every additional function would have to be paid for in terms of new men and new dollars.⁸³

And again:

You cannot depend upon the Army to perform civil defense of the United States. It is neither organized, trained, nor equipped, nor directed to do that sort of thing. We are here to supplement the civilian defense.⁸⁴

Speaking for all the military services, Admiral Radford explained that gaining the war objective required the maximum use of offensive power. The only part of the total force that could be committed for defensive employment was that "necessary to provide a reasonable degree of protection for the essential elements of the warmaking capacity." The military depended on civil agencies at home for such matters as internal security and mitigating the effects of enemy action. However, in the face of enemy-caused disaster, if the civil capacity was inadequate, "the military services will provide emergency support, as practicable, consistent with the execution of their primary missions."⁸⁵

Admiral Radford also said:

I feel that military assistance to civil-defense agencies must be rendered on a basis where Armed Forces do not become so involved or so completely responsible that they cannot be speedily redirected into military action against the enemy.

The primary mission of our Armed Forces is to fight and defeat the enemy by offensive action anywhere, anytime, and under any circumstances. This mission is so comprehensive and vitally important as to make highly undesirable the assignment of any additional diversionary functions and responsibilities, such as civil defense, to the Department of Defense.⁸⁶

While the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not want the military services to be committed to definite civil-defense responsibilities, they recommended State recruitment and organization of "defense forces" not subject to Federal military service, as provided in Public Law 364, 84th Congress. "It would be better from our standpoint," Admiral Radford said, if the States would recruit such military forces to perform policing and other assistance functions for local civil-defense organizations.⁸⁷ And General Taylor observed: "That to me is the only thorough answer."⁸⁸ Asked in what manner these forces would be set up, he replied: "I haven't really thought it through and the States will decide for themselves."⁸⁹ He acknowledged, however, that State defense forces "are virtually unorganized at the present time."⁹⁰

⁸³ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 444.

⁸⁴ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 454.

⁸⁵ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 342.

⁸⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 343.

⁸⁷ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 370.

⁸⁸ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 443.

⁸⁹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 451.

⁹⁰ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 438.

Assistant Secretary Burgess, who emphasized to the subcommittee the difficulty of building a voluntary reserve for defense requirements, also expressed the view that the State defense forces authorized by Public Law 364 could be trained and preassigned to civil-defense tasks. He said: "Trained in survival techniques, these State defense forces may well mean the difference between organized recovery and chaos."⁹¹ But Assistant Secretary Burgess said also that State responses under the law "have not been realistic."⁹²

DIFFERING VIEWS OF MILITARY MISSIONS

The extent to which the military services can render assistance to civil defense without interfering with their primary combat missions depends, of course, on the concept of those missions.

Asked what the role of a land army would be in nuclear war, Admiral Radford replied:

It would depend on where they are. Lots of people wonder that, too. I think in general they do the same things they have always done, with various degrees of difficulty.

He did not foresee mass troop movements at the beginning of an attack.⁹³

General Twining, as we have noted, was more explicit. He did not visualize a war in which several million men would be mobilized and transported to foreign shores. He said:

No, sir, particularly in this initial phase, which we call the atomic offensive phase, no ships will be leaving our ports, no troops will be leaving this country until this slugfest or atomic offensive is completed, and we need everything we have got in this country to clean up the debris and prevent chaos, and everything we have got here will be used, I think, for that purpose.⁹⁴

In response to the question whether the Army's primary mission is to be changed to one of civilian assistance, General Twining replied:

Well, that is certainly the way I feel about it, and I am sure that the Army will be up here to answer that question, but I certainly say, I know it has got a terrific job in this country doing this.⁹⁵

Admiral Burke likewise foresaw no mass transportation of troops in the next war, but noted that large quantities of fuel would have to be transported.⁹⁶

FCDA Administrator Peterson has expressed a view substantially in accord with General Twining's. He foresaw "vast elements of the military that won't be able to go anywhere the morning after the attack and will have no greater responsibility than to help the American people get to their feet." He added:

Fighting men will have new responsibilities in a nuclear war, different than those they had before. We won't be

⁹¹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 566.

⁹² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 548.

⁹³ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 355.

⁹⁴ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 392.

⁹⁵ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 393. See also pp. 401-402.

⁹⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 422.

marching out to battle to the sound of music. We won't be shipping out people by ships to all parts of the world. We will have the job of seeing that we have enough to eat, enough energy and enough material to continue to live.⁹⁷

General Taylor took a different view. He considered it likely "that all or most active Army units may be deployed overseas before an enemy attack." This might be due to situations involving limited hostilities or a general war in which both sides desisted at first from using atomic weapons.⁹⁸ Forty percent of Army troops are now overseas, General Taylor said, and the Army itself is a user of nuclear weapons.⁹⁹

In cases where active Army, Reserve, and National Guard units were not required for early development or support of combat operations, assistance would be given to civil-defense forces.¹

VOID IN MILITARY-CIVIL PLANNING

There is a great void in civil-defense planning created by these circumstances: (1) The military authorities make civil-defense plans for their own installations independently of those made by civilian authorities in the same areas; (2) they subordinate civil-defense requirements to military ones without weighing the relative strategic values; and (3) they render only auxiliary support to civil authorities which do not have effective civil-defense plans or organizations of their own.

There are scores or even hundreds of Army, Navy, and Air Force installations throughout the country. Each has its own "disaster plan" drawn up in accord with headquarters direction. Civil-defense officials in localities adjacent to, or encompassing these installations, have little or no information about the military plans. Even if they do learn about them, the city authorities in each community still face the problem of adjusting such civil-defense plans as they have to avoid conflict with the military plans.

General Taylor's statement to the subcommittee that the local Army commanders participate in civil-defense planning can only be taken to mean, at best, exchange of information. There is no evidence whatsoever before the subcommittee of integrated military-civilian civil-defense planning for the protection of a target area.

The lack of integrated planning of military and civilian authorities on the local level is matched on the Federal level. In illustration the subcommittee cites the situation attending radio communications in the event of an impending enemy attack.

Radio beams sent out from transmitting stations can be picked up by enemy aircraft and can be used as a homing device to locate targets. To deny this opportunity to the enemy, a civil-defense arrangement has been worked out among the Air Force, Federal Communications Commission, and the Federal Civil Defense Administration by which radio transmitting stations are shut down after an alert warning.

This system, known as conelrad (control of electromagnetic radiation), requires the radio stations to go off the air after announcing the alert and converting to emergency broadcast operation over 640 and

⁹⁷ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1182.

⁹⁸ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 429.

⁹⁹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 457, 459.

¹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 429.

1240 frequency bands. In order to prevent the enemy from identifying the stations involved, messages broadcasting information to the public are broken up so that a few words of a message are transmitted by one station, and additional words by another, and so forth. Variations in the transmitting power frequently cause these messages to sound garbled because of considerable variation in volume. Also, rural stations, which do not participate in the conelrad clusters, cannot broadcast any messages at all.

There is a division of opinion among radio executives, technicians, and others concerning the extent and seriousness of conelrad difficulties. Most State or local civil-defense directors and staff personnel of the FCDA strongly believe that the conelrad system is a serious gap in communications to the public after an alert has been sounded. Some civil-defense officials go so far as to say that millions of casualties could ensue because of these difficulties.

General Twining on behalf of the Air Force insisted that conelrad is necessary to prevent enemy aid in locating targets. While many informed persons discount the value of such aids in view of other intelligence and locating devices which the enemy could use, the Air Force stands on its position.

The question here is whether more lives will be saved by full use of radio transmission facilities during an attack situation to keep the public informed or by denying the enemy a target-locating aid.

So far as the subcommittee knows, this question has not been resolved. It serves to bring home the fact that the military authorities have only a dim regard for civil defense as a strategic concept.

Apart from independent planning by military authorities for their own civil-defense needs, more complex problems are created by the theory of auxiliary or incidental aid to civil-defense authorities when the latter are not prepared to perform the major civil-defense tasks.

Interestingly enough, the military planning authorities in the field assume that civilian civil defense cannot be counted upon.

The Continental Army Command (headquarters, Fort Monroe, Va.), as the designated planning agent of the Department of the Army, prepares plans in collaboration with agents of the other military services for assistance to civil authorities in civil-defense emergencies. The domestic emergency plan of the Continental Army Command for 1956 contains this planning assumption: "There will not be an effective CONUS [continental United States]-wide civilian civil-defense mechanism at D-day."²

Asked to explain that assumption, Lt. Col. W. K. Koob, Jr., civilian defense officer on the operations staff of the command, expressed his understanding: "That the civilian-defense organization will not be able to function effectively to cope with an overall disaster caused by an enemy attack on D-day." Colonel Koob also agreed that there was no military mechanism to perform civil defense functions effectively, in view of the primacy of the combat mission.³

Assistant Secretary Burgess, whose office is responsible for military-civil relations in civil defense, was unfamiliar with the assumption and refused to accept it. Referring to the military planners who made it,

² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 470.

³ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, pp. 470-471.

Mr. Burgess said: "I don't see how they could testify to that."⁴ He added:

I think a great deal of progress has been made. I think the passage of the civil-defense laws by the Congress is a great deal of progress. This might be the Continental Army Command planning assumption at a given moment. I could not concur completely with that assumption.

It is not incumbent upon me in my position to make that assumption. I think a great deal of planning has taken place on the civilian side.⁵

General Taylor said he hoped the military planning assumption of an ineffective civilian defense proved wrong, but he agreed it was valid as of today.⁶

The implications of this military planning assumption are far-reaching. For the military to perform their auxiliary support role in the absence of effective civilian defense, either there will be a great gap in preparedness or else the military authorities will change this role and move increasingly in the direction of taking over basic civil-defense functions.

The subcommittee considers that civil defense is properly a civilian function, as indeed, almost every witness before the subcommittee including the military emphasized. Yet the military witnesses, being practical and trained to prepare for eventualities, recognized that such responsibilities could be placed upon them. Thus Admiral Radford said that while he preferred to limit the military support role to an auxiliary one, " * * * we do have to be prepared to go further in case we are directed to."⁷

Likewise, Assistant Secretary Burgess said:

We are not ignoring that the active forces will be an asset and may be an available force to aid in the situation. In the final analysis, we have to be prepared and to be prepared on a total basis.⁸

Unless a strong civilian effort is made at the highest levels of Government to plan for civil defense and to build up the necessary Federal, State and local organizations, civil defense will become increasingly a military responsibility.

DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW

The traditional military role in disasters has been that of rendering supplemental aid to civilian authorities. The Presidential proclamation during Operation Alert 1955 created an entirely new role when it theoretically placed the whole Nation under some form of military control.

When military troops move into an area because civil government has broken down, it is understood, according to standard military doctrine, that they are in complete command. ODM Director Flemming and FCDA Administrator Peterson contended that the purpose of the martial law proclamation was not to place the country

⁴ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 562.

⁵ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 563.

⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 463.

⁷ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 352.

⁸ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 531.

under military control but to insure that military assistance to civil defense agencies would be forthcoming.

A great deal of confusion and uncertainty attended the martial-law proclamation. There is an understandable reluctance on the part of the Government officials concerned to disclose details of the circumstances leading to the President's decision. The FCDA Annual Report for 1955, while it discusses Operation Alert, omits any reference to martial law or the President's proclamation.

Title III of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, vests in the Federal Civil Defense Administrator emergency authority, in the event of attack, to take charge of Federal agency activities and to channel Federal funds and resources into civil-defense operations. Where did he stand in relation to the martial-law declaration after the assumed enemy attack?

Administrator Peterson recalled that one of the first things the President did, after the sounding of the alert, was to invoke the emergency powers of title III. Then "protracted debate" ensued, after which the martial-law proclamation was issued. The Administrator said he "was present and participated in the discussion which led to the declaration of martial law," but "did not participate in the drafting of the proclamation."⁹

Dr. Charles Fairman, Harvard professor of law and noted authority on the law of martial rule, described the martial-law proclamation as "unstudied," "hashed up" for the occasion, "falls apart upon examination."¹⁰ In his view:

Operation Alert bungled into crude compulsion where insight, administrative skill, and inspiring leadership were needed.¹¹

Examination of the text of the proclamation, which first came to light in the Senate Civil Defense Subcommittee hearings,¹² shows a confusing and contradictory mixture of decrees. Privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was declared suspended for Federal but not for State offenses, a distinction, said Dr. Fairman, which "doesn't make sense." Even the partial suspension he considered objectionable. "Surely it misconceives the nature of the problem to suppose that the great need on the morrow of an attack, would be to lock up people and hold them without the means of even questioning the legality of the detention."¹³

And yet, even with the suspension of the writ, civilian courts were to be allowed to function to the extent they "do not materially affect the war effort."

The proclamation also recited that it was necessary to have a minimum of interference with the primary missions of the Armed Forces, but the Secretary of Defense and military commanders of the Army areas were directed to enforce law and order and at the same time to carry out civilian Federal agency decisions and proclamations in civil defense and other fields.

⁹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1421.

¹⁰ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 285.

¹¹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 318.

¹² Senate Civil Defense Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, pp. 748-749. Text of proclamation reprinted in this subcommittee's hearings, pt. 2, pp. 279-280.

¹³ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, pp. 310, 311.

"The fact that it was primarily support by the military for the civilian authorities should be stressed," Administrator Peterson stated to the subcommittee.¹⁴

In a similar vein, Director Flemming stated:

It is clear that the decision last June was not a decision to usurp civil authority but rather to provide the maximum military support to the civilian authorities on a nationwide basis in order to deal with the type of the situation assumed in the exercise.¹⁵

Director Flemming also testified: "We did not presuppose in connection with Operation Alert 1955 the complete breakdown of civilian government. What we were after was maximum military aid to the civilian government." Asked why that required a declaration of martial law, he rejoined, "That is debatable back and forth." Whether martial law would be required to elicit maximum military support in the next exercise was a "legal" question which he preferred to leave with the Attorney General. As a "nonlawyer" he thought it very unlikely that martial law on a nationwide basis would be declared in Operation Alert, 1956.¹⁶

Within the Department of Defense the martial-law declaration was interpreted quite differently from the Flemming-Peterson doctrine of military support to civil authorities. A memorandum from Secretary of Defense Wilson through Colonel Beers to the Secretary of Army read in part:

For the purposes of problem play all agencies are to assume that civilian agencies in the civil defense and mobilization areas are to continue to function under authoritative leadership and enforcement by the military.¹⁷

General Huebner, director of civil defense for the State of New York, stated the problem this way:

Now, the real crux of military rule is, who assumes the responsibility? Once the military has taken over a situation, then the commander of that force no longer reports to the local authorities or even to the State authorities, but he reports directly to his superior officer in the chain of military command.¹⁸

Col. Charles G. Stevenson, State judge advocate of the New York National Guard, submitted to the subcommittee a critical analysis of Operation Alert which declared in part:

But, the big thing wrong with the 1955 proclamation was that it mixed "limited martial rule" with "military aid to the civil authorities" without making clear the extent of each. The proclamation said that the Army should enforce law and order (limited martial rule) and "carry out decisions of Federal agencies" (military aid to civil authorities).¹⁹

¹⁴ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1421.

¹⁵ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1046.

¹⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, pp. 1071-1072.

¹⁷ Senate Civil Defense Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 749.

¹⁸ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 5, p. 1806.

¹⁹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 5, p. 1863.

Administrator Peterson acknowledged that consternation and confusion were caused among civil defense workers in the field when word of the martial-law declaration reached them.²⁰

Stanley Pierson, civil-defense director for the State of California, observed to the subcommittee that if such declaration had occurred 2 years ago, the civil-defense effort in that State would have been destroyed.²¹

Don E. Carleton, civil-defense director for Milwaukee, stated: "The manner and suddenness with which martial law was declared in Operation Alert 1955 left a great deal of confusion and uncertainty in the minds of all field operators."²²

Maj. Gen. Karl F. Hausauer, commanding general of the New York National Guard, said neither the civil-defense director, the National Guard, nor the First Army commander received any clear or firm plans or directive from Federal authorities. "The result was complete confusion."²³

Since the exercise was concluded before the military actually took over, New York authorities considered that the proclamation by itself was not controlling and that the assumed state of martial law never existed in New York.²⁴

In an effort to allay the distress in local civil-defense ranks caused by the resort to military operations, the FCDA general counsel, Mr. Archambault, circularized a memorandum which essayed to interpret the Presidential proclamation. He dwelt on the potential import and application of martial law in the H-bomb era but assured regional FCDA administrators and local civil authorities that they had not been displaced by the military.²⁵

Commenting on this memorandum, Mr. Carleton said: "It is obvious that this explanation does not answer the questions that arose." He thought it confusing to attempt "to qualify or redefine" a term that had "a definite and precise meaning to all military people."²⁶

Administrator Peterson praised the motives of his general counsel in circulating the memorandum of explanation but said, "I doubt the wisdom of his action," on the ground that officials of the executive branch ought not to try "to interpret the intentions of the President of the United States."²⁷

FOLLOWUP STUDIES OF MARTIAL LAW

The President announced in a press conference of July 6, 1955, that he had asked the Attorney General to study the national experience with martial law and to devise an appropriate remedy for such a situation.²⁸ He indicated later that this study would be made public when completed.

Dr. Fairman, noting some 7 months later (February 1956) that the outcome of the study was yet to be disclosed, said to the subcommittee:

²⁰ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1422.

²¹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 6, p. 2212.

²² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 5, p. 1920.

²³ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 5, p. 1847.

²⁴ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 5, p. 1806.

²⁵ For text of memorandum, see subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, pp. 1423-1425.

²⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 5, p. 1921.

²⁷ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1422.

²⁸ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 280.

I hope most sincerely that the Department shows the courage to confess error. The time is close at hand for planning the next Operation Alert.

The subcommittee asked Attorney General Brownell to appear before it and discuss the significance of the martial-law declaration in relation to civil defense. The Attorney General declined to appear.

Admiral Radford reported that the Army had been directed to make a special study in this field.²⁹

Administrator Peterson said he sat on a committee with Admiral Radford, Director Flemming, and others, to study the problem and he knew that the Army "has been working furiously on it" for the past year.³⁰

Assistant Secretary Burgess said that the military study was not yet complete, and that the Department of Defense was in touch with the Office of Defense Mobilization and Department of Justice. Serious consideration was being given, he said, to a "Federal disaster management plan to quickly restore order when and where local government has broken down and to reorganize the community to self-sufficiency."³¹

Director Flemming undertook in the meantime, as we have seen, to work out an allocation of responsibilities between the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Department of Defense.

Stepped-up military interest in civil-defense matters was noticeable. On August 17, 1955, the Secretary of Defense instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to place greater emphasis on civil defense support operations of the military services. The Joint Chiefs were asked to give positive guidance to the military services in developing programs for emergency assistance and for orienting the training of reserve and active duty units toward these civil-defense support tasks.

The Joint Chiefs accordingly instructed the services to prepare plans for military assistance to civil authorities.

Assistant Secretary Burgess said:

These plans are being actively worked on and will be designed to provide, when fully implemented, military personnel and units in considerable number with thorough training in the military responsibilities for civil defense.³²

It was indicated that reserve units would get training in such things as community decontamination and mass feeding projects. Present plans do not call for the type of specialized civil-defense training received by British Army units. Assistant Secretary Burgess observed:

It is not at that point now. We might have to come out with some plan that might parallel, approach, or even exceed that.³³

General Taylor directed 5 to 15 hours of additional instruction on the Army's role in civil emergencies, to be integrated in officer candidate courses and other instruction. He stated to the subcommittee

²⁹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 352.

³⁰ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1422.

³¹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, pp. 554-555.

³² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 557.

³³ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 560.

that the six Army commands would soon start courses of instruction in martial law for all duty officers and warrant officers.³⁴

In January 1956, directions were sent out to the Continental Army Command to amplify and broaden their civil-defense planning. General Taylor referred to this directive and summarized it for the record, but the Army insisted on deleting certain classified items.³⁵

At the Department of Defense level, as noted earlier, an emergency planning committee, to include civil-defense matters, was established by directive of the Secretary.

MILITARY-CIVIL RELATIONS IN OPERATION ALERT 1956

During Operation Alert 1956, held from July 20 to July 25, it was announced by the participating Federal agencies that after "a year long study by Government officials of emergency actions required in the early hours after an attack on the United States," a proclamation had been evolved to replace the martial-law proclamation of the previous exercise.

Under this proclamation the Department of Defense would be directed to assist the FCDA Administrator for a period of 60 days in discharging his emergency duties under title III of the Federal Civil Defense Act. However, any military personnel, facilities, or resources made available under this arrangement would remain under military command. At the same time the Secretary of Defense would be "authorized to establish whatever military areas may be required in performing any mission assigned to the Armed Forces."

It appears, then, that the new proclamation did not rule out martial law; it simply refrained from an immediate declaration of nationwide military rule; leaving it to the military authorities to determine how much of the United States must be brought under such rule for the purposes of carrying out their missions, and how much assistance they would give to civil defense for a 60-day period.

The proclamation essentially is a compromise between the complete military control implicit in a declaration of nationwide martial law and the more limited civilian control by the FCDA Administrator explicit in title III of the Federal Civil Defense Act.

Instead of having military commanders take over in areas where civil government has broken down, the new proclamation would impose this task in the first instance on the FCDA Administrator.

What forces would be utilized by the Administrator in maintaining law and order and carrying on the processes of local government under such breakdown is not made clear. If reliance is placed upon military troops and other military personnel for the performance of major emergency duties, the problem of martial rule still remains—the military would maintain their own channels of command and control.

The official release on Operation Alert 1956 raises a host of questions concerning military-civil relationships in civil defense. Actual texts of proclamation and directives have not yet been released to the public.

The subcommittee intends to examine closely into Operation Alert 1956 at a later date. Subcommittee staff observers have been present at the emergency relocation site for Federal Government agencies and will report back to the subcommittee.

³⁴ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, p. 432.

³⁵ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, pp. 433, 464, 465.

CIVIL DEFENSE LEGISLATION

Having considered the civil defense functions of the Department of Defense and the office of Defense Mobilization in relation to the Federal Civil Defense Administration, we are in a better position to consider the statutory role of the latter agency.

The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, is the legislative charter for the FCDA. Although, as noted, the FCDA is but 1 of 3 major Federal agencies in this field, the Nation generally looks to the FCDA as the primary civil defense agency.

The very first sentence of the act, part of a declaration of congressional policy, recites:

It is the policy and intent of Congress to provide a plan of civil defense for the protection of life and property in the United States from attack.

Then in a sentence immediately following, the Congress cuts the ground from under its own declared intent. The sentence states:

It is further declared to be the policy and intent of Congress that this responsibility for civil defense shall be vested primarily in the several States and their political subdivisions.

The third and final sentence of the declaration assigns to the Federal Civil Defense Administration created by the act the role of coordination and guidance and providing assistance, as well as carrying out the powers and duties conferred upon it by the statute.

The act thus contains an inherent ambiguity in that States and local units of government have primary responsibility for civil defense, which is very broadly defined in the act, and on the other hand the Administrator has potentially broad and sweeping powers in his own right.

Whether the Federal Administrator will exercise strong leadership and vigorous application of his authority depends not only on his own personality and executive ability but on how much weight he assigns proportionately to the first and third sentences in the congressional declaration.

There is some question that under the 1950 legislation the policy declaration in section 2 should be considered as limiting with respect to the interpretation of powers and duties substantively written into the act. However, Administrator Peterson stated that he considered himself limited by the policy statement in section 2 and that the whole philosophy of the law is to work through the States and local subdivisions.³⁶

Title I of the act establishes the organizational base of the agency and authorizes the establishment of a Civil Defense Advisory Council. (The Administrator prefers on important legislative and policy matters to work through the annual conference of governors rather than the statutory advisory council.)

Title II confers upon the Administrator certain powers and duties "in order to carry out the above-mentioned purposes." Actually no specific purposes are mentioned in the act; they have to be construed from the ambiguous declaration of policy and from the actual powers and duties.

³⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1375.

Briefly the Administrator's functions are: (1) Prepare national plans and programs for civil defense; (2) delegate functions to other Federal agencies; (3) provide for civil defense communications and disseminate warnings of enemy attacks to the civilian population; (4) study and develop civil defense measures, including research and studies in treating the effects of attacks, developing shelter designs and protective materials, and developing and standardizing equipment; (5) conduct training programs; (6) disseminate civil defense information to the public; (7) assist and encourage the States to make civil defense compacts; (8) procure by condemnation or otherwise, construct, lease, etc., materials and facilities for civil defense; (9) make financial contributions to the States on the basis of approved programs or projects; (10) arrange for the sale or disposal of surplus civil defense materials.

Title III of the act gives the Administrator emergency powers to direct Federal agencies in the event of impending or actual enemy attack and to assist affected States and individuals in certain ways.

Administrator Peterson explained several times that under the 1950 act his agency could only recommend, advise, or offer guidance, but could not command or direct. He likened FCDA's position to that "of the minister who exhorts his flock on Sunday to be good people the rest of the week, but we have very little means of following up to see that they are good people."³⁷

The crux of the whole problem, in his view, was the lack of authority to train or prepare for an attack. Pointing out that an Army required a command, he said:

I think to organize civil defense properly, I need some pretty broad authority to conduct exercises in America, to set standards, to run inspections, to penalize under certain circumstances. In other words, you cannot have an army unless you have command function, and we are running an army without any command function, if you can call it an army, and we have not been able to get this Nation ready on that basis. It is an utter impossibility. That doesn't mean we have failed in the performance of our duty up to this time.³⁸

At least three points of view are held with regard to the Administrator's authority.

One is reflected in the testimony of Admiral Radford who stated that the concept of the 1950 act "is the correct one" though under questioning he thought that the Federal authority might be somewhat increased.³⁹

Another is that the legislation is adequate but its full potentialities have not been realized. This attitude is reflected in the interim report by the Senate Subcommittee on Civil Defense, which concluded that the 1950 legislation had not been given a fair test, despite the insistence in the report "that the Federal Government must assume a drastically increased responsibility for the civil-defense program."⁴⁰

The third point of view, most prevalent, is that the 1950 legislation

³⁷ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1379.

³⁸ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1429.

³⁹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 2, pp. 342, 365.

⁴⁰ Interim Report on Civil Defense by the Subcommittee on Civil Defense, Senate Committee on Armed Services, pp. 8, 9.

is outmoded and that the Federal Government must assume greatly increased authority and responsibilities.

Every recent major study of civil defense and most witnesses before the subcommittee took that position. The reports of the Project East River review committee, Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, and National Planning Association, all prepared in 1955, and a unanimous resolution of the Governor's conference in 1956, strongly recommended a shift in the focal responsibility for civil defense from the States and localities to the Federal Government.

Administrator Peterson made it known to the subcommittee that he had a hand in the work of the Project East River review committee report, that he voted affirmatively as a member of the Intergovernmental Relations Commission, and that the resolution of the Governors' conference was based on his request that they study legislative revisions in the act.

The Administrator said he was convinced that greater Federal authority and responsibility are now in order. His position in this respect has developed very gradually over a period of several years.

In June 1953, a few months after taking office, he explained to the House Appropriations Committee his concept of civil defense as "simply the extension of already existing civic services." "I don't see anything new in civil defense at all," he said, noting that the only new idea in civil defense as compared to existing Government activities is "the idea of the block warden."⁴¹

About a year and a half later (February 14, 1955), he stated to the House Appropriations Committee:

As I go around the country I quite frequently run into people who think civil defense is a part of national security and therefore should be the responsibility of the Federal Government as national defense is its responsibility. I have not personally subscribed to that, although a case may be made in that direction.⁴²

Three weeks after that (March 8, 1955) Senator Kefauver asked him directly whether the 1950 act should be amended to give the Federal Government increased responsibility. Administrator Peterson replied:

As to the broad question, Mr. Chairman, I should prefer to study that further and to consult with others in the administration before I should attempt to make such an answer.⁴³

Shortly thereafter (May 18, 1955), he stated to the Senate Appropriations Committee his view that civil defense, instead of being a primary responsibility of the States and local government, should now be shared jointly. In his words:

The facts of the H-bomb combine to pose problems beyond those envisioned when the law was written, and we cannot escape the conclusion that civil defense has become a joint

⁴¹ House Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on the Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1954, 83d Cong., 2d sess., pt. 1, p. 225.

⁴² House Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on the Independent Offices Appropriation, 1956, 84th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 1, p. 383.

⁴³ Senate Civil Defense Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, pp. 222-223.

responsibility of the States, cities, counties, and the Federal Government.⁴⁴

He also stated to the Senate committee:

I don't know just what recommendations we will come up with, eventually. As a part of the team, my recommendations would be made through the proper channels in the administration and then to the Congress.⁴⁵

A year after that statement (April 17, 1956), Administrator Peterson took substantially the same position before this subcommittee. He said that he was not ready to submit legislative proposals to the Congress, but would ask for legislative changes in the 1950 act when he chose and through the proper channels.⁴⁶

At the same time he said:

I have done what I could under my responsibilities. It is out of my hands. It certainly would not be proper on my part to be standing on the corner beating any drums in this area for apparent reasons.⁴⁷

He advised the subcommittee that his staff had made certain recommendations for legislative and administrative changes. These were listed as follows:

Authority to exercise greater control over the civil-defense activities of the States and their political subdivisions through the increase in Federal grant-in-aid type assistance to include contributions toward personnel and administrative expenses.

Authority to exercise greater control over civil-defense activities related to metropolitan complexes which include more than one State through joint State commissions or authorities.

Incorporation in national programs—such as the construction of roads, schools, hospitals, public buildings, and defense facilities—of a specific requirement that civil-defense measures be observed with respect to provision of shelter, location, protective construction, communications, and emergency use.

Establishment and maintenance by the Federal Government of a nationwide system for monitoring and reporting radiological fallout.

Emergency military assistance to civil defense in an attack, comparable to assistance in disaster relief in peacetime. Preparation to include:

(a) The training of regular forces, reservists, and National Guard troops in support of civil defense as a task within the military mission.

(b) The orientation of training of Reserves toward the civil-defense support task as well as specific civil-defense assignments for individuals and some units based upon pre-attack arrangements. Among obvious exceptions would be such units as the Air National Guard and antiaircraft units, since they have an immediate military mission for defense or retaliation.

⁴⁴ Senate Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on the Independent Offices Appropriation Bill, 1956, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 382.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 389.

⁴⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, pp. 1221, 1250.

⁴⁷ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1248.

The establishment of a new agency of Government responsible for all elements of nonmilitary defense including civil defense.⁴⁸

The Administrator stated that he approved these proposals generally, but that they had far-reaching implications with regard to Federal expenditures and Federal-State relations; consequently he would not be in a position to test their practical value until basic information was derived from the "survival" studies. In his view, it was essential to weigh and analyze these proposals as part of the "survival planning" program.

The subcommittee takes the position that the 1950 civil defense legislation was outmoded upon its enactment 5 years after atomic bombs were dropped on Japanese cities, and 5 more years of weapon advances have made it obsolete. The 1950 legislation must be redrafted not only to place the basic responsibility for civil defense where it belongs—in the Federal Government—but to clarify that responsibility.

The basic defect in the act, aside from the stated congressional policy that primary responsibility for civil defense should reside in the States and local units of Government, is that divided responsibility without mandatory obligation is built into the act. Consequently, there can be no precise measure of performance and no strict accountability.

It becomes a matter of decision for the Administrator how far he wants to go in exercising his own authority, and how much he is inclined to leave to the States and political subdivisions. In exercising his responsibility for disseminating warnings of enemy attack to the civilian population, for example, the Administrator has decided that his responsibility stops at key centers, from which local groups must carry on. Even in exercising his planning responsibilities, the major effort is left to State and local groups.

While the subcommittee cannot undertake here to define in detail the responsibilities of the Federal Government for civil defense, some of these fall readily into place.

In the first place the Federal agency vested with civil defense responsibilities must develop, in conjunction with the military authorities, a master plan for national defense and for each target area.

It must assume the major financial burden of a nationwide shelter construction program geared to target areas.

It must insure that warning systems will reach all the people and that communications are adequate.

It must develop effective means of nationwide radiological monitoring.

It must provide expert instruction and training to Federal, State, and local civil defense personnel.

It must provide timely and authoritative information to State and local civil defense officials and to the public.

It must assist State and local civil defense organizations by contributing a share of administrative expenses.

It must have the authority to inspect State and local programs based upon the provision of Federal funds to assist the administration of these programs.

⁴⁸ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, pp. 1190-1191.

In discharging these and perhaps other important responsibilities, the Federal agency must speak with the President's authority for the whole civilian side of the Federal Government in civil defense activities, and it must have the requisite authority, status, and prestige to command the assistance and resources of other Federal agencies, including the military.

The subcommittee has no intention of proposing that a vast Federal bureaucracy be created to discharge civil defense responsibilities down through the States and localities. Nor does it believe that the conditions of an effective civil defense depend on radical transformations of the structure of government below the Federal level. States and local units of government have a rightful and important part to play in preparing their people to withstand an enemy assault. The subcommittee insists only that the States and localities not be asked to be responsible for, and to discharge tasks beyond their capacity.

The subcommittee notes in this regard that the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, created by Public Law 109 of the 83d Congress, recommended that civil defense be made "a responsibility of the National Government, with States and localities retaining an important supporting role;" and that the National Government be made "responsible for overall planning and direction of the civil defense effort." This recommendation is especially noteworthy in that it stands out as a striking exception to the emphasis placed by the Commission report on the State and local functions in the Federal system.

In a very broad and basic sense, the Federal Government has a constitutional responsibility to provide for the common defense and protect the people of this country against the threat or the impact of nuclear war. The revolution in warfare assigns a new role to civil defense and the Federal Government must respond to new demands and new responsibilities in its age-old task to defend the country against its enemies.

ATTITUDES TOWARD CIVIL DEFENSE

The testimony before the subcommittee is rife with criticism of civil defense in the United States. The deficiencies are ascribed variously to inadequacies of Federal legislation making States and localities primarily responsible, to the disorganization among Federal agencies such as FCDA and ODM, to the shortcomings of FCDA leadership or staff, to the lack of military interest in civil defense, to the lack of congressional support for FCDA appropriations, to the shortcomings of State and local civil defense, to the apathy of the people caused either by psychological repugnance to the horrors of nuclear war or by a failure of the executive to fully inform and warn them of the threat.

The subcommittee cannot undertake in this report to assess the complex factors which contribute to the low estate of civil defense. It observes, however, that public apathy, whether real or apparent, does not relieve the leaders of Government in the executive branch and the Congress from discharging their responsibilities for building an effective civil defense as an integral part of the national defense.

The subcommittee's own view concerning public apathy is that it is too easily used as an excuse for not doing anything about civil defense.

The subcommittee does not believe that the American people, fully informed and properly warned, would fail to act for their own protection or to put forth the necessary effort and sacrifice to obtain the protection that can be achieved.

To put it bluntly, the highest national authorities must regard the danger as serious, otherwise one should not expect the public to do so.

Since the FCDA is the agency vested by law with the duty of informing the public on civil defense, the performance of that agency and its own evaluation of the nature of the threat must be considered.

Dr. Tuve, who is chairman of the committee on civil defense of the National Academy of Sciences which advises FCDA, described the civil defense program as "fumbling and inconsistent" and bereft of public confidence. Of the FCDA administrative leadership he said:

Governor Peterson is a devoted public servant and a personally likeable man, but he and his top lieutenants seem to have no conception of what should constitute an acceptable performance by their organization.⁴⁹

Administrator Peterson, in his turn, said that Dr. Tuve had only secondhand information about the agency and complained about the "Delphic oracles" who have sprung up to declaim outside their own fields of competence.⁵⁰

Dr. Albert W. Bellamy professor of biophysics at the University of California, Los Angeles, stated as the final conclusion of his testimony that "more than 5 years of effort has not produced a set of operating plans for war-caused disaster."⁵¹

Representatives of the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, though like Dr. Bellamy, they carefully refrained from naming the FCDA or any other Government agency, agreed that no civil-defense system "that will hold up" exists in this country.

State Senator Miller, of California, reflected the sentiment of most witnesses when he said:

I will say, without equivocation, that it is my firm belief that at the present time we do not have a civil defense program. During the past 5 or 6 years we have had develop across the country a spotty conglomeration of efforts on the local levels, all labeled "civil defense."⁵²

The most devastating criticism of all was made by General Nelson, who, as noted previously, directed both Project East River and its reevaluation in 1955 at the Government's request. He described existing civil defense to the subcommittee as "ineffective and fragmentary" and "worse than no program at all". Identifying the present civil-defense effort as based on a calculated concept of an inadequate and ineffective program, General Nelson stated:

"* * * Perhaps an extreme way of putting it is to say that, under the concept, one considers the nonmilitary defense task to be so difficult, complex and expensive that there is no practical or effective solution. However, this is not to be

⁴⁹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, pp. 200, 205.

⁵⁰ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1401.

⁵¹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 6, p. 2369.

⁵² Subcommittee hearings, pt. 6, p. 2093.

admitted publicly but instead an ineffective phantom program is set up with appropriate individuals and agencies to serve as scapegoats, if such are needed at a later time.

* * * I suppose the justification for such an attitude is the feeling that for political reasons something must be done, so you make a gesture in the absence of any effective program or the knowledge of how to undertake them.⁵³

General Nelson stated that both the Congress and the Administration had failed to answer the crucial questions of civil defense.

Administrator Peterson was quite willing to acknowledge to the subcommittee his agency's shortcomings in civil defense, stating that FCDA saw its problem "with greater clarity" than did its critics. Part of the difficulty he attributed to inadequate staff. The entire FCDA staff, he said, was not much larger than a single infantry battalion. He pointed to the agency's inability to recruit a lone nuclear physicist. As of January 1956, there was no nuclear physicist on the FCDA staff.

Witnesses attributed personnel recruiting difficulties to the FCDA's lack of prestige, to the move of the headquarters away from Washington, or to the psychological barriers to high-caliber scientific employment in this field.

Other difficulties were ascribed by Administrator Peterson to the newness of civil defense and the limited experience of his agency (5 years) amidst vast and terrible advances in weaponry, to the unwillingness of the Congress to appropriate funds, and to limitations of legal authority. He apportioned part of the responsibility for present shortcomings to the world at large. Thus, in agreeing that "we haven't developed that capability" (for civil defense), he said: "When I say 'we', Mr. Chairman, all mankind stands before you deficient in this respect."⁵⁴

A close reading of Administrator Peterson's testimony strongly suggests that he entertains great doubt about the value of civil-defense planning in the face of the high-yield nuclear weapon threat. He came out early in his prepared statement with this dramatic description of his occupation: "I have been staring into hell for 3 years."⁵⁵ Later on he said: "We just are not going to be prepared for that kind of a hell."⁵⁶

Although he has issued an impressive-sounding series of thirty-odd directives to Federal agencies to carry on postattack planning for various medical, welfare and other services, he told the subcommittee that a good deal of this was "academic."

He envisaged a bleak wasteland, with tens of millions of dead and injured, the desolate survivors living in the most wretched way, eating gruel, covered with rags, sleeping anywhere they can. He insisted to the subcommittee that he would not be a party to any pretense that America can, "by delegations, and by planning, and by thinking," ready itself for this holocaust by normal peacetime methods.

All remaining resources after an attack, in his view, would be commandeered and shared without owner identity in collective misery (one might say, "disaster socialism").

⁵³ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 3, p. 670.

⁵⁴ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, pp. 1431-1432. See also p. 1226.

⁵⁵ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1160.

⁵⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1313.

"If this kind of war occurs", Administrator Peterson said, "* * * life is going to be stark, elemental, brutal, filthy and miserable."⁵⁷ He summed up the situation in this sentence: "That we are pitifully prepared and at the best we will be pitifully prepared."⁵⁸ At another point he referred to "a very nearly hopeless problem."⁵⁹

We noted earlier that he denied statements by Mr. Taylor of his staff and other engineering experts that a shelter program probably could save two-thirds of the people in a target area. He also stated his "contempt for anybody who attempts to minimize the sheer destructiveness and death and desolation that will befall mankind if these weapons are dropped."⁶⁰

The subcommittee observes that State and local civil-defense organizations tend to emphasize their peacetime disaster work because they believe it conduces to greater public acceptance of civil defense. While the subcommittee sees some merit in this contention and certainly believes that State and local civil-defense units have a useful role to perform in peacetime disasters, it would be a serious mistake to suppose that a Federal civil-defense agency must "sell" itself on that basis. The magnitude and complexity of civil defense against enemy-caused disaster are of a quite different order.

The subcommittee is the last group to minimize or play down the horrors and the devastation of nuclear warfare. The FCDA must not fall into the error of substituting local disaster planning for a national defense plan to cope with nuclear war. The magnitude of the problems of such a war is so great when compared with even such devastating disaster as the New England floods of 1955, that we must realize the greater problem. Local disaster plans must be encouraged but never substituted for a modern national defense plan designed to give our Nation the best possible chance of survival.

⁵⁷ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1313.

⁵⁸ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1314.

⁵⁹ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1226.

⁶⁰ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, pp. 1227-1228.

ANNEX

DEVELOPMENT OF SHELTER AND EVACUATION POLICIES

Early studies of civil defense were more concerned with establishing a civil-defense organization than with analyzing the relative values of specific civil-defense measures.

In the Hopley report (1948), shelter as such was hardly mentioned and evacuation was regarded somewhat in the "strategic sense" of the orderly removal of mothers and children, the infirm and others, with essential persons remaining behind.¹

The National Security Resources Board in 1950 emphasized shelter protection. For economic reasons it proposed that shelter should be provided only in predetermined critical target areas rather than throughout the country and that every effort should be made to use existing structures.²

Evacuation was regarded by the Board as one means of mass safety, but to be used only as a last resort. While State and local civil-defense units were enjoined to include evacuation possibilities in their planning, the Board stated:

Because of its disruptive effect upon organized communities and upon the morale of the people, evacuation before attack should be considered only after all other means of insuring mass safety have been evaluated. The Federal civil-defense agency is not planning for widespread use of this method.³

Legislative bills in the Congress in 1950, based largely on the NSRB report, proposing to create a Federal Civil Defense Administration, reflected the emphasis on shelter building. During House hearings on the 1950 legislation it was stated that a big shelter program was not contemplated. The Federal contribution for shelter construction was estimated at \$1,125 million. Sponsors of the legislation indicated that city surveys on exact shelter locations were awaited, but that the FCDA (administrative predecessor to the statutory agency) had the general areas in mind.⁴

In the House report on the bill the \$1,125 million figure for shelters was noted as covering a 3-year period ending June 1954.⁵

The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, signed by the President January 12, 1951, included in the definition of "civil defense" "the construction or preparation of shelters, shelter areas, and control centers; and when appropriate, the nonmilitary evacuation of civil population."

The Administrator was authorized, among other things, to "study and develop civil-defense measures" and among these measures was

¹ Civil Defense for National Security, Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Office of Civil Defense Planning (1948), pp. 220, ff.

² United States Civil Defense, Executive Office of the President, National Security Resources Board (1950), p. 35.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁴ House Committee on Armed Services, hearings on H. R. 9798, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (Dec. 5, 1950), pp. 7731, 7785-7786.

⁵ 81st Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 3209, p. 19.

included "developing shelter designs and materials for protective covering or construction."

Further, the Administrator was authorized to make financial contributions to the States on a matching basis with the proviso that contributions for shelters and other protective facilities were to be proportioned among the States according to their urban target-area populations. The value of land contributed by any State or locality was not to be figured in the State share of matching funds.

The act barred Federal contributions for dual-purpose shelters but authorized the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, upon certification by the FCDA, to make 50-year loans up to \$250 million for the purpose of aiding civil-defense projects. It was expected that large structures having shelter value would be built as underground parking garages or other revenue-producing enterprises.

The subcommittee is advised that except for a few hospitals and civil-defense control centers no loan assistance was sought or provided under this part of the act.

Although the law was not explicit on the point, the FCDA early took the administrative position that no Federal contributions would be made to States for shelter construction unless these would be public shelters. However, Federal grants, like the loan feature, have remained a dead letter. The Congress provided no funds for helping the States build shelters.

The first FCDA Administrator, Millard Caldwell, in his first appearance before the House Appropriations Committee on March 16, 1951, indicated that large, deep community shelters, if contemplated in the act, had been abandoned. Emphasis was to be placed on use of existing structures. Administrator Caldwell said:

There was much thinking over the country until the last few months that deep community shelters would be the only means of protecting large segments of the population. The Federal Government, the governors of the States, and many responsible people have given a great deal of thought to it, and all of us have concluded that any large, deep community-shelter program is not feasible for a number of reasons. In the first place, we will probably not be able to give adequate warning to all the people who could get in such shelters. In the second place, it will take too long to construct them. In the third place, they will use too much in the way of labor and critical materials, steel, and concrete. Therefore, new emphasis must be put on making the most out of whatever we have wherever we find it, identifying those places that are relatively safe such as the basements of reinforced concrete buildings, and then identifying those places which can be made fairly safe by shoring up. They are available now. We cannot wait for the deep-shelter program.⁶

Administrator Caldwell indicated that estimates for shelter costs were difficult to make, but that those prepared in connection with the 1950 act were "not too far wrong." He then pointed out "that we will transfer considerable of the emphasis which was then placed on deep shelters to what we may call surface shelters, the shoring up of

⁶ House Committee on Appropriations, hearings on the third supplemental appropriation bill, 1951, 82d Cong., 1st sess., p. 589.

basements and buildings generally to take the principal part of that load."⁷

He agreed with the Appropriations Committee chairman, Mr. Cannon, "that there has been considerable revision in plans and estimates since this evidence was submitted to the Armed Services Committee because the great bulk of the Federal expenditure at that time was to be invested in shelters." The policy now, said Administrator Caldwell, was "Instead of digging a hole in the ground and pouring it full of concrete we are now going to try to bring the existing buildings up to a standard. This we understand is almost equally expensive."⁸

In other words, the shelter concept had changed from below ground to above ground, but the costs would not be materially lessened.

At this point Administrator Caldwell cited the figure of \$3 billion as the probable cost of protecting 1 percent of the people if they were put in deep community shelters (making \$300 billion for 100 percent protection). He added:

It is a fantastic sort of a thing. There is not enough labor, steel, or concrete in the country to do it. So we think we had better emphasize this other type of shelter and devote more time to training the people in what to do and how to do it rather than digging holes in the ground.⁹

The sum of \$250 million was requested for shelters, but James J. Wadsworth, then Acting Deputy Administrator, admitted FCDA really did not know what it wanted to do with that sum. However, FCDA felt that it needed the money as inducement to the States to come in with shelter plans. Mr. Wadsworth made it plain that this estimate was only a small part of shelter costs. He said that individual cities would make surveys under Federal guidance, and he expected the individual surveys to take 3 weeks.¹⁰

Administrator Caldwell again appeared before the House Appropriations Committee on July 30, 1951, in connection with the supplemental appropriation bill for 1952. He said he anticipated that a great number of people would be sheltered in existing structures: first, in those that did not need modification; next in those needing only minor modification; and finally in those which would require major modification. He made the point that the more shelters built, the less the need for medical supplies, because the casualties would be reduced.¹¹

Mr. Cannon said he was under the impression that Administrator Caldwell, on the basis of previous testimony, had considered communal shelters impractical, since they would serve people only nearby and would be prohibitive in cost. Mr. Wadsworth, then Deputy Administrator, said that FCDA did not intend to abandon the communal shelter, that earlier it had asked for funds to survey and find out exactly where to set up shelters of the kind that would prove adequate, and also to find out what existing buildings could be used for shelter purposes.

⁷ Ibid., p. 591.

⁸ Ibid., p. 591.

⁹ Ibid., p. 592. Administrator Caldwell indicated at a later date that the figure was applicable to much more than shelters. At the Senate Appropriations Committee hearings on the third supplemental appropriation bill, 1951, he said on April 23, 1951, that "a full civil-defense program of ultimate capacity would cost \$300 billion. This would include relocation and dispersion of all important industry and concentration of population, which is not contemplated at this time" (p. 682). That total he described as "a fantastic, impossible figure." He expressed a desire for a reasonable program.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 632.

¹¹ House Committee on Appropriations, hearings on supplemental appropriation bill, 1952, 82d Cong. 1st sess., p. 653.

Mr. Wadsworth said that FCDA had "very definitely abandoned the thought of very large mass deep shelters." He still believed, however, that community shelters that could each serve hundreds of people still would be feasible. These would accomodate 200 or 300 people. He estimated that new communal shelters were needed for 15 million people, as contrasted with the use of existing structures for 16 million people. The per capita cost of construction of those shelters he put at \$90; that was on the basis of \$15 per square foot. The FCDA estimate for shelter requirements was \$250 million as a starter.¹²

Construction of shelters in the larger cities, Mr. Wadsworth indicated, would be a 100 percent city responsibility. He said that the Bureau of the Census had a study underway to determine where shelters should be located. Local authorities were said to be cooperating in the surveys.

Apparently convinced that FCDA did not have enough supporting information to justify the appropriation of shelter funds for a contributions program, the House committee denied the request. Administrator Caldwell renewed his plea before the Senate Appropriations Committee on September 12, 1951, and explained how the shelter program was to be approached. He said in his prepared statement:

The shelter program has been the subject of a great deal of misunderstanding and misinterpretation. It has not been, and will not be, the intent of this Administration to invest shelter funds in a program of deep holes in the ground.

The shelter program presented by this Administration is economical because it is devoted to making use of existing facilities. The three phases of the shelter program as currently presented are: (1) six and one half million dollars to make surveys in the target cities throughout the country for the purpose of identifying those existing buildings which are suitable for shelter. Designation of such buildings as shelters alone can save many thousands of lives and markedly reduce the number of living casualties who would require assistance, (2) after the survey has been made, a percentage of the buildings found unsuitable for shelters could be made suitable with minor alterations, (3) the Federal Civil Defense Administration will provide technical assistance for the building of a limited number of group shelters in those areas where skilled industrial personnel have absolutely no shelter in case of attack.

The purpose of a shelter is to save lives, and we can do so at a very low cost per person. Shelters are a part of a balanced civil-defense program. If you don't have shelters, the consequences in the event of an attack will be twofold: (1) A substantial loss of life in many cities which could have been prevented, and (2) many thousands more living casualties than now anticipated and provided for. This will necessitate additional funds for medical supplies, equipment, and civil-defense services of every type at the Federal, State, and local levels.¹³

¹² Ibid., pp. 671-672.

¹³ Senate Committee on Appropriations, hearings on supplemental appropriation bill, 1952, 82d Cong., 1st sess., p. 662.

Again he said:

In striking out all of the funds for the shelter program, the implication was made that further study and analysis was necessary before any shelter program could be undertaken. It is true that the Administration does not have every answer to every possible question that may be raised regarding shelters. However, there is sufficient information available to establish certain minimal requirements, and when followed, would produce some shelter for the masses of people found in the population density centers within critical target areas. This is an area where we can all learn by doing, and no amount of drawing-board technique is going to provide better answers than those gained in experience through application of present knowledge.¹⁴

In subsequent discussion it was indicated that the total shelter program spread over a 3-year period would amount to \$865 million in Federal contributions. Of this, \$190 million would be devoted to modification of existing structures. Surveys and the identifying of existing safe structures to house 2 or 3 million people of critical target areas would cost \$6½ million.¹⁵

Having failed to obtain congressional funds for matching shelter grants to the States, Administrator Caldwell tried again the following year. He reported to the House Appropriations Committee on June 12, 1952:

We will complete shelter surveys in major cities and match funds with the States for the minor modification of existing structures to provide shelter for more than 15 million people.¹⁶

He deplored the lack of support for a shelter program, saying that World War II had proved the value of such a program. "We can locate or prepare simple, inexpensive shelter for 30 million Americans who will need it if an attack comes."¹⁷

Administrator Caldwell restated his proposal for a three-phase shelter program: (1) Engineering surveys to locate and mark adequate existing shelter and to identify buildings which can be made adequate by practicable modifications; (2) completion of the modifications indicated by the surveys; (3) construction of simple group shelters—not mass shelters—to meet the deficiency.

He proposed \$250 million in Federal funds in that year (1952) to be matched by State and local contributions. The shelter program was described as essentially the same as the preceding year's. The estimate of \$250 million he regarded as a minimum, to cover the first and second phases, providing shelter for an estimated 15 million people.

When asked to explain how that figure was established he said that it "is a more or less arbitrary figure to start with."¹⁸

In July 1952 (still in the nominal bomb era), Project East River, considered that FCDA's total projected costs of \$1.8 billion for shelters (half to be financed by the States), as worked out with the help of

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 664.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 678.

¹⁶ House Committee on Appropriations, hearings on the supplemental appropriation bill, 1953, 83d Cong., 2d sess., pt. 2, p. 9.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

Lehigh University, probably were excessive. On the basis of Boston and New York surveys, Project East River believed that minor modifications could be made in existing buildings at a cost of \$5 per person or about \$1 per square foot of shelter space. Use of existing structures was emphasized; massive communal centers were opposed. The lifesaving potential of shelters was put at 75 percent.¹⁹

Project East River recommended that the FCDA-sponsored survey of shelters in existing structures be completed and that "a study should be made of the cost and feasibility of a comprehensive shelter program to provide a reasonable level of protection for those within vulnerable urban districts."²⁰

Little was said in the Project East River reports about evacuation as a civil-defense measure. A great deal of emphasis was placed on industry and population dispersion to reduce urban vulnerability.

Governor Peterson took office as Administrator of FCDA on February 20, 1953, and on June 4, 1953, he made it known to the House Appropriations Committee that he heartily endorsed their refusal to vote funds for a mass-shelter program. He suggested that families and individuals build their own shelters. Observing that the growing threat of bigger bombs, deadlier weapons and new means of developing them posed new and greater civil-defense tasks, he said:

On the other hand, I believe one of the programs previously recommended was wisely voted down by the Congress.

I particularly have in mind the repeated requests which you received for \$250 million for large public shelters. You will find no such request in this budget for a very sound reason. The vast improvement in the destructive power of nuclear weapons could turn such public shelters into death traps in our large cities. Our research in this whole public-shelter area is inadequate and too incomplete at this time for me to ask you to invest that kind of money in large public shelters.

Make no mistake, however. The need for individual and family-type shelters in our target areas has been solidly proven by the recent Nevada tests and our agency is now embarked upon a program to encourage the use of such shelters by individuals and families in our target areas.²¹

Again he said:

No funds are requested for a public-shelter program in this budget despite the fact two States have submitted budget plans for modification of existing structures to provide public shelters. We are reevaluating the entire shelter program in light of recent weapon developments, new estimates of warning time, and various tests and studies affecting shelter requirements. There are so many factors still to be studied that I do not honestly feel we can ask congressional support of a public-shelter program at this time.²²

¹⁹ Reduction of urban vulnerability, pt. V of the Report of Project East River, July 1952, pp. 15, 52, 88, 90.

²⁰ General report, pt. I of the Report of Project East River, October 1952, p. 64.

²¹ House Committee on Appropriations, hearings on the supplemental appropriation bill, 1954, 83d Cong., 1st sess., pt. 1, p. 221.

²² Ibid., p. 224.

And again he said:

You will notice that in this program we have not asked the Congress for \$1 for the shelter program. I think the agency got off to a bad start, and not necessarily through fault of the agency, in all of the talk that went on in America back in 1950 about the necessity for going under the ground. It is true that we could go under the ground far enough to escape the effects of an atomic attack. But the cost would be billions of dollars, and more important than that, or equally important with that, we have not done enough research to know how sensible it is to attempt to go under the ground, particularly in our big cities.²³

He pointed out that the State of New York had asked FCDA for \$7½ million of matching money to spend \$15 million for plans already worked out to utilize the New York subway systems for shelter purposes. He added: "I could not, in good conscience, recommend \$1 for that."

He went on to declare there was insufficient research and lack of knowledge about atomic bomb effects and stated: "In other words, we just do not know enough about it, so we are not asking the Congress for one dime." He went on:

It might surprise you to have anything said that was good about the Congress. I know it used to surprise me to have something good said about a governor, but I think the Congress was absolutely right when it refused to appropriate a dollar for the mass-shelter program.

I want to say that time may indicate, in the future, the necessity for some activity in this field; in other words, I would not want to close the door, because this is a matter that engineers, scientists, and experts will have to speak about.

But as of today, your action in cutting out the shelter program, in my judgment, has been well substantiated. I am not saying, now, that we do not need family-type shelters. The experiments in Nevada have shown conclusively that any family is wise if it creates a shelter in the basement, possibly just a lean-to shelter against the cellar wall, by throwing some rough boards up against the wall, or by building a box-type shelter at the least possible cost, or by building a more elaborate concrete shelter, if it cares to, outdoors or a slit trench. Experience has shown those things will save lives.²⁴

Three years later, Administrator Peterson stated to this subcommittee that his predecessor, Mr. Caldwell, had presented "sensible plans" to the Congress which were rejected, and that if he had to judge who was more right he "would be inclined to go along with Governor Caldwell rather than the Appropriations Committee." He added:

²³ Ibid., p. 228.

²⁴ Ibid.

I assume the record is pretty clear as to the requests he made before the Congress, including those for the shelter program which was turned down by the Congress in the most cavalier manner; turned down very quickly and pointedly. He wasn't given much of a show. I don't think anything is to be gained in trying to assess any blame between the Congress and the administration. I think this is a field in which both administrations and the Congress and the American people have all been slow to awaken to the seriousness of the problem.²⁵

Although Administrator Peterson had praised the Congress for turning down his predecessor's shelter request, he stated to this subcommittee:

I don't think there is any question but had that shelter program been begun it would have been of some value to us today. It is true had those shelters been built at that time they would not have been built to the standards we see necessary today, but I think any shelter would have been better than no shelter, and it may be that we would even have lost some money in the process of the construction of the shelter program offered in 1951, 1952; and 1953.²⁶

He then reflected that perhaps the Congress in refusing to vote funds for shelter in 1951 and 1952 may have saved the American people some money and permitted evacuation to work since "evacuation is a sound tactic until the day that the ICBM eliminates warning time."²⁷

Mr. Taylor of the FCDA staff described the shift in emphasis to family shelters in this manner:

After all three (appropriation) requests were denied, from then on our only recourse has been to try to sell the program on a do-it-yourself and pay-for-it-yourself basis. This has not met with much success.²⁸

On April 27, 1954, Administrator Peterson stated to the House Appropriations Committee that "this budget we are submitting to you today is based on the philosophy of the concept of evacuation". He also stated that in order to evacuate cities, warning time of 2 to 6 hours was necessary.²⁹

A day later he said to the Senate Appropriations Committee that the alternatives in the face of the hydrogen bomb threat were "die, dig, or get out". Based on the Swedish and Swiss experience in underground shelters, he thought that was "a perfectly feasible approach" except for the enormous cost.

He added:

However, we have not proposed it in the United States because if we were to put all the people of the United States into comparable shelters, we would have to go down in the ground 100 or more feet, we would have to build concrete

²⁵ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1210.

²⁶ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1210.

²⁷ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, p. 1210.

²⁸ House Committee on Appropriations, hearings on the supplemental appropriation bill, 1955, 83d Cong., 2d sess., pt. 2, pp. 152-153.

reinforced catacombs. The cost would be untold billions of dollars.

Instead of that, we have proposed to evacuate the people from the cities and our policy now is approved by the highest authorities in the executive branch.

Our policy is assuming adequate warning time. We hope that within 24 to 30 months, plus or minus, the Air Force will have completed the detection system that it is now working on, to the point that it can give us warning of 2 or 3 or 4 hours, of approaching enemy airplanes.²⁹

On February 14, 1955, Administrator Peterson emphasized to the House Appropriations Committee that the jump in the destructive power of hydrogen weapons made evacuation the only alternative. He said:

In the light of destructive forces several hundred times more powerful than the bomb which exploded over Hiroshima, we evolved the policy of evacuation in our cities. There was no alternative. No one near the point of release of this terrific force can survive.

Civil defense was flexible enough to shift its planning to a policy of evacuation, now some 2 years old. The acceptance of this policy is increasing rapidly throughout America as cities take steps to make it operational.³⁰

The fallout danger, Administrator Peterson assured the Appropriations Committee, did not outmode civil defense but only imposed new duties and required a modification of evacuation plans to provide shelter for evacuees.³¹

A few months later Administrator Peterson explained to the Senate Appropriations Committee why the President had requested additional funds for evacuation routes. He stated:

Now, the first thing we want to know, and the reason the President made this request, is to find out what percentage of the people in each of these large cities of America must be moved out to escape this situation that means death. What percentage must we move out? That permits us to know what percentage can do nothing better than to dig a backyard shelter and stay in town.

When we know that, we can come to the Congress and ask for enough money to build reasonable shelters along the highways to protect the people.

I personally will not come to Congress, Mr. Chairman, to ask for money until we have made studies, until we have removed the guesswork. One gets into a ludicrous and indefensible position otherwise.³²

In the interval, Administrator Peterson further explained to the Senate Civil Defense Subcommittee his views on evacuation and shel-

²⁹ Senate Committee on Appropriations, hearings on supplemental appropriation bill, 1955, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 472.

³⁰ House Committee on Appropriations, hearings on the independent offices (FCDA) appropriations for 1956, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 375.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Senate Committee on Appropriations, hearings on independent offices appropriations, 1956, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 384.

ter. He said he first started talking publicly about evacuation in June 1953; agreed that future planning in the field of civil defense must be predicated upon evacuation; and observed that it "fits in very nicely" with the President's highway program. Several studies had convinced him that evacuation of cities was feasible and could be accomplished and must be done to save people who otherwise would be burned or blasted to death by large nuclear weapons.³³

Noting that Dr. Libby in December 1954 had suggested that one of the best protections against radioactivity was to "create a foxhole and curl into it," Administrator Peterson urged people not to wait for a Government shelter program but to build backyard or basement shelters if they lived 15 miles from a probable target area. He expressed the opinion that 20 to 25 percent of the people in the great metropolitan areas should never move onto the highways in case of attack but should stay in their own shelters. Remaining in such a shelter would be his personal preference.³⁴

In advocating that people dig their own shelters, Administrator Peterson said that he believed "in approaching the problem from the ground up, and I mean that in no sense as a pun, but in taking the most economical and easiest way."³⁵

Administrator Peterson then outlined his ideas for providing shelter along evacuation routes. As the cheapest way, outside of using barns, houses and other existing structures, "it would be my plan to employ trenching machines and go along the public highways and dig miles of trenches 2 feet wide and 3 feet deep which can be dug at the cost of about 25 cents a running foot, and place people in those shelters." Covering the top of the trenches to protect against radioactivity raised a difficult problem, he said, perhaps boards covered with a foot or more of dirt or possibly tar paper could be used.

He said that the FCDA had no plan for using trenching machines or acquiring space along the public highways since civil defense is primarily a State and city responsibility and he had "no doubt that the civil-defense people in the States will find it entirely possible to implement such a suggestion."³⁶

As a more costly alternative to an emergency program of this type, Administrator Peterson suggested that miles of concrete pipe, 4 or more feet in diameter, be placed along the highways and be covered with 3 feet of dirt. He estimated that some 25 million people might be required to accept such cover and that costs might run \$40 per person or about \$1 billion.

Finally he suggested as the most expensive and much more comfortable type of shelter, light concrete structures reinforced with steel and covered with 3 feet of dirt. These would be surface buildings built on the highways or on private properties. The cost here he put at "several billions of dollars."³⁷

On June 29, 1955, Administrator Peterson presented to the House Appropriations Committee the budget justification for the aforementioned Presidential request for funds to finance evacuation feasibility studies. He proposed a no-year appropriation of \$10 million "for surveys and development or evacuation plans," \$2 million for related

³³ Senate Civil Defense Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, pp. 61, 62.

³⁴ Senate Civil Defense Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, pp. 122, 123.

³⁵ Senate Civil Defense Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, p. 121.

³⁶ Senate Civil Defense Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, pp. 118, 119.

³⁷ Senate Civil Defense Subcommittee hearings, pt. 1, p. 121.

research and some \$3 million for other Federal agencies performing delegated FCDA functions. In his introductory statement he said:

The Federal Civil Defense Administration is responsible for preparing national plans and programs. To carry out that responsibility, this Administration proposes a survey, plans, and research program which will furnish evacuation plans for critical target areas. This program will assist this Administration in determining the needs for shelter incident to evacuate plans and will provide for research to determine the best methods of carrying out the civil-defense evacuation and shelter program.³⁸

The appropriation request included an item of \$35,000 for shelter research, and the justification was as follows: "This is primarily a review of past studies and ongoing atomic research to determine optimum relationships between blast, thermal and radiation protection afforded by various degrees of shelter and cover."³⁹

Administrator Peterson restated his view that evacuation was the only alternative since the advent of the multimegaton hydrogen bomb.

The casualties in an attack with such weapons is horrible to contemplate. In the absence of a complete dispersion of our great productive and population centers, the only possible safety for the people in our target cities lies in preattack evacuation. Shelters cannot be constructed to withstand the effects of the bomb at, or near, ground zero, however, and any program to construct complete shelter facilities would run into untold billions of dollars. This, then, leaves us with no reasonable or practical alternative to evacuation, at least from the areas of probable severe damage. The tremendous investment now being made by the Air Force in early warning devices indicate strongly that sufficient time will be available for evacuation, if our cities can develop the capacity for making it work.⁴⁰

Administrator Peterson said that on the basis of the "best information" he had, 4 to 6 hours of warning time reasonably could be expected when the DEW line was completed. The ICBM would present a wholly different problem, he said, but it was in the uncertain future, and he "felt that the evil of today is sufficient in this business, and if we could work out plans which would stand firm for a period of years, until the time that an intercontinental ballistics missile possibly comes into being, we would have made a gain".⁴¹

Again he said:

I personally, while accepting the responsibility of this work, will not ask the Congress for any money for a shelter program until we have made these studies which would indicate what a logical request would be. In other words, I do not want to be in the position of asking for money which I cannot justify.⁴²

³⁸House Committee on Appropriations, hearings on supplemental appropriation bill, 1956, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 756.

³⁹Ibid., p. 759.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 766.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 771-772.

⁴²Ibid., p. 773.

In November 1955 the Project East River review committee proposed a balanced program of shelter and evacuation, with continued efforts in the direction of dispersing industry and population. Evacuation as a single civil-defense measure, in the opinion of the review committee, had become largely unmanageable because of the greatly extended metropolitan areas which would have to be evacuated and of the potential fallout hazard over parts of the country.

In January 1956 the FCDA evaluated the Operation Alert 1955 civil-defense exercise and, among other things, concluded that evacuation is the only answer to thermonuclear warfare. Noting that the evacuations were simulated and the estimated saving of lives "highly theoretical," the FCDA evaluation added:

At the same time, the fact that this number of cities even assumed that they would evacuate their people demonstrated the widespread acceptance of the evacuation concept. Mayors, governors, and civil-defense leaders throughout the country are rapidly being convinced that despite the awesome problems involved in moving whole populations and providing for their care, there is no other answer to the threat of attack on our cities with high-yield weapons.

FCDA is making every effort to help the States develop sound evacuation plans. A great stimulus to this planning will result from the data made available by the surveys and studies made possible by the recent appropriation of about \$10 million for these purposes by the Congress.⁴³

The studies referred to above are analyzed in the main body of this report.

LIST OF WITNESSES AT CIVIL DEFENSE HEARINGS

(Alphabetically arranged)

Abramson, Leon, acting mayor, Baltimore, Md.
Adams, Col. James Y., Chief, Plans and Operations, Headquarters, Sixth Army
Aitken, H. L., Executive Assistant Administrator, Federal Civil Defense Administration
Allen, Niel R., chairman, civil-defense committee, American Legion
Andrews, Dr. Howard, National Cancer Institute, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Anthony, S. A., president, Civil Defense Research Associates, New York City
Archambault, Raoul, Jr., General Counsel, Federal Civil Defense Administration
Ballantyne, Thomas R., director, Onondaga County (New York) civil defense
Bannister, Phoebe, Bureau of Public Assistance, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Barnard, O. G., civil defense organization, Baltimore, Md.
Barton, Frank W., secretary, Council of National Defense, American Medical Association, Chicago, Ill.

⁴³ Subcommittee hearings, pt. 4, pp. 1493-1494.

Bascom, Willard, advisory committee on civil defense, National Academy of Sciences

Baxter, Tom, American Broadcasting Co., and conelrad supervisor for Los Angeles area

Beers, Col. Barnet W., Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower, Personnel and Reserve

Bellamy, Dr. Albert W., University of California, Los Angeles

Benham, Edward, security chief, General Electric

Bennett, Dudley J., Onondaga County (New York) civil defense

Berhner, Dr. Lloyd V., president, Associated Universities, Inc., member, Project East River Review Committee

Berry, Lewis, Deputy Administrator, Federal Civil Defense Administration

Blackburn, Schuyler C., civil-defense organization, Baltimore, Md.

Blume, Norman H., Wisconsin Office of Civil Defense

Bowman, H. L., Division of Biology and Medicine, Atomic Energy Commission

Brinkman, William, assistant civil-defense director, city of Detroit

Burgess, Hon. Carter L., Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower, Personnel, and Reserves, Department of Defense

Burke, Adm. Arleigh A., Chief of Naval Operations

Burt, Dr. Benjamin P., department of chemistry, Syracuse University

Byrnes, Horace F., former pilot project, Nassau County, N. Y.

Callahan, Alfred, general counsel, New York State Department of Civil Defense

Carleton, Don E., director, Milwaukee Civil Defense Administration

Carmichael, P. A., Bureau of Public Roads, Department of Commerce

Carnahan, George W., civil-defense coordinator, County of Milwaukee, Wis.

Chapman, John P., Office of the Administrator, Housing and Home Finance Agency

Christian, D. E., Office of the Secretary, Department of Labor

Christopher, Hon. George, mayor, city of San Francisco

Cobo, Hon. Albert E., mayor, city of Detroit

Cohen, Edward, Amman & Whitney, consulting engineers, New York

Colgrove, Jacob B., office of civil defense, city of Los Angeles

Condon, Maj. Gen. Robert E. (retired), head, New York City Office of Civil Defense

Conley, Lt. Col. Victor G., Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army

Cook, Rear Adm. A. G. (retired), Director, San Francisco Disaster Council and Corps

Cooper, Capt. J. D., Department of the Air Force

Corsbie, R. L., Division of Biology and Medicine, Atomic Energy Commission

Costigan, James J., New York City Office of Civil Defense

Crane, Frank, president, Southern California Broadcasters Association

Crayton, Lt. Col. Robert, Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army

Cronin, Dr. Walter L., Cambridge, Mass.

Cronkite, Dr. Eugene P., Medical Department, Brookhaven National Laboratory

Curtiss, C. D., Commissioner, Bureau of Public Roads, Department of Commerce

Davis, J. J., United States Weather Bureau, Department of Commerce
Davis, Col. Lee J., 28th AAA Nike Group
Dearing, Dr. W. Palmer, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Dice, George, Department of Agriculture
Drake, Harold G., region IV, Federal Civil Defense Administration
Dunham, Dr. Charles L., Director, Division of Biology and Medicine, Atomic Energy Commission
Dyer, Thomas H., Onondaga County Board of Supervisors (New York)
Easton, Bruce, Department of Agriculture
Earl, Howard, Director, Disaster-Civil Defense Authority, county of Los Angeles, Calif.
Eicholzer, Albert J., chief engineer, WSYR, Syracuse, N. Y.
Engle, Lavinia, Social Security Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Engquist, Col. M. J., Headquarters, Sixth Army
Evans, William, Deputy Civil Defense Director, Wayne County, Mich.
Fairman, Prof. Charles, professor of law, Harvard Law School
Fallon, Hon. George H., Congressman, Fourth Congressional District of the State of Maryland
Farrell, Thomas J., San Francisco Disaster Council and Corps
Ferguson, Alec, Civil Defense Senior Attack Warning Officer, 32d Air Command
Fitzgerald, J. Edmund, American Machine & Foundry Co.
Fitzpatrick, John W., Deputy Director of Civil Defense, State of Wisconsin
Flemming, Dr. Arthur S., Director, Office of Defense Mobilization
Fogle, Lt. Col. George, Headquarters, Second Army
Fondahl, John E., Director, District of Columbia Civil Defense Organization
Friedel, Hon. Samuel N., Congressman, Seventh Congressional District of the State of Maryland
Gallagher, Gerald R., Assistant Administrator, Technical Advisory Services, Federal Civil Defense Administration
Gallagher, Hubert, Assistant Administrator, Field Relations, Federal Civil Defense Administration
Garrett, Ralph L., Director, Welfare Office, Federal Civil Defense Administration
Gault, Col. Jack C. (retired), executive director, Cincinnati-Hamilton County Civil Defense Organization
Gentry, Dr. John T., district State health officer, Syracuse, N. Y.
Glass, Dr. H. Bentley, Johns Hopkins University; member, Genetics Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation, National Academy of Sciences
Gold, T. S., Assistant to Under Secretary, Department of Agriculture
Grant, Thomas, lieutenant, Michigan State Police
Grey, Shelby T., Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
Griffin, John E., acting director, Michigan Office of Civil Defense.
Grinwis, Gordon, Michigan State Police
Haddaway, E. D., sergeant, Maryland State Police
Harriman, Hon. Averell, Governor, State of New York
Harris, Innis, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Defense Mobilization

- Hausauer, Maj. Gen. Karl F. (retired), chief of staff to the Governor and commanding general, New York National Guard
- Hendee, Clare, Assistant Chief, Forest Service, Department of Agriculture
- Hennessey, Joseph, assistant director, New York State Department of Civil Defense
- Hill, Dr. Albert G., Massachusetts Institute of Technology; chief scientist, Weapons System Evaluation Group DQD; formerly Director, Project Lincoln
- Hinners, Capt. Robert A., commanding officer, United States Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory
- Hohmann, Arthur C., deputy chief, Los Angeles Police Department
- Horton, Burke, Plans and Readiness Area, Office of Defense Mobilization
- Hospital, Gen. Ralph (retired), president, Civil Defense Directors Association, State of New York
- Hozier, Dr. John B., Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
- Hubbard, Hon. Orville, mayor, city of Dearborn, Mich.
- Huebner, Maj. Gen. C. R. (retired), Director, New York State Department of Civil Defense
- Hurt, T. Yale, Assistant Director, Los Angeles Basin Area Survey
- Israel, Brig. Gen. Robert S., jr., commanding general, 32d Air Command, Hancock Field
- Jarchow, Alfred W., Director, Appraisal and Mortgage Risk Division, Federal Housing Administration
- Jeffus, Col. John H., acting commander, 27th Air Division (Defense), Norton Air Force Base, Calif.
- Johnson, Col. Harold S., USA (retired), director, Sonoma County Civil Defense and Disaster Council, California
- Johnson, Col. Ralph, Plans and Operations, Fort George G. Meade, Md.
- Keenan, E. L., Deputy Director, Bureau of Employment Security, Department of Labor
- Kelly, Harold F., chief, Syracuse, N. Y., Police Department
- Kendall, Charles H., General Counsel, Office of Defense Mobilization
- Killian, Dr. James R., Jr., president, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- Kirkpatrick, Martin D., Office of Chief of Engineers, United States Army
- Knight, Hon. Goodwin J., Governor of California
- Koebel, Ralph, Office of General Counsel, Department of Agriculture
- Koob, Lt. Col. W. K., Jr., Continental Army Command, Fort Monroe, Va.
- Kullenberg, Leslie L., Emergency Operations Office, Federal Civil Defense Administration
- Lapp, Dr. Ralph E., nuclear physicist, Washington, D. C.
- Larke, Thomas, Jr., San Francisco Disaster Council and Corps
- Lastner, Frank J., county commissioner, Prince Georges County, Md.
- Levine, Murray S., attorney, New York City
- Lewis, R. E., Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor
- Libby, Dr. Willard F., Commissioner, United States Atomic Energy Commission
- Lindsey, Col. Julian B., commanding officer, Fort George G. Meade, Md.

Lipscomb, Col. Thomas H., Military Plans, OCE, United States Army
Long, Corbett, assistant director of civil defense, Los Angeles County, Calif.
Low, Vice Adm. Francis S., commander, Western Sea Frontier, United States Navy
Lowell, Stanley H., assistant to Hon. Robert F. Wagner, mayor of the city of New York
Ludington, Dr. John R., Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Lueth, Dr. Harold C., member of council of national defense of the American Medical Association
Lynch, Richard F., director of civil defense, city of Los Angeles, Calif.
Machta, Dr. Lester, United States Weather Bureau, Department of Commerce
Marsh, Maj. R. A., Department of the Air Force
Martin, Capt. W. R., Office of Chief of Naval Operations
Matteson, Lt. Col. Orbil V., Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department of the Army
Matthews, Frederick S., deputy director, State civil defense agency, Maryland (on behalf of Governor McKeldin)
McCormick, Ray J., assistant director, Oakland Civil Defense and Disaster Organization, Oakland, Calif.
McGillivray, Peter, operations director, Detroit civil defense program
McMillan, Don C., city manager of Pasadena, Calif.
Mead, Hon. Donald H., mayor of Syracuse, N. Y.
Metcalf, John R., member, Erie County, Pa., Civil Defense Council
Michael, Dr. Donald N., psychological consultant, Washington, D. C.
Mider, Dr. G. Burroughs, National Cancer Institute, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Milani, Frank, director of civil defense, city of Baltimore, Md.
Miller, Hon. George, Jr., member of the California State Senate
Mitchell, William L., Social Security Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Morrell, Arthur D., Technical Advisory Services, Federal Civil Defense Administration
Morrill, Lt. Col. H. R., Department of the Air Force
Morse, Hon. True D., Under Secretary, Department of Agriculture.
Nelson, Maj. Gen. Otto L. (retired), vice president in charge of housing, New York Life Insurance Co.; Chairman, Project East River Review Committee
Nutting, Col. H. L., Bristol Laboratories
Olson, Clarence H., national legislative commission, American Legion
O'Reilly, John B., civil defense director, Dearborn, Mich.
Orwatt, Col. Norman S., base commander, Selfridge AFB, Mich.
Owen, Elise (Miss), director of civil defense, Stonington, Conn.
Parkinson, Rear Adm. George A., United States Naval Reserve, Milwaukee Civil Defense Administration
Peterson, Hon. Val, Administrator, Federal Civil Defense Administration
Pierson, Stanley, director of civil defense, State of California
Piggins, Edward, commissioner, Detroit Police Department
Pohlenz, D. Dean, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Planning, Federal Civil Defense Administration

Poulson, Hon. Norris, mayor, city of Los Angeles
Radford, Adm. Arthur, Chairman, United States Joint Chiefs of Staff
Randall, Philip A., project engineer, Urban Renewal Administration
Redihan, Col. B. F., G-3, Headquarters, Fifth Army
Reeves, Harry, inspector, Detroit Police Department
Reginald, Sister Mary, R. S. M., American Hospital Association
Ridley, Granville S., American Legion
Rothrum, William, vice president, WSYR, Syracuse, N. Y.
Russell, Col. J. G., Department of the Air Force
Sample, David R., civil defense organization, Baltimore, Md.
Sass, Lt. Col. Edward J., Headquarters, 10th Air Force, Continental Air Command
Scheele, Dr. Leonard A., Surgeon General, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Schnepe, Fred E., Bureau of Public Roads, Department of Commerce
Shade, Dr. Frank R., Governor's Advisory Committee on Civil Defense, State of California
Sheahan, Harvey, assistant director of civil defense, Madison County, N. Y.
Sheets, Albert E., counsel, California State Senate Special Committee on Government Administration
Shreve, Arthur L., Baltimore area survival plan project
Siciliano, Hon. Rocco C., Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor
Sivers, R. Hal, director, Prince Georges County (Maryland) civil defense agency
Simons, Howard, Department of Agriculture
Skellan, Robert, Bristol Laboratories, Syracuse, N. Y.
Skramstad, Dr. Harold K., National Bureau of Standards
Sonne, H. Christian, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, National Planning Association
Stahl, Lt. Col. F. N., Department of the Air Force
Stark, Melville I., Los Angeles Office of Civil Defense
Stead, Dr. William H., National Planning Association
Stone, Albert E., sheriff, Onondaga County, N. Y.
Strope, Walmer E., United States Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory
Sturgis, Lt. Gen. Samuel D., Jr., Chief of Engineers, United States Army
Tark, Herbert, station WWJ; Detroit, Mich.
Taylor, Benjamin C., Director, Engineering Office, Federal Civil Defense Administration
Taylor, Dr. Lauriston S., Chief, Atomic and Radiation Physics Division, National Bureau of Standards
Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., Chief of Staff, United States Army
Thisse, Francis, assistant chief engineer, WSYR radio and TV, Syracuse, N. Y.
Thomas, E. Gwyn, public relations director, Manufacturers Association of Syracuse, N. Y.
Tipton, L. W., fiscal officer, State of Maryland
Todd, Dr. Frank A., Agricultural Research Service, Department of Agriculture
Tompkins, Dr. Paul C., United States Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory

Tuve, Dr. Merle A., director, research laboratory of Carnegie Institution of Washington
Twining, Gen. Nathan F., Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Wagner, Les, chief of public information, California Office of Civil Defense
Wagner, Paul, Assistant Administrator for Education, Federal Civil Defense Administration
Walker, Col. George H., Office of Chief of Engineers, United States Army
Ward, William W., Jr., director, office of civil defense, Contra Costa County, Calif.
Warren, Dr. Stafford L., dean, School of Medicine, University of California, Los Angeles, Calif.
Waters, Earl G., California State Senate Special Committee on Governmental Administration
Weathers, Maj. W. W., Jr., planning officer, plans and operations, Military District of Washington.
Wells, John L., Assistant Director of Finance, Department of Agriculture.
Wesser, Carl, chief engineer, WWJ, Detroit, Mich.
White, William L., director, civil defense research, Stanford Research Institute.
Whitney, Dr. John M., Director, Health Office, Federal Civil Defense Administration.
Williams, Robert E., Jr., civil defense organization, Baltimore, Md.
Williamson, Kenneth, associate director, American Hospital Association.
Wilner, J. T., director of engineering, WBAL, Baltimore, Md.
Wilson, James R., Jr., director, national security commission, American Legion.
Wilson, Rear Adm. R. E., United States Navy.
Zeidler, Hon. Frank P., mayor, city of Milwaukee, Wis.

A LIST OF CORRESPONDING MAYORS AND GOVERNORS ¹

Alabama:

Hon. James E. Folsom, Governor
Hon. James W. Morgan, mayor, Birmingham
U. N. James, director, Civil Defense Corps, Birmingham-Jefferson County

Arkansas:

Hon. Orval E. Faubus, Governor
Owen Payne, Jr., director, State of Arkansas, Office of Civil Defense

California:

Hon. Goodwin J. Knight, Governor
Hon. Norris Poulsen, mayor, Los Angeles
Col. Richard F. Lynch, director, Los Angeles office of Civil Defense
Hon. Charles C. Dail, mayor, San Diego
Hon. Elmer E. Robinson, mayor, San Francisco

¹ Replies received in response to a letter of Chairman Chet Hollifield to mayors and governors, December 1955.

Colorado:

Hon. Edwin C. Johnson, Governor
Hon. W. F. Nicholson, mayor, Denver

Connecticut: Elise Owen, civil defense director, Stonington

Delaware: Hon. August F. Walz, mayor, Wilmington

Georgia: Hon. Marvin Griffin, Governor

Illinois: Hon. William G. Stratton, Governor

Indiana:

Hon. George N. Craig, Governor
Hon. Henry O. Roberts, mayor, Evansville
Hon. John A. Scott, mayor, South Bend

Kansas: Hon. Fred Hall, Governor

Kentucky:

David Aronberg, director of civil defense, Ashland
Hon. Andrew Broadbuss, mayor, Louisville

Louisiana:

Hon. Robert F. Kennon, Governor
Maj. Gen. Raymond H. Fleming, adjutant general, State of Louisiana
Hon. DeLesseps S. Morrison, mayor, New Orleans

Maine:

Hon. Edmund S. Muskie, Governor
Sumner T. Pike, Public Utilities Commission, State of Maine

Maryland:

Hon. Theodore R. McKeldin, Governor
Hon. Thomas D'Alesandro, mayor, Baltimore
Col. Frank Milani, Director, Baltimore Civil Defense Organization

Massachusetts: Francis J. McGrath, city manager, Worcester

Michigan:

Hon. G. Mennen Williams, Governor
Hon. Albert E. Cobo, mayor, Detroit

Minnesota:

Hon. Orville L. Freeman, Governor
Hon. Eric G. Hoyer, mayor, Minneapolis
Walter P. Halstead, executive director, Minneapolis Office of Civil Defense
Hon. Joseph E. Dillon, mayor, St. Paul

Mississippi: Hendrix A. Dawson, director, Mississippi Civil Defense Council

Missouri:

Hon. Phil M. Donnelly, Governor
Hon. H. Roe Bartle, mayor, Kansas City
Hon. Raymond R. Tucker, mayor, St. Louis
F. P. Hardaway, director, St. Louis Office of Civil Defense.

New York:

E. G. Ziegler, director, Consolidated Erie County Civil Defense Office, Buffalo
Stanley H. Lowell, assistant to the mayor, New York City
Maj. Gen. Robert E. Condon, director, New York City Office of Civil Defense
William H. Taubert, citywide supervisor, New York City
Hon. Donald H. Mead, mayor, Syracuse
Thomas R. Ballantyne, director of civil defense, Onondaga County

Nevada: Hon. Charles H. Russell, Governor

New Hampshire: Hon. Lane Dwinell, Governor

New Jersey: Hon. Robert B. Meyner, Governor

North Dakota: Hon. Norman Brunsdale, Governor

Ohio:

Hon. Charles P. Taft, mayor, Cincinnati
C. A. Harrell, city manager, Cincinnati

Oklahoma: Lt. Col. Thomas M. Brett, director, Oklahoma Office of Civil Defense

Oregon:

Hon. Paul Patterson, Governor
A. M. Sheets, director, Oregon State Civil Defense Agency
Hon. Fred L. Peterson, mayor, Portland

Pennsylvania:

Hon. Arthur J. Gardner, mayor, Erie
Hon. Joseph S. Clark, Jr., formerly mayor, Philadelphia
Hon. Richard Dilworth, mayor, Philadelphia

Rhode Island:

Hon. Dennis J. Roberts, Governor
Hon. Walter H. Reynolds, mayor, Providence

South Carolina: Maj. Gen. James C. Dozier, director of civil defense, State of South Carolina

South Dakota: Hon. Joe Foss, Governor

Tennessee: Hon. Edmund Orgill, mayor, Memphis

Texas: Hon. Allan Shivers, Governor

Utah: Hon. J. Bracken Lee, Governor

Vermont: Hon. J. B. Johnson, Governor

Virginia:

J. H. Wyse, coordinator, Virginia Office of Civil Defense
Ira F. Willard, director of civil defense, Alexandria
Hon. W. F. Duckworth, mayor, Norfolk
Hon. Fred A. Duke, mayor, Portsmouth

Washington:

Hon. Arthur B. Langlie, Governor
Hon. Allan Pomeroy, mayor, Seattle

Wisconsin:

Hon. Walter J. Kohler, Governor
Hon. Frank P. Zeidler, mayor, Milwaukee

Wyoming: Hon. Milward L. Simpson, Governor

MINORITY REPORT

The first recommendation of the subcommittee suggests that Federal civil-defense legislation should be redrafted to vest the basic responsibility for civil defense in the Federal Government, with the States and local units of government having an important supporting role.

The entire area of Federal-State relationships has recently been studied by the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations which published a staff report on Civil Defense and Urban Vulnerability in June 1955. The recommendations concerning Federal participation and responsibility for civil defense seemed to the undersigned to be preferable to the first recommendation of the subcommittee. These recommendations are:

1. It is recommended that congressional action be taken to reallocate responsibility for civil defense from a primary State and local responsibility to a joint responsibility of the National Government on the one hand, and the States and their political subdivisions on the other.

Such amendment to the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (Public Law 920, 81st Cong., 2d sess.) should additionally provide—

- (a) during the preattack phase, the National Government to be responsible for overall planning, development of civil defense policies and technical doctrine, coordination and leadership of State activities, facilitation of interstate cooperation, and a sharing of preparedness costs; States and localities to be responsible for day-to-day planning operations, adaptation of national policies and doctrines to local situations, and a sharing of preparedness costs.

- (b) the assumption that under postattack conditions the primary responsibility, both operational and financial, will shift to the National Government.

While it is true that the civil defense problem does not arise out of internal conditions which the States can control, but is a direct outgrowth of relations between the United States and other nations, this does not necessarily imply that the Federal Government should have the basic responsibility for civil defense. In actual practice the day-to-day planning action and the selection and training of volunteer personnel acquainted with the area and its peculiarities is of such importance that it may well result in the State or local government assuming major responsibility.

Insofar as the committee report makes the point that the basic responsibility for civil defense must be shifted from State and local to the Federal Government it appears open to serious question. There are many who do not believe that every time we have an important problem, its solution lies in appealing to the Federal Government and in increasing Federal authority over the lives and property of the citizens of our communities.

The problems of civil defense are complicated ones; they reach into every level of government from the Nation's Capital to the smallest village and indeed into the very homes of our citizens. No simple solutions are possible in this field.

Consequently, while we recognize the necessity for legislative changes in the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, we believe that we should attempt to improve that legislation and not throw away its wise recognition of the important role that State and local units of government must play in this field. It is difficult to imagine anything more isolating in effect than a nuclear attack on our major cities. Further centralization of authority scarcely seems to be an appropriate answer to the myriad problems raised by this possibility.

By proposing the creation of a new Cabinet department embracing the civil defense functions of the present Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Office of Defense Mobilization, the committee is proposing an organizational objective which is unnecessarily difficult. The committee has not fully accepted the responsibility for exploring the possibility of improving the functioning of the Federal Civil Defense Administration as presently constituted. Likewise, it has not fully considered the possibilities of placing civil defense responsibilities with one of the existing Cabinet offices. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare have been mentioned frequently in this connection.

By proposing the creation of this new Cabinet department, the committee suggests the second augmentation of the Cabinet during this administration. There is a serious question as to how large the Cabinet can be without exceeding the span of effective control by one man, the President.

If a Secretary for Civil Defense were to be created, where would he fit into the interrelationships or subcommittees, formal or informal, which have been established in many cases and which have, in some instances, proved fairly workable? The National Security Council is an excellent example of a permanent subcommittee based on the community of interest of a few Cabinet members. On the other hand, were a *broad* Cabinet Subcommittee on Civil Defense to be established, it would probably involve all members of the Cabinet and prove to be so cumbersome it would fall of its own weight. A Cabinet subcommittee called the National Security Resources Board proved inoperative because so many agencies were concerned with its problems.

At no time does the subcommittee prove that the basic tasks of civil defense cannot be achieved without unnecessarily creating a new department. It is interesting to note that even if such a new department were to be established, it would then have the problems of delegating functions to other departments on the same level in the governmental structure. It would be the Department of Civil Defense, but it would still be faced with the same problems of securing cooperation in the performance of civil defense functions from the other departments as it faces today when it is organized as Federal Civil Defense Administration.

CHARLES B. BROWNSON.
GEORGE MEADER.

While concurring in the above views, I wish to add that, in my judgment, civil defense to date has been a waste of public funds.

CLARE E. HOFFMAN.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN *8/27/56*

DATE: August 3, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT *JEY*SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - [REDACTED] *JEY*

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont ☒
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

(Buplan) Emergency Headquarters For S.O.C. Referral/Consult

On 7-30-56 there was received through the mail the attached [REDACTED]

RECOMMENDATION:

Inasmuch as Bureau vehicles are controlled through the Administrative Division, it is recommended that that Division might want to designate a motor transportation director and coordinator who will coordinate Bureau motor vehicle transportation between relocation sites [REDACTED] This plan is to be placed into effect in the event of an emergency.

- EX 104* *ENCLOSURE* *91* *JEM:dje* *(?)*
- 1 - Mr. Nichols
 - 1 - Mr. Boardman
 - 1 - Mr. Belmont
 - 1 - Mr. Mohr
 - 1 - Section tickler
 - 1 - Mr. McArdle
- EX 104*

RECORDED - 91
INDEXED - 91

66-17381-1695

18 AUG 20 1956

Enclosure *10*

Sec. 27, Page
 151

AUG 31 1956

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. MOHR

DATE: August 8, 1956

FROM : L. J. GAUTHIER *LJG*SUBJECT:

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Referral/Consult

Baplan Emergency Headquarters For S.O.C.

The plans contained in the attached document would, in effect,

This appears to be an unsatisfactory arrangement as far as the Bureau is concerned. Such an arrangement could seriously hamper the Bureau's implementation of emergency procedures such as the Detcom program and activation of relocation sites within 300 miles of Washington D. C. It is possible that conflicting orders and the need to obtain clearance for use of vehicles could seriously obstruct the Bureau's effectiveness during the very vital early hours of an emergency.

Inasmuch as Bureau vehicles are mostly pursuit cars and are specially equipped, they could be most profitably used for the specialized work for which they are intended.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Bureau not participate in any plan that may tie up its automotive equipment in a national emergency.
2. That the Liaison Section discuss this matter further with ODM for the purpose of obtaining the necessary exemption.

LJG
 LJG:GLC:11jly
 (4)

Enclosures

CC: Mr. Belmont
 Liaison Section

RECORDED - 91 18 AUG 11 1956

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 154

AUG 31 1956

66-17351-1696

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 13, 1956

FROM : R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT:

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mason	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

Referral/Consult

Reference is made to the memorandum from Mr. Gauthier to Mr. Mohr dated 8-8-56 wherein it was pointed out that

would be an unsatisfactory arrangement so far as the Bureau is concerned. Bu plan Emergency Headquarters For S.O.G.

It was recommended that Liaison contact the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) regarding exempting the FBI

Discreet inquiry was made at ODM by Liaison and it was determined that Mr. Edward Cox, Transportation Director, ODM, was the person in charge of this plan, and that he was on annual leave until 8-20-56.

ACTION:

Liaison will contact Mr. Cox upon his return from leave and discuss this matter with him for the purpose of obtaining the necessary exemption.

WTW:bal
(6)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Gauthier
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. McArdle
- 1 - Mr. Whaley

RECORDED - 91

66-17381-1697

18 AUG 20 1956

Sec. 27, Page
155

AUG 31 1956

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *Chas*

DATE: August 22, 1956

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH *R*SUBJECT:

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Buplan Emergency Headquarters For S.O.C.

Reference is made to my memorandum to you dated August 13, 1956, concerning the above-captioned matter in which it was stated that upon his return from leave, Liaison would contact Mr. Edward Cox, Transportation Director, Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). This was based on a request in a memorandum from Mr. Gauthier to Mr. Mohr dated August 8, 1956, for clarity as to the emergency use of Government-owned vehicles.

Referral/Consult

On August 21, 1956, Mr. Bartlett, Liaison Section, contacted Mr. Edward Cox at ODM

ACTION:

For your information. This memorandum should be routed to the Administrative Division.

- CHB*
COBB:bal
(7)
- MB*
MB
- 11 Dec*
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
 - 1 - Mr. Mohr
 - 1 - Mr. Gauthier
 - 1 - Liaison Section
 - 1 - Mr. McArdle
 - 1 - Mr. Bartlett *W*

EX-104
RECORDED - 91

66-17381-1698

18 AUG 28 1956

Sec. 27, Page *W*

156

66-17381-1701

CHANGED TO

64-4123-221-1270X1

APR 18 1957

ma

e

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons

DATE: 8/9/56

FROM : Mr. Beach

SUBJECT: BUPLANS Emergency Headquarters For S.O.G.
RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

b7E

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

On August 7, 1956, SA J. E. McArdle of the Liaison Section and SA W. R. Heilman of the Laboratory conferred with Dr. Gordon M. Dunning, Health Physicist, Division of Biology and Medicine, Atomic Energy Commission, relative to the adequacy of our relocation quarters at [] in relation to radioactive fallout hazards. It is pointed out that Dr. Dunning previously surveyed the Bureau's relocation facilities at [] and has also been present at the testing of most of the nuclear detonations to date.

Dr. Dunning was questioned relative to the practicality and effectiveness of the installation of some type of pressurizing system at [] in order to keep outside air, containing radioactive fallout particles, from coming into the building during an emergency. Dr. Dunning stated that his greatest concern would be the replacement of blownout windows after an attack. He stated that undoubtedly a thermonuclear explosion in the vicinity of Washington would result in windows being blown out at []. In order to keep the ensuing fallout out of [] it would be most expedient to replace and seal the windows with plastic, wood or other materials. Fallout could reach [] in twenty minutes after a blast and in this short time the windows would have to be replaced. Dr. Dunning said that such a replacing and sealing of windows together with the sealing up of doors would be most effective and would be little improved by any pressurizing system.

Dr. Dunning revealed that during the hydrogen tests [] during 1954 dangerous levels of fallout fell on some of []. He said that some of the natives had received damaging doses of radiation but that most of the damaging radiation came from the fallout particles on the ground and that the amount of radiation received internally by the inhalation and ingestion of fallout particles was at a surprisingly low tolerable level.

WRH:mmc
(5)

59 SEP 11 1956
cc McArdle sent
separately Desc

EX-110

RECORDED - 55

66-17381-1703

SEP 4 1956

Memo Recd. to Belmont
8-22-56
J.E.M.

As a result of data obtained from actual test explosions, it has been found that inside a building the best location for protection from radiation from fallout is in the basement against the outside walls. The earth against the outside wall and the wall itself will protect against the most dangerous fallout particles outside on the ground and the distance and location will protect from fallout on the roof.

Dr. Dunning advised that in the event that [redacted] was being subjected to severe fallout and that the windows and doors were sealed and that adequate radiation monitoring was in effect, he would certainly take his chances at [redacted]. In addition, he remarked that if he had twenty minutes warning at [redacted] he would proceed to [redacted] where he knew he would be safe from extremely high levels of fallout. The soil and concrete would be the most effective barriers against fallout and radiation. Fallout particles have never penetrated the soil to a depth greater than three inches, even after several years.

Dr. Dunning pointed out that it might be necessary to stay [redacted] or basement for a few days depending on the initial intensity of radiation and upon the decay rate. In any event it would be necessary to have effective, efficient radiation monitoring equipment and trained personnel in order to determine how and when to get back into operation.

As far as a water filtering system is concerned, Dr. Dunning stated that tests conducted have shown that seventy-five per cent of the fallout particles in water elude filtering systems. It was felt that the protected water supplies (approximately 2,300,000 gallons) at [redacted] would be adequate for cooking and drinking provided a rigid enforced control is maintained. It would be an added protection to have a supply of canned beverages or juices available in the event the water supplies were cut off.

ACTION:

For information only.

MB
KAB

Ⓟ
-2-

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 22, 1956

FROM : R. R. Roach

SUBJECT:

BUPLANS - Emergency Headquarters
 RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

For S. 1111

b7E

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Reference is made to the memorandum from Mr. Beach to Mr. Parsons dated 8/9/56 captioned as above reporting an interview with Dr. Gordon M. Dunning of the Atomic Energy Commission wherein Dr. Dunning pointed out that in the event there is a bomb blast in the general Washington area sufficiently large enough to blow out the windows in the FBI relocation site, it would be quite essential that we replace or seal the window or other openings which might appear in the building as soon as possible and that such a replacing and sealing of windows, together with sealing up of doors, would be most effective and would be little improved by any pressurizing or filtering system.

In light of Dr. Dunning's pronouncement, it would appear that it may not be feasible to equip our relocation site with a pressurized-filtering system as under the circumstances it may not fulfill the need desired. It is believed that if possible it would be more feasible to have arrangements made for equipment which could be rapidly used to seal up any blown out windows or other holes in the building resulting from a bomb blast.

This problem has been discussed with [redacted] and he states that to perfect arrangements and obtain material to seal all of the openings, windows, doors, and any bomb damage holes at [redacted] within the short period of 20 minutes would indeed be a large undertaking. [redacted] points out that in view of the small number of personnel (3) at the [redacted] at various hours it would be necessary that the repair material, whatever it may be, must be immediately at hand at the given windows and doors as time (20 minutes) would not permit storing it in the attic of the building or off premises. [redacted] also points out that it may be more feasible to restrict the sealing of openings to a given area such as the gym, communications room, or other quarters. However, if the Bureau approved, he would make a survey among his contacts [redacted] to see what feasible means of handling the problem could be worked out taking into consideration the matters of cost and material available.

RRR:mls (9)

1-Mr. Nichols; 1 - Mr. Boardman; 1-Mr. Belmont;
 1-Mr. Mohr; 1-Mr. Mason; 1-Mr. Parsons;
 1-Mr. McArdle; 1-Section Tickler

66-17381-1704

1 SEP 4 1956

SEP 11 1956

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: BUPLANS - RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

b7E

RECOMMENDATION:

(1) In view of the advice given by Dr. Dunning of the Atomic Energy Commission, it is recommended that we not now consider the possibility of installing a pressurized-filtering system for our relocation site. Such a system would not be effective until we have overcome the problem of sealing up damaged areas in the building.

OK
Ar

(2) It is recommended that [] be given permission to make a survey to see if it is possible and feasible to work out with his contacts the obtaining of materials and other facilities for the closing up of damaged areas in [] either as it pertains to the entire [] or to certain restricted areas. If you approve, [] will be so advised.

Ar

OK to make survey. No
no further at this time, also
[] should find out [] plans.

Done
8/22

Q

~~TOP SECRET~~

2 - orig and 1
1 - yellow
1 - Mr. McArdle
1 - Section tickler

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SAC, New York

August 31, 1956

Director, FBI

**HIGHLIGHTS OF SEAT OF
GOVERNMENT DEFENSE PLANS
FOR THE CHAIN OF COMMAND**

RECORDED - 50
4/14/2010

Re: [unclear] Emergency [unclear] [unclear] For [unclear]

Enclosed is insert No. 12 for Highlights of Seat of Government Defense Plans for the Chain of Command. It is the Bureau's desire that after having inserted these pages in their appropriate place in captioned document you advise the Bureau, attention Liaison Section, by routing slip, that this has been done.

In addition to insert No. 12, above mentioned, there is enclosed a title page for captioned document to replace the present title page now in the document in your possession.

Enclosures (2)

1 - Chicago (Enclosures - 2)
1 - Baltimore (Enclosures - 2)

JEM:clr (7)

1 - Chicago
1 - Baltimore

Intra-Bureau communications are normally not classified; however, the highly ~~confidential~~ nature of the information contained in the enclosures to this communication make it desirable to classify it.

RECORDED - 50 66-17381-1705

EX-134

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

RECORDED
INDEXED

~~TOP SECRET~~

SEP 11 1956

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN *10/14/56*

DATE: August 29, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT *AWB*

b7E

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS

A brief of the Bureau evacuation and relocation plan was originally submitted July 19, 1955, and was last amended July 5, 1956. *Plan Emergency Headquarters For S.O.C.*

Because of changing regulations, instructions and changes in Bureau personnel this brief will be periodically brought up to date. Attached are the following amended pages:

- Page 5 - Retyped to add paragraph 4 relative to when relocation should be undertaken.
- Page 8 - Retyped to reflect that bedrooms 210 and 212 would be used as code rooms at the relocation site.
- Page 10 - The last sentence, paragraph 4, changed to reflect that the could be used between agencies and to add the last paragraph relative to network.
- Page 11- Rewritten to clarify the penultimate paragraph.
- Pages 13, 14, 15, 16 and 16a retyped to reflect the current relocation sites of the agencies there listed.
- Exhibit A - First floor - changed to show specific allocation of classrooms 3 and 4 and the recreation room.
- Exhibit E - Classroom number 2 - changed to better show placement of clerical desks and to reflect the interchange of the desks of Messrs. Belmont and Hennrich.
- Exhibit F - Second floor - changed to show room 210 now to be used as a code room in a period of emergency.
- Exhibit K - Teletype room - changed to better show placement of teletype machines.
- Exhibit O - A map reflecting relocation sites of key agencies will be changed as soon as the Exhibits Section has reworked the map. The new map will reflect that the Secretary of the Army now at will relocate to and that the office of the Secretary of Defense now at will relocate to

ACTION:

For use of the Director and other officials having a copy of the brief in question.

Enclosures

- JEM:vec (7)
- 1 - Mr. Nichols
- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Holloman
- 1 - Section tickler
- 1 - Mr. McArdle

RECORDED - 91

EX-117

66-17381-1707

SEP 5 1956

Change made in Director's Copy

ELSON
action
70 10/18/56

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mason	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN *LB* *9/4/56*

DATE: August 30, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT *AHB*SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS--BRIEF
OF BUREAU EVACUATION AND
RELOCATION PLAN

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd *OK* _____
 Tele. Room *12* _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Boylan Emergency Headquarters For S.M.C.

Re my memo dated August 29, 1956, submitting
 amended pages to captioned document. Attached is exhibit 0,
 a map reflecting the relocation sites of key agencies.

ACTION:

For use of the Director and other officials having
 a copy of the brief in question.

Enclosure

JEM
 JEM:clr
 (7)

- 1 - Mr. Nichols
- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Holloman
- 1 - Section
- 1 - Mr. McArdle

RECORDED - 91

EX-117

66-17381-1708

SEP 5 1956

*Change made in
 Director's copy*

LIASON

*Consolidated
 no action
 10/8/56*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman *8/27/56*

DATE: August 22, 1956

FROM : A. H. Belmont *ahb*SUBJECT: BUPLANS - EVACUATION*Emergency Headquarters*

This is another in the series of monthly memoranda setting forth the status of unfinished items being considered in connection with Bureau evacuation plans.

For S.O.B.

1. Communications

A. Cryptographic Equipment

Certain items of "on line" cryptographic equipment designed for secure teletype and telephone communications between [redacted] are to be installed as part of the Interagency Communications System (ICS). This equipment is being installed by ICS at no expense to the Bureau and at the convenience and insistence of ICS.

2. Gas Masks

b7E

Delivery of 290 additional gas masks originally expected in May of this year have not been received to date. Upon receipt these gas masks will be distributed to [redacted] as well as [redacted]

This matter is being followed by the Administrative Division.

3. Field Relocation Sites

The Laboratory Division is conducting a survey in an effort to determine if current field relocation sites are in areas relatively free from radioactive fall-out. Following the results of this survey, where deemed advisable, field offices will be instructed to find more desirable emergency sites.

JEM:awj/aeu
(9)

- 1 - Mr. Nichols
- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Bland
- 1 - Section Tickler
- 1 - Mr. McArdle

Tolson	✓
Nichols	✓
Boardman	✓
Belmont	✓
Mohr	✓
Parsons	✓
Rosen	✓
Tamm	✓
Nease	✓
Winterrowd	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Holloman	✓
Gandy	✓

RECORDED - 1

EX-110

EX-110

25 SEP 5 1956

52 SEP 11 1956

Memo A. H. Belmont to Mr. L. V. Boardman

4. Alert Message

The Subversive Control Section, Domestic Intelligence Division is currently studying the problem in an effort to find the most feasible manner in which to alert the field to prepare for the institution of the Emergency Detention Program following the receipt of an alert at Seat of Government.

ACTION:

(1) The Communications Section and the Laboratory Division will upon receipt of information that the ICS materials are available acknowledge receipt of same and indicate their location for installation at the relocation site.

(2) The Administrative Division is following producer of gas masks and upon receipt of them will make appropriate distribution.

(3) The Laboratory Division is continuing its survey relative to fall-out patterns and the location of field relocation sites.

(4) The Subversive Control Section, Domestic Intelligence Division is expediting the plan for the most expeditious means of alerting the field in the event of an emergency.

R

RB

ju

2 - orig &
1 - yellow
1 - Section
1 - Mr. McArdle

SAC, Washington Field (66-2233)

September 4, 1956

Director, FBI (66-17381)

BUREAU PLANS--

EMERGENCY EVACUATION Headquarters

Re Bulet SAC, WFO dated 1/26/56 captioned as above, and Bulet to SAC, Richmond dated 1/26/56, entitled Bureau Plans--Emergency Relocation of the Attorney General, both of which enclosed copies of charts reflecting: 1. Route to [redacted] 2. Route to [redacted] 3. Chart reflecting route to Bureau relocation sites, all of which were classified. b7E

To better facilitate your ability to carry out your responsibilities in connection with the emergency relocation of certain Bureau officials and the Attorney General during the period of emergency, there is enclosed for each office receiving a copy of this communication, a list of emergency relocation sites of key agencies and four copies of a chart entitled Relocation Sites, Key Agencies, dated August 27, 1956.

Although both of these documents are classified, there is no objection to your making them available to the employees who have primary responsibility in connection with the relocation of Bureau officials or the Attorney General; however, persons in possession of these documents must maintain them in accordance with the requirements for classified data as set forth in Executive Order 10501. You will, of course, appropriately record any distribution of the enclosed documents.

Enclosures (5)

1 - Richmond (Enclosures 5)


JEM:clr
(6)

EX-117

(Cover memo Belmont to Boardman, RE "Defense Plans -- Emergency Evacuation" JEM:clr 9/4/56)

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Signed J.E.H. - NO E.R. Initial
JM



66-17381-1711
CHANGED TO
100-356062-1712X

APR 23 1957

JB

C

~~TOP SECRET~~

2 - orig & dupl
2 - yellows
- Section
1 - Mr. McArdle

SAC, Baltimore

September 6, 1956

Director, FBI (66-17381)

REGISTERED

DEFENSE PLANS--
EMERGENCY RELOCATION

RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
4/14/2010

ReBulet dated 2/14/55 pointing out that Department of Justice Instructions for Key Personnel in the Event of a Civil Defense Emergency reflect that if a departmental representative is unable to contact the Bureau relocation site directly after relocation has been ordered, the SACs at Baltimore or Richmond may be called upon to relay a message to the Bureau at its relocation site or to a Department of Justice representative at the departmental relocation site.

For your information, the Department of Justice relocation site is now the [redacted]

b7E

[redacted] The Department of Justice relocation site may also be contacted through the main FBI [redacted] (code) radio stations. As you have been previously advised, all radio contact with the Bureau relocation site should be through the central radio stations in the Washington area.

The telephone numbers of the Bureau relocation site, as set forth in referenced letter, continue to be the same. The teletype numbers connecting the FBI relocation site with the Richmond, Virginia teletype exchange are Richmond 230, Richmond 441 and Richmond 466.

If you are requested by an individual representing himself to be a member of the Department of Justice to relay a message to the FBI or the Department of Justice relocation site, it is the Bureau's desire that you first assure yourself that you have sufficient identifying information on the individual contacting your office; secondly, that you clearly understand the message he wishes to have you convey, and thirdly, in relaying the message to the Bureau or directly to the Department of Justice relocation site, if that is necessary, you do so expeditiously and include therein the name of the individual who requested that you relay the message.

1 - Richmond

JEM:clr (7) [initials]
cc: Bufile 66-18953

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

25 SEP 7 1956

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Letter to SAC, Baltimore

Any call requesting you to relay a message will more than likely come from one of the following individuals:

Mr. Herbert Brownell, Jr.	Mr. Frederick Ford
Mr. William T. Rogers	Mr. Victor B. Hansen
Mr. J. Lee Rankin	Mr. Charles E. Rice
Mr. William F. Tompkins	Mr. Dallas S. Townsend
Mr. Warren Olney III	Mr. Perry W. Morton
Mr. George C. Doub	Mr. T. Robert Seaver
Mr. Oscar H. Davis	Mr. J. Salter Yeagley
Mr. David Irons	Mr. George S. Leonard
Mr. Edward A. Foote	Mr. John N. Stull
Mr. Paul V. Myron	Mr. J. Edward Williams
Mr. Walter F. Black, Jr.	Mr. Robert Ticken
Mr. Donald E. Kelley	Mr. Clive W. Palmer
Mr. William V. Foley	Mr. Rufus D. McLean
Mr. Joseph D. Guilfoyle	Mr. Wallace W. Kirkpatrick
Mr. Frank Chambers	Mr. John F. Doherty

All of the foregoing individuals hold a position in the Department of Justice Chain of Command.

In addition to the foregoing, you may be requested to relay messages by one of the following individuals:

Mr. James V. Bennett	Mr. John C. Airhart
Mr. Bennett Willis, Jr.	Mr. John V. Lindsay
General Joseph M. Swing	Mr. Arthur Flemming,
	Director of the
	Office of Defense
	Mobilization

This communication is being directed to the SACs at Baltimore and Richmond to comply with the instructions set forth on page 10 of the instructions for key personnel of the Department of Justice in event of a civil defense emergency as revised 2/23/55. On 8/31/56 John Airhart, Relocation Office of the Department, was reminded that the list of departmental officials supplied the Baltimore and Richmond offices in February, 1955, is now obsolete. Airhart suggested that those offices be given the identity of the individuals now in the over-all department Chain of Command and include Messrs. Bennett, Swing, Willis and himself, as well as Dr. Flemming of ODM.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: September 4, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS--
EMERGENCY EVACUATION

Headquarters For S.O.G. b7E

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

By memorandum dated January 23, 1956, captioned as above, copies of charts showing: 1. Route to [redacted]; 2. Route to [redacted]; 3. Routes to Bureau relocation site, were made available to all individuals at Seat of Government having responsibility in connection with the emergency relocation of the Director, Mr. Tolson and the Attorney General.

By memorandum dated January 26, 1956, to the SAC, Washington Field Office and the SAC, Richmond, copies of the above documents or charts were made available to those offices to facilitate carrying out their responsibilities for relocating the above-named individuals. All individuals receiving a copy of the above-named charts were advised that they must be maintained under proper conditions at all times since they were classified documents.

Although the above charts do reflect the geographical location of many agency relocation sites, they do not set forth the specific relocation site of any agency listed thereon and generally speaking it is believed that the agents having a specific responsibility in connection with relocation of the above individuals would not be able to take these individuals to any specific relocation site other than that of the FBI. It is suggested, therefore, that each individual receiving a copy of this memorandum be given a copy of the enclosed list.

Enclosure

JEM:clr
(11)

RECORDED-41

EX - 134

66-12381-1713
18 SEP 10 1956

- 41
1 - Mr. Boardman
 1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. G. C. Gearty
 1 - Mr. O. H. Bartlett
 1 - Mr. J. I. Cavanaugh
 1 - Mr. C. Q. Smith
 1 - Mr. D. G. Hanning
 1 - Mr. Rosen
 1 - Section
 1 - Mr. McArdle

SEP 14 1956

Memorandum to L. V. Boardman

reflecting the emergency relocation sites of key agencies in the Executive Branch of the government. Inasmuch as this list is classified ~~top secret~~, it must, of course, be retained in conformance with the maintenance of ~~top secret~~ information as set forth in Executive Order 10501, as well as a chart showing the relocation sites of key agencies brought up to date as of August 27, 1956.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That each person receiving a copy of this memorandum be given a copy of the list of emergency relocation sites of other agencies and a copy of the chart entitled Relocation Sites, Key Agencies dated August 27, 1956.

2. That the enclosed memorandum to the SAC, Washington Field, copy to SAC, Richmond, enclosing a copy of a list of emergency relocation sites of other agencies and four copies of the chart entitled Relocation Sites of Key Agencies dated August 27, 1956, go forth.

R

AW

✓

GK J.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: September 7, 1956

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - HIGHWAY PRIORITIES
IN MILITARY AREAS

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Emergency Headquarters For S.O.B.

By memorandum dated August 15, 1956, you were advised that the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense had more or less decided that uniform vehicle markers, which would be good for day-to-day operations and free access through strategic areas during an emergency, were not practical. It was further pointed out that it was thought by Defense that Bureau personnel would have no trouble whatever traveling anywhere they desired to go merely by showing their credentials. It had been suggested by Defense to the Transportation Corps, Department of the Army, that Transportation draw up a directive for all Army commands concerning the recognition of Bureau credentials as the only required identification for free access to any particular military area during an emergency.

On September 6, 1956, Lieutenant Colonel D. L. Jenkins, Office of the Chief of Transportation, advised SA D. J. Sullivan, that he had a draft of a directive to all Army commands which, if approved, would go out over the signature of the Adjutant General, Department of the Army. He stated he was endeavoring to get concurrence of this directive from Department of Defense prior to submission or transmittal through channels and wanted the Bureau to know the contents of same. He pointed out that the proposed directive concerned priority travel of security personnel through military areas during an emergency. The first paragraph of the draft pointed out that this superseded two previous letters on this same subject, and it further pointed out that the Commanding Officers would take cognizance and provide for the highest priority for the free movement of security agencies during an emergency. It directed that the security agencies' credentials would be honored by all concerned in the free movement of security agency personnel in any area under Army control.

Colonel Jenkins was advised that this appeared satisfactory to the Bureau and it was again reiterated to him that the Bureau was asking for no special treatment and desired to have only the highest priority available along with other security agencies. Colonel Jenkins stated that he would forward a copy of this directive to the Bureau immediately upon its official issuance.

INDEXED-41

ACTION:

RECORDED-41

10 10 1956

For information. Liaison will follow to make sure we obtain a copy of this directive when issued.

DJS:jlf (5)

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. McArdle

1 - Liaison Section 1 - Mr. Sullivan

LIVIS

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. B. C. BROWN *mb*

DATE: 8/29/56

FROM :




b7E

SUBJECT:


(BUPLANS Emergency Headquarters For S.O.C.)
RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Reference is made to the memo from Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont dated April 22, 1956, concerning repairs of blast damage to windows and doors at the FBI relocation site and recommending that the writer conduct a survey to determine the feasibility of stocking repair material. There are 240 windows and 46 doors, vents and other openings at the relocation site, totaling approximately 7,680 square feet of material necessary to seal the building, assuming that all glass was blown out and no material damage was done to the masonry construction of the building.

According to 

b7E

 wallboard such as 1/8 inch masonite or 3/8 inch plywood costs from 12 to 16¢ per square foot. The necessary material to cover the openings, but not counting the frame work and materials necessary to hold the wallboard in place would cost approximately \$1,000.

I recommend against any use of wallboard for repair to blown out windows for the reason that due to the opaqueness of the wallboard, no outside light could get in the building, the necessary unsightly frame work necessary to hold such boards in an air-tight condition, plus the lack of the necessary storage space for the material until needed near the rooms in which it is to be used.

Referral/Consult

Enclosure 1

ENCLOSURE

cc. Mr. Nichols
 cc. Mr. Boardman
 cc. Mr. Belmont
 cc. Mr. Mohr
 cc. Mr. Parsons
 cc. Mr. McArdle

RECORDED-53

INDEXED-53

66-17381-1715
18 SEP 12 1956Sec. 27,
Page 227

HLS:rz

68 SEP 20 1956

108

Mr. B. C. BROWN

Referral/Consult

BUPLANS

RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

8/29/56



RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that the Liaison Section of the Security Division contact the Federal Civil Defense Administration to find out the cost and availability of this flexible vinyl film, it being noted that the Civil Defense Administration has stock piles of this material for bomb damage.

2. It is recommended that no further consideration be given to the use of wallboard for this purpose.

5

Sec. 27,
Page 228

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: September 7, 1956

FROM : R. R. ROACH

b7E

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
ESSENTIAL RECORDS

Buplan Emergency Headquarters For D.O.C.

One copy each of the following is attached for storage with the other Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) material which has previously been forwarded to [redacted]

Minutes, IIC meeting, September 5, 1956

Agenda, IIC meeting, September 5, 1956

Minutes, IIC Working Committee meeting, July 18, 1956

Agenda, IIC Working Committee meeting, July 18, 1956

Minutes, IIC Working Committee meeting, June 28, 1956

ACTION:

The above-listed material should be forwarded to [redacted] for storage.

Enclosures (5)

1-Mr. Belmont

1-[redacted]

1-Mr. Day

1-Mr. McArdle

1-Liaison Section

GAD:hke
(6)

RECORDED-47

66-17381-1717

18 SEP 13 1956

SEP 11 1956

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

✓ [Signature]
[Signature]

Filed at CIA 700
9-11-56 - [Signature]

-61-

[Signature]
[Signature]

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: July 2, 1956

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: OUTLINE OF A SUGGESTED SPEECH BY THE DIRECTOR
OPERATION ALERT, JULY 20-26, 1956
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Bufile Emergency Headquarters For S.D.C.

Pursuant to the Director's request, you will find enclosed a brief outline of a suggested unclassified speech which the Director may be called upon to give at Operation Alert, July 20-26, 1956.

The enclosed outline makes manifest the form the speech will take. If the outline is approved, the full details with specific examples and illustrations will then be prepared in speech style.

It is to be noted that the subject matter will be limited to the United States, the assumption being that to discuss foreign communism and foreign communist leaders would necessitate clearance from the State Department.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum with the enclosed outline of a speech be referred to the Director for his decision.

Enclosure

WCS:nar nar

(5)

- 1 - Section tickler
- 1 - Mr. A. H. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. L. V. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. L. B. Nichols

RECORDED - 52
 INDEXED - 52

66-17381-1718

15 SEP 13 1956

ENCLOSURE

ONLINE

RECEIVED

275
 124
 1956

THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, IN 1956

I. The United States Government Is the Target of the Communist Party, USA

- A. This Government stands in powerful opposition to any form of tyranny be it from the left or from the right.
- B. We intend to keep this Government powerful.
 - 1. This is a major reason why Operation Alert, 1956, is being held.
 - 2. This alert is devised to make certain we will, as a Nation, function successfully in the face of a vicious, all-out enemy attack.
 - 3. Certain phases of our alert must be simulated, for example, military operations stemming from an external attack.
 - 4. The fact remains, we need not simulate other phases for we are actually under a widespread systematic internal attack by the enemy as we meet here today.
 - 5. We are already under a carefully planned four-pronged attack which is being delivered by the Communist Party, USA, and its supporters within our borders. The attack is:
 - a. Economic
 - b. Political
 - c. Cultural
 - d. Espionage

II. Economic Attack

- A. Colonization Program
- B. Immediate Demands

ENCLOSURE

III. Political Attack

- A. United Front
- B. Party Line

IV. Cultural Attack

- A. Race Issue
- B. Propaganda

V. Espionage Attack

- A. (Here the already known public record will be cited.)

VI. The Purposes behind These Attacks

- A. Confuse
- B. Divide
- C. Weaken

VII. Capabilities of Communists To Continue the Attack

- A. Contingent upon whether our opposition is strong or weak.
- B. Contingent upon the American people being fully aware of the communist threat and their willingness to act unitedly against it.

VIII. What Has Been Done To Stop the Communist Attack

- A. Investigations
- B. Democratic court procedures
- C. Prosecution of leaders
- D. National Security Program

IX. What We Must Continue To Do To Stop Completely the Communist Attack

A. Continuance

1. National Security Program
2. Prosecutions where necessary
3. High economic standards
4. Political, educational, social, and religious freedoms
5. Strong oppositions to communist subversion from a united people
6. Alert operations

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: July 10, 1956

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

SUBJECT: ~~SUGGESTED SPEECH BY THE DIRECTOR~~
~~FOR OPERATION ALERT, JULY 20-26, 1956~~
 INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Enplan Emergency Headquarters for S.O.G.

Reference is made to the enclosed memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman dated July 2, 1956, containing an approved outline of the above-captioned speech.

Enclosed with this memorandum you will also find the speech in question captioned "The Communist Party, USA, Aggressor within Our Gates."

When this request was originally made, it was said that, if called upon, the Director would have to give this speech before newspaper men and other similar persons. Therefore, it would be an on-the-record talk which could reach the press of the country. In view of this fact, the suggested enclosed speech consists only of unclassified material.

Because Operation Alert, 1956, is built around the idea of an attack upon this country, this same theme has been built into the speech. The Communist Party, USA, is depicted as launching an attack against our economic, political, cultural, and national defense institutions. Further, the question of Leninism is taken up. Communists say today they are returning to Leninism. Therefore, Leninism is defined and described and linked to the present program and objectives of American communists.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum, with the enclosures, be forwarded to Mr. Nichols for his judgment.

ENCLOSURE
 Enclosures

WCS:mjh
 (4)

- 1 - Section tickler
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Nichols

RECORDED - 52
 INDEXED - 52

66-17381-1719

18 SEP 13 1956

7-10-56
 WE ARE PREPARING DETAILED
 OUTLINE. IT IS RECEIVING
 SPECIAL HANDLING.

Done - outline enclosed

WCS
 7-10-56

THE OUTLINE

THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, AGGRESSOR WITHIN OUR GATES

INTRODUCTION

- I. OPERATION ALERT, 1956, HAS FOR ITS PURPOSE THE FORMULATION AND TESTING OF MEASURES WHICH WILL GUARANTEE OUR CONTINUED EXISTENCE IN THE FACE OF A MASSIVE, ANNIHILATING ATTACK BY THE ENEMY.
 - A. This is a most practical operation.
 - B. The man who planned it, planned for the future in order that we will have a future.
 - C. We must first exist before we can maintain our sovereignty, protect our freedom, foster the well-being of our people, advance our culture, elevate our living standards, and broaden our spiritual horizons.
- II. THIS IS AN UNUSUAL ALERT IN THAT IT IS ONLY PARTIALLY SIMULATED.
 - A. Simulated phase consists of military operations stemming from external attack.
 - B. Nonsimulated phase is the present attack upon the United States Government by the Communist Party, USA, and foreign communist espionage agents.
 - C. This attack is four-pronged -- economic, political, cultural, and espionage.

ENCLOSURE

THE BODY OF THE SPEECH

- I. THE ECONOMIC ATTACK ----- THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA,
BASES THIS ATTACK UPON THE PREMISE THAT OUR ECONOMIC SYSTEM
IS DYING OF CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN CAPITAL AND LABOR,
COMPETING BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, AND HIGHLY AND LESS HIGHLY
DEVELOPED AREAS OF THE NATION.
- A. The Party utilizes its colonization program and tactic of
"immediate demands" to aggravate and worsen these
"contradictions."
- B. The Party sows destructive and divisive ideas in the minds of
workers and consumers. These ideas are:
1. The Government grants unjust concessions to business.
 2. Unemployment is rising.
 3. Labor and capital will never harmonize.
 4. The Administration is trying to discredit organized labor.
 5. Freedom of enterprise must give way to socialistic
measures.
 6. Strikes should be increased.
 7. All communist-dominated unions expelled from the
CIO should be admitted into the AFL-CIO.
- II. THE POLITICAL ATTACK ----- THE WELL-ORGANIZED POLITICAL
ATTACK OF THE COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION IS TWO-FOLD IN NATURE--
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC.

A. Foreign: Communists are trying to convince Americans

1. The foreign policy of the United States Government is designed to cause atomic war.
2. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is aimed at "peaceful coexistence."
3. The "cold war" has been profitable for "ruling circles" in the United States.
4. The United States should increase its trade with communist nations.
5. The United States is imperialistic and predatory.

B. Domestic: Communists falsely insist

1. Our present prosperity is based on preparation for war.
2. The Government is militarizing our colleges.
3. Corruption in Government is inherent in freedom of enterprise.
4. Civil rights are being violated.
5. The national security program should be abolished.
6. All communists, socialists, liberals, progressives, and pacifists should form a united front.
7. American farmers are in a state of crisis.
8. The Smith Act, the Walter-McCarran Act, the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Immunity Act of 1954, and Congressional investigations violate the Bill of Rights.
9. Military appropriations must be reduced or they will bankrupt the Nation.

10. United States military bases in other nations present a serious threat to world peace.
11. There is a wave of terror directed against racial minority groups in the United States.
12. An educational crisis prevails in the United States because funds have been diverted to military appropriations.

C. The "General Staff"

1. Communists describe their Party as a "General Staff."
2. They follow the instructions of V. I. Lenin to master all methods of warfare possessed by the enemy both in military and political battles.

III. THE CULTURAL ATTACK ----- THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA,
DISTORTS THE ENTIRE FIELD OF CULTURE INTO A MANY-FACETED
WEAPON. ALL FORMS OF CULTURE ARE USED TO CONVINCE
AMERICAN CITIZENS THAT:

- A. American culture under the present form of Government cannot be any higher than comic-book level.
- B. Federal legislation should be enacted to subsidize cultural activities.
- C. Cultural opportunities for women and youth in the United States are inadequate.
- D. The United States would profit from cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union.

IV. THE ESPIONAGE ATTACK ----- THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, HAS
PLACED ITS APPARATUS AT THE DISPOSAL OF FOREIGN ESPIONAGE

NETWORKS, AND MUST ASSUME ITS SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTS OF ESPIONAGE COMMITTED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

- A. The Party has rendered specific services to the espionage network.
- B. Indirectly, the Party has contributed to espionage by its abuse of our system of Government and its arguments for allegiance to a foreign movement.
- C. Known individuals who have engaged in atomic espionage in this country and its bordering countries are Dr. Klaus Fuchs, Dr. Allan Nunn May, David Greenglass, Julius Rosenberg, Ethel Rosenberg, Morton Sobell, and Harry Gold.
- D. Primary espionage targets today are scientific research, the intelligence and counterintelligence agencies of our Government, our vital facilities, and our national defense establishments.

V. RENEWED VITALITY AND DETERMINATION ----- THE TACTICAL EMPHASIS PLACED ON UNCHANGED COMMUNIST DOCTRINE OF THE TWENTIETH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION HELD FEBRUARY, 1956, HAS GIVEN NEW VITALITY AND DETERMINATION TO THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA.

- A. This Congress downgraded Joseph Stalin and upgraded V. I. Lenin.
- B. The Congress discussed collective leadership, "peaceful coexistence," parliamentary procedures, increased trade with noncommunist nations, cultural exchanges, and a relaxation of dictatorial measures. The Congress said this was Leninism, and communists everywhere must return to Leninism.

C. Communist Party, USA, sees in this development an opportunity to end its present relative isolation from the American masses.

1. The Party sees in this an excellent opportunity to propagandize, confuse and weaken the American people.
2. The Party feels that it can now bask in some degree of "respectability."
3. The Party may change its name or start a new organization.
4. Eugene Dennis, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA, has publicly proclaimed the Leninist line of the Twentieth Congress.

D. What is Leninism? V. I. Lenin was a man of militant action and advocated the following:

1. Truth must be concealed.
2. Flexibility, subterfuges, zigzags, compromises, and retreats are necessary to the advancement of communism.
3. Alliances and coexistence (he termed it "class collaboration") are temporary and a matter of expediency. Such agreements are not made in good faith.
4. Parliamentary bodies are historically obsolete.
5. Deception, conspiracy, secrecy, betrayal are weapons of Leninism. Timeliness, too, is important.
6. Economic agitation should be utilized. "Revolutionaries" should demand all sorts of measures from free governments. The field of labor should be penetrated. Once captured, trade unions are to be made schools of communism.

7. Abolition of the state means also the abolition of democracy. The destruction of that democracy is to be achieved by trickeries, illegalities, use of subversion, and, in the final analysis, force.
 8. Violence will be an inevitable accompaniment of the collapse of capitalism. It is not voting but war which settles the decisive issues of history.
- E. This is Leninism. It explains the revolutionary method of attack against American society being delivered today by the Communist Party, USA. But, Leninism is much more than a method.

CONCLUSION

I. LENINISM IS A COMPLETE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

- A. It is a grossly materialistic interpretation of the origin, purpose, and destiny of man.
- B. It reduces all history to acrimonious class struggle.
- C. Leninism rejects all religion and all moral principles derived from religious concepts.
- D. Leninism submerges the total man -- body, mind, and soul -- into a godless, classless, and stateless world communist society where all private property will be dissolved into the dust of collective ownership. It considers this goal attainable within the foreseeable future.
 1. William Z. Foster, National Chairman of the Communist Party, USA, dedicated his book called The Twilight of World Capitalism, written in 1949, as follows:
"To My Great-Grandson Joseph Manley Kolko Who Will Live in a Communist United States."
 2. This dedication of 1949 is being re-emphasized in 1956 with ever greater fervor. To us, this dedication is preposterous. To American communists, it is a fanatical conviction which motivates them.

II. SEPARATION OF COMMUNISTS FROM NONCOMMUNISTS

- A. The goal of Leninism puts American communists in conflict-- not only with the United States Government but with the fundamental values of western civilization as well.
- B. With unrelenting treachery, deceit, ruthlessness, and tenacity of purpose, communists everywhere press on toward the alluring mirage. Their national and international organizations dovetail and synchronize into a flexible, conspiratorial, global pattern of action.
- C. Every Communist Party has its own assignments for attacking the economic, political, cultural, and national defense areas of its own country. These assignments in 1956, taken as a whole, form the daily far-flung world battle lines of ideas which separate the communists from the noncommunists.

III. CHALLENGE OF COMMUNISM

- A. The stakes are high. The stakes are no more or no less than the possession of the soul of man and the conquest of the world.
- B. This is the real meaning of Leninism; the meaning of communist attacks against American society.
- C. This is the challenge which American communists hurl with utter contempt into the face of us who participate today in OPERATION ALERT, 1956.
- D. This is the challenge which we have together accepted.
- E. This is the challenge which we must together meet--and meet successfully--or perish.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, AGGRESSOR WITHIN OUR GATES

INTRODUCTION

Operation Alert, 1956, in which we are now participating, is a most practical operation. It has for its purpose formulating and testing measures which will guarantee our continued existence in the face of a massive annihilating attack by the totalitarian enemy. Indeed, what is more practical than our very existence -- individually and collectively as a nation? We must first exist before we can maintain our sovereignty, protect our freedom, and foster the well-being of our people. We must first exist before we can advance our culture, elevate our living standards, and broaden our spiritual horizons.

The farsighted men who planned these exercises know this. In the present, they plan for the future in order that we will have a future.

This is an unusual period in our national history. The world is in a state of drastic ferment and change. Therefore, we need not be surprised that this Operation Alert, 1956, of which we are an active part, is an

ENCLOSURE

unusual Alert. I say this because normally an Alert is wholly simulated; it normally has about it the ring of artificiality. This is not true of the present Operation. Only certain phases of it must be simulated; for example, military operations stemming from external attack. We need not simulate other phases for we are today actually under a widespread, deep-rooted, systematic internal attack by the totalitarian enemy.

The attacker is the Communist Party, USA. The target to be destroyed is the United States Government. The strategy and tactics being used consist of a four-pronged attack:

The Economic

The Political

The Cultural

and

The Espionage Attack

It is this four-pronged, relentless, and divisive drive against our Government which, over a period of time, the Communist Party, USA, thinks will prepare the way for the final annihilating blows. We will analyze briefly this attack.

THE BODY OF THE SPEECH

The Economic Attack

The Party delivers its economic attack from the premise that our economic system is dying of contradictions, believed by them to exist between (1) capital and labor, (2) competing business enterprises, and (3) highly and less highly developed areas of the Nation. The Party, therefore, seeks daily to aggravate and worsen these "contradictions," pitting management against labor, race against race, and group against group.

The Party's colonization program is employed to this end. Under this program, its least known members are being planted in basic industries. These industries include steel, steel fabrication, petroleum, and especially the textile industries in the South. Through application of the technique "immediate demands," communists try to keep every industrial area penetrated by them in a state of agitation and discord. They seize upon popular desires such as higher wages, shorter working hours, and even issues not related to industrial conditions, and insist that their utterly impossible demands be met -- immediately. Conflict, confusion, unrest, and bitterness follow.

With astute organization, the Party is carrying its attack into our economic system by spreading and sowing specific poisonous ideas into the minds of workers and consumers. These poisonous, destructive, and divisive ideas include the following:

1. Corporate profits are at an all-time high because of unjust concessions granted by the Government to business, causing laborers and consumers to suffer greatly.
2. Unemployment is rising everywhere in the Nation.
3. There can never be any harmony between labor and capital, and labor leaders should dismiss "illusions" that there can be harmony.
4. The Administration is deliberately trying to discredit and damage seriously organized labor.
5. All communist-dominated unions expelled from CIO should be admitted into the AFL-CIO.
6. Freedom of enterprise must give way to more and more socialistic measures.
7. Strikes should be multiplied in number and broadened in scope to achieve desired ends.

This is but a small sampling of the ammunition used by the Communist Party, USA, in its never-ceasing economic attack.

The Political Attack

The small but superb communist organization shows real competency in its political attack. It is twofold in nature -- (1) foreign and (2) domestic.

In attacking American thinking and practices in foreign policy, the Communist Party, USA, is driving home again and again into the minds of our people these corrosive viewpoints:

1. The foreign policy of the United States Government is deliberately designed to cause an atomic war and destruction.
2. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is deliberately designed to promote "peaceful coexistence" and construction.
3. The "cold war" has been highly profitable only to "ruling circles" in the United States.
4. The United States should increase its trade with communist nations.
5. The United States is imperialistic and predatory.

In attacking domestic policies, the Communist Party, USA, hammers away with these inflammatory falsehoods:

1. Our present prosperity is based on preparation for war.
2. The Government is militarizing our colleges and preparing youths for atomic obliteration.
3. Corruption in Government is inherent in the freedom of enterprise.
4. Civil rights are everywhere being violated.
5. The national security program should be abolished.
6. The only way to progress in the United States is for all communists, socialists, liberals, progressives, and pacifists to form one vast united front and remove the present "ruling class" from power.

7. American farmers are in a state of crisis and the situation is further deteriorating as the Government favors large-scale farmers in order to drive small farmers from the land.
8. The Smith Act, the Walter-McCarran Act, the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Immunity Act of 1954, and Congressional investigations all violate the Bill of Rights.
9. If military appropriations are not drastically and immediately reduced, they will bankrupt the Nation.
10. The United States military bases in other nations are a serious threat to world peace.
11. In certain areas in the United States, a wave of terror reigns, directed against members of racial minority groups.
12. An educational crisis prevails in the United States because funds necessary for schools have been directed to military appropriations.

In this political field, the Communist Party, USA, moves like a striking army. Communists, in fact, describe their Party as being a "General Staff." This is especially significant at this time because American communists, following the lead of foreign communist spokesmen, are emphasizing with great vigor that they are not Stalinist anymore but Leninist; that V. I. Lenin this time is their "infallible" guide and Lenin told them very clearly

"...that the behavior of that army which does not prepare to master all types of weapons, all means and methods of warfare which the enemy may possess, is unwise and even criminal; but this applies even more to politics than to armies." *

"Left" Communism: An Infantile Disorder
by Nicolai Lenin, p. 77

* Underlining added for emphasis.

American communists are most certainly applying this nefarious advice in their attacks in the political arena.

The Cultural Attack

To communists, ideas are weapons. Words are weapons. The arts are weapons. The Communist Party, USA, is a combat Party. It is always attacking. This is its nature. Naturally, it must have weapons; therefore, it distorts the entire field of culture into a many-faceted weapon.

As with freedom, communists use culture to destroy culture. The novel, the short story, poetry, music, painting, science, and nonfiction are all used as instruments to convince American citizens that

1. American culture under freedom of enterprise is not and cannot be any higher than the comic-book level.
2. There are no real cultural opportunities for women in the United States.
3. American youths never have had equal or adequate cultural opportunities.
4. Unless Federal legislation subsidizes cultural activities, we will have none.
5. The United States stands to gain tremendously by an increase in, and closer, cultural exchanges with Soviet Russia.

This last point -- cultural exchanges -- brings us very close to a complex and difficult internal security problem. I refer to the fourth and last form of communist attack to be discussed here, namely, espionage, which employs cultural exchanges as "covers" in illegal work.

The Espionage Attack

The Communist Party, USA, must shoulder a heavy burden of guilt for the espionage attack being made against this Nation. It has long manifested willingness to be of service to foreign communists in this country engaging in espionage. Each member of the Communist Party, USA, is a potential espionage agent. Directly, it has rendered specific services. Indirectly, American communists have contributed to espionage by defiling our streets, our factories, our lecture halls, and even our homes with their vile abuse of our system and their pernicious arguments for allegiance to a foreign movement. The Communist Party, USA, has thus been able to create a reserve of persons with either confused or divided loyalties, pushing the orbit of espionage potential into wider areas. Having created a climate favorable to espionage and having placed its own apparatus at the disposal of the foreign espionage networks, the Communist Party, USA, must assume its share of responsibility for treacherous acts of espionage committed against the Government of the United States.

The story of perfidy contained in the record of espionage against this country is a familiar one to all of us. I will mention some of the principals in this treachery. First, there are those persons who had direct access to atomic data, and were certainly well aware of the high

trust placed in them for the absolute safeguarding of these secrets.

Dr. Klaus Fuchs, a German-born British scientist and member of the British Atomic Energy Mission who came to the United States during World War II, participated in atomic research and from August, 1944, to June, 1946, functioned in a key capacity at Los Alamos. Fuchs took part in making the earliest atomic bombs, was cognizant of information and plans for improved atomic weapons, and shared the thinking of that time concerning the hydrogen bomb. Fuchs betrayed to the Soviet Union not only secret weapons data but vital theory underlying atomic production. In a confession given to British authorities in early 1950, Fuchs commented on the manner of his betrayal, saying that he had made use of his communist philosophy to conceal his thoughts in two separate compartments, a device he referred to as controlled schizophrenia. Communism was his motivation for espionage activities.

Dr. Allan Nunn May, a native-born British scientist, also betrayed atomic secrets to Russia, as did David Greenglass, an American citizen. These men each had direct access to atomic data. They had been exposed to the communist blueprint for betrayal.

In 1951, Julius Rosenberg, Ethel Rosenberg, Morton Sobell, and Harry Gold were convicted of conspiring to procure national defense secrets

for Russia. These persons had shared with the scientists one common bond -- communism.

There is no abatement in the attack. I can tell you that scientific research, the intelligence and counterintelligence agencies of our Government, our vital facilities, and our national defense establishments are at the present time espionage targets of the first order. Repeated efforts are being made to hit these targets.

Renewed Vitality and Determination

The tactical emphasis put on unchanged communist doctrine at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has given new vitality and determination to the Communist Party, USA. This Twentieth Congress, held February 14-26, 1956, among other things, downgraded the unpopular Joseph Stalin and upgraded V. I. Lenin who has been dead since 1924 -- long enough to give him some degree of popularity with those who never suffered under his dictatorship. This Congress talked about collective leadership, "peaceful coexistence," parliamentary procedures, increased trade with noncommunist nations, cultural exchanges, and a relaxation of dictatorial measures. The Congress said this was Leninism; that communists everywhere must and will return to Leninism. N. S. Khrushchev advised: "We must be guided by these wise injunctions of Lenin in all our

activity." D. T. Shepilov concluded his speech at the Congress with these ringing words:

"Leninism has become the battle standard of our time, the ideology of hundreds of millions of people, a great prime mover of the masses of the people..."

Speech by D. T. Shepilov
Booklet No. 10, p. 18
Report of the Central Committee
Communist Party of the Soviet Union

The Communist Party, USA, sees in this development an opportunity to end its present relative isolation from the American masses. The Party sees in this "new look" and old tactic the best opportunity to propagandize, divide, confuse, and weaken the American people that it has had since it formed the united front against fascism in the middle and late thirties. The Party sees in it the most subtle and effective "line" it has had to work with since its origin in 1919, for now it can bask in some degree of "respectability" for having denounced Stalin along with the rest of us. This is why the Party, on recovering from its initial uncertainty, has received renewed vitality and determination from the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Party is so confident in the outcome of its long-range plans for continued attacks against American society that it may either change its name or start a new organization better suited to the new tactical emphasis and better able to circumvent all

legislation now hampering its progress in subversion.

Eugene Dennis, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA, is quick to hold high and proclaim the Leninist line of the Twentieth Congress, saying:

"The liberating teachings of Lenin have already triumphed in one third of the globe."

"The U.S. A. and Khrushchev's Special Report"
Daily Worker, June 18, 1956, p. 2

We see why, then, the Communist Party, USA, is so enthusiastic about this return to Leninism. But, what is Leninism? It has been called Czarism in overalls. It is this and much more. The meaning of Leninism is the very crux of all our present day discussion on the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its repercussions on the Communist Party, USA.

The real meaning of Leninism is a matter of record. V. I. Lenin was a man of militant action. He taught that in militant action truth must be concealed and that flexibility, subterfuges, zigzags, compromises, and retreats are essential to the advancement of communism throughout the world. He said plainly that communist leaders who were unable to tack, maneuver, concede temporarily, and compromise in order to avoid disadvantageous conflicts were good for nothing. The task, said Lenin, was not to renounce

compromises when they were necessary but to make them helpful and to remain true to the objective of a world communist society. Again and again, he reiterated this theme:

"... The strictest loyalty to the ideas of Communism must be combined with the ability to make all the necessary practical compromises, to tack, to make agreements, zigzags, retreats and so on. . . ."

Selected Works, Vol. X, p. 138
Vol. VI, p. 208

Lenin insisted that communists in all countries must understand the necessity of displaying the utmost flexibility in tactics. He called refusal on the part of communists to temporize, to maneuver, or to utilize conflict of interests, ridiculous in the extreme. For, he said:

"As long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live in peace: in the end, one or the other will triumph--a funeral dirge will be sung either over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism. This is a respite in war... From the point of view of the danger of a collision between capitalism and Bolshevism, it must be said that concessions are a continuation of the war, but in a different sphere.* Every step of the enemy will have to be watched. Every means of administration, surveillance, influence and authority will be required. And this is war..."*

Selected Works, V. I. Lenin, Vol. VIII, p. 297

This is precisely what the Communist Party, USA, understands by the term "Leninism." The Party is a combat Party at war with American society striving to establish here the dictatorship of the proletariat described in these words by Lenin:

* Underlining added for emphasis.

"Dictatorship is power based directly upon force and unrestricted by any laws.

"The revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is power won and maintained by the violence of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, power that is unrestricted by any laws."

Selected Works, V. I. Lenin, Vol. VII, p. 123

CONCLUSION

This, then, is Leninism. It is a militant, dynamic, revolutionary method of action. It is a materialistic, atheistic philosophy of life, equating man in essence with beasts of the field. Leninism reduces all history to acrimonious class struggle. It advocates multiple forms of revolution to subvert and topple over all noncommunist governments. It rejects all religion and all moral principles deduced from religious concepts. Leninism sets up as its goal a godless, classless, and stateless world communist society where all private property will be dissolved into the dust of collective ownership. It considers this goal attainable within the foreseeable future.

William Z. Foster, National Chairman of the Communist Party, USA, wrote a book in 1949 called The Twilight of World Capitalism. He dedicated this book as follows:

"To My Great-Grandson Joseph Manley Kolko Who Will Live
in a Communist United States"

This makes us all laugh. It is ludicrous. Yet, Mr. Foster and his fanatical followers believe this to be true. True or false, it does fill them with even greater zeal to drive on legally or illegally toward the Leninist goal.

It is this Leninist goal which puts American communists in conflict -- not only with the United States Government but with the fundamental values of western civilization as well. With unrelenting treachery, deceit, ruthlessness, and tenacity of purpose, communists everywhere press on toward the alluring mirage. Their national and international organizations dovetail and synchronize into a flexible, conspiratorial, global pattern of action. Every Communist Party has its own assignments for attacking the economic, political, cultural, and national defense areas of its own country.

These assignments in 1956, taken as a whole, form the daily far-flung world battle lines of ideas which separate the communists from the noncommunists.

It is this battle line which separates the enchained, enslaved communist idea of dialectical materialism from the free, democratic idea of the sovereign spirit.

The stakes are high. The stakes are no more or no less than the possession of the soul of man and the conquest of the world.

This is the real meaning of Leninism; the meaning of communist attacks against American society.

This is the challenge which American communists hurl with utter contempt into the face of us who participate today in Operation Alert, 1956.

This is the challenge which we have together accepted.

This is the challenge which we must together meet -- and meet successfully -- or perish.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

7/3

1956

TO ✓

☒ Director
☒ Mr. Tolson, 5744
☐ Mr. Boardman, 5736
☐ Mr. Belmont, 1742
☐ Mr. Mason, 5256
☐ Mr. Mohr, 5517
☐ Mr. Parsons, 7621
☐ Mr. Rosen, 5706
☐ Mr. Tamm, 4130 IB
☐ Mr. Sizoo, 1742

☐ Mr. Nichols, 5640
☐ Mr. McGuire, 5642
☐ Mr. Wick, 5634
☐ Mr. DeLoach, 5636
☐ Mr. Morgan, 5226

☐ Mr. Jones, 4236
☐ Mr. Leonard, 6222 IB
☐ Mr. Waikart, 7204
☐ Mr. Eames, 7206
☐ Mr. Wherry, 5537

☐ Mr. Nease, 5744
☐ Miss Gandy, 5633
☐ Mr. Holloman, 5633

☐ Records Section
☐ Pers. Records, 6631
☐ Reading Room, 5531
☐ Mail Room, 5533
☐ Teletype, 5644
☐ Code Room, 4642
☐ Mechanical, B-114
☐ Supply Room, B-216
☐ Tour Room, 5226

☐ Miss Lurz
☐ Miss Mathers
☐ Miss Carter
☐ Mrs. Faber
☐ Miss McCord
☐ Miss Loper
☐ Miss Price
☐ Miss Gibson

☐ See Me

☐ For Your Info

☐ For appropriate action

☐ Note & Return

Looks O. K. but should be prepared with

both outline and manuscript. Don't see

how Dir could use manuscript at

presentation.

RECORDED - 52

SEP 18 1956

L.B. Nichols
Room 5640, Ext. 691

Mr. Tolson ✓
 Mr. Nichols ✓
 Mr. Boardman ✓
 Mr. Belmont ✓
 Mr. Mason ✓
 Mr. Mohr ✓
 Mr. Parsons ✓
 Mr. Rosen ✓
 Mr. Tamm ✓
 Mr. Nease ✓
 Mr. Winterrowd ✓
 Tele. Room ✓
 Mr. Holloman ✓
 Miss Gandy ✓
 W.C. Sullivan

126
SEP 19 1956

CLEVELAND
 CRIMINAL
 LIAISON

(Buplan) Emergency Headquarters For S.O.C.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: July 16, 1956

FROM : L. B. Nichols *LBN*SUBJECT: *Plan* Emergency Headquarters for S.O.C.

Tolson	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Nichols	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Boardman	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Belmont	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Mason	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mohr	<input type="checkbox"/>
Parsons	<input type="checkbox"/>
Rosen	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tamm	<input type="checkbox"/>
Nease	<input type="checkbox"/>
Winterrowd	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tele. Room	<input type="checkbox"/>
Holloman	<input type="checkbox"/>
Gandy	<input type="checkbox"/>

With regard to the attached material for the Director's use in the suggested speech to the press during Operation Alert, I frankly am at a loss to know how we can prepare precisely at this point a statement which would be proper for the Director to make. I think the attached data is very good; I think it covers the general field of activity. I suspect that what is wanted, however, would be a statement to the press on Operation Alert. I think we should feel our way and, as soon as the operation gets started, begin compiling material which would be timely and relate to the operation itself which could be used to supplement the attached.

cc - Mr. Boardman

cc - Mr. Belmont

LBN:rm

(4)

RECORDED - 52

66-17381-1721

SEP 19 1956

TOLSON

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: September 10, 1956

FROM : R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - RELOCATION SITES

Buplon Emergency Headquarters For J.O.B.

On 9/5/56 colored charts entitled RELOCATION SITES, Key Agencies dated August 27, 1956 were distributed as follows:

Director's office	- 2	
Mr. Nichol's office	- 1	
Mr. Boardman's office	- 1	
Mr. Belmont's office	- 1	b7E
	- 1	

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

These ~~TOP SECRET~~ charts show the geographical relocation site of the key agencies with which we normally do business.

ACTION:

For information.

JEM:plp
(4)

1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Section Tickler
 1 - Mr. McArdle

RECORDED

66-17381-1722

18 SEP 14 1956

LIAISON

170
59 SEP 19 1956

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *8/29/56*

DATE: August 23, 1956

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1956

(FINAL REPORT OF INSPECTION GROUP)

Boyleyn Emergency Headquarters For S.O.G.

By memorandum 8-17-56, ODM submitted 2 copies of Inspector Boyleyn's report of Bureau participation in Operation Alert 1956 and the final report of the ODM Inspection Group.

Mr. Boyleyn's report disclosed that the conduct of the exercise by the FBI was outstanding in that it revealed the Bureau can operate with a high degree of efficiency from its relocation site and is in an immediate state of readiness should an emergency arise. He points out that last year's exercise was successful, that Operation Alert 1956 represents improvement in the manner in which field offices participated, in the elimination of a communications backlog and the general ease with which problems were handled at the relocation site. Mr. Boyleyn points out that the FBI's relocation needs are thoroughly developed, that emergency operations and programs are spelled out in detail including delegation of authority and succession in command, that a versatile communications system has been established, that the relocation site is in a continual state of readiness and provides excellent accommodations, that adequate supplies and equipment are maintained at the site and that the 52 field offices have established a relocation site.

The ODM inspection group report found that all 42 agencies participating in Operation Alert 1956 showed marked improvement over the previous exercise although there was need for clarification of responsibility between certain agencies. Namely, ODM and FCDA and Department of Interior and Federal Power Commission. The Justice Department was one of 8 agencies which were considered to have carried out their over-all administration and logistics responsibilities of the exercise in an outstanding manner.

The ODM inspection group report sets forth 13 recommendations covering delegations of authority, permanent staffs at relocation site, adequate provisions for relocatees to proceed to relocation site during off-duty hours, provisions for evacuation of families of relocatees, transportation of key officials, availability of records and equipment,

Enclosure

RECORDED - 27

66-17381-1727

11 SEP 17 1956

SENT DIRECTOR

8-24-56

JEM;men (8)

- 1 - Mr. Nichols
- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Section Tickler
- 1 - Mr. McArdle

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont

simplification of communication procedures, keeping of employees informed of developments during emergency operations, clarification of responsibilities between agencies, consideration of declassification of relocation sites of nonsensitive agencies, arrangements for early deputizing persons not in Federal service at the time of emergency, and adequacy of support required, such as emergency generators and adequate communication facilities. Other recommendations have to do with staffing needs at relocation site, maintenance of a current roster of personnel designated for relocation and assurance that all designated relocatees have knowledge of the manner in which they are to respond to a surprise emergency. The problem of funds for the exercises as well as for all necessary expenditures involved in preparation of relocation are to be considered. It is also recommended that agencies whose primary responsibilities are foreign rather than domestic should be relocated at the State Department in order to facilitate over-all operations.

None of the foregoing recommendations create problems for the FBI; each of them have been previously considered by this Bureau and appropriate plans have been made to carry out the above recommendations where they pertain to FBI operations.

It should be noted, however, that certain recommendations do not apply to FBI operations. The recommendation relative to declassifying relocation sites applies primarily to the nonsensitive agencies. The FBI being a sensitive agency maintains a secret classification on its relocation site. It is not believed that this classification should be reduced. This Bureau does not plan to deputize persons not now in Federal employment to carry out Bureau responsibilities. Therefore no problem is involved in this recommendation. Similarly we have no primary responsibilities in the foreign field and, therefore, there is no need to relocate the FBI with the Department of State. A Bureau liaison representative will be stationed with the State Department to handle any Bureau problems. We have found no need to publish a daily news letter relative to exercise developments in order to keep our relocatees interested in their work while at the relocation site as is indicated in recommendation 6 of the ODM report.

Recommendation 13 suggests that the problem of funds for the exercise as well as for all necessary expenditures in preparing for relocation should be considered. Operation Alert 1956 cost the Bureau slightly more than \$55,000, all of which is being absorbed in our current budget. To date we have not found it necessary to refrain from purchasing or installing necessary equipment at the relocation site because of finances. Bureau emergency planning has previously covered all the pertinent recommendations set forth by the ODM inspection Group.

ACTION:

For information

Would like breakdown of this cost. H.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: August 28, 1956

FROM : J. P. MOHR

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS
OPERATION ALERT 1956Poplin Emergency Headquarters For S.O.C.

Reference is made to the attached memorandum from Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont dated August 23, 1956, the last paragraph of which indicates that Operation Alert 1956 cost the Bureau slightly more than \$55,000. The Director noted in connection therewith "I would like breakdown of this cost. H."

There is set forth below a tabulation reflecting the breakdown of this cost:

ESTIMATED COST OF OPERATION ALERT 1956

	Seat of Government	Field	Total
Salaries	\$11,525.47	\$35,792.16	\$47,317.63
Other Expenses:			
Travel	1,890.60	2,120.81	4,011.41
Transportation of Things	---	105.96	105.96
Communication Services	1,126.65	902.76	2,029.41
Rents and Utilities	---	94.64	94.64
Other Contractual Services	---	1,283.10	1,283.10
Supplies	---	182.00	182.00
Total Other Expenses	\$ 3,017.25	\$ 4,689.27	\$ 7,706.52
Total All Expenses	\$14,542.72	\$40,481.43	\$55,024.15

Enclosure
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(9)

SENT DIRECTOR
8-28-56

RECORDED - 27

66-17381-1728

SEP 17 1956

must have a more
detailed breakdown of
above.

BUPLANS - EMERGENCY HEADQUARTERS FOR S.O.G. 66-17381
SUBJECT FILE NO.

FOLLOWING SERIALS REMOVED FROM FILE AND
DESTROYED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AUTHORITY
CONTAINED IN 66-17380 - 1717

1699 thru 1700

1716

1723 thru 1726

10/2/69 #10

DATE _____

INITIALS _____